The Afghan war began 1979 1989. History. Combined-arms operations to capture fortified areas

Soviet war in Afghanistan e lasted 9 years 1 month and 18 days.

The date: 979-1989

Place: Afghanistan

Outcome: The overthrow of H. Amin, the withdrawal of Soviet troops

Enemies: USSR, DRA against - Afghan Mujahideen, Foreign Mujahideen

With the support of : Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, USA, UK, Iran

Side forces

USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel

DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to the NVO, no more than 300 thousand

From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a prolonged political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of the Afghan society sympathizing with them, with political and financial support foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. friendly regime in Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging special unit of the KGB "Vympel" killed the incumbent President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the protege of the USSR, the former Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, B. Karmal, became the new leader of Afghanistan, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support Soviet Union.

Chronology of the Soviet war in Afghanistan

1979

December 25 - Columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.

1980

January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.

February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the movement of oncoming columns in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred, a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated.

March - the first major offensive operation of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar Offensive.

April 20-24 - Massive anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jets.

April - The US Congress authorizes $15 million in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition. The first military operation in Panjshir.

June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.

1981

September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in the province of Farah; the death of Major General Khakhalov.

October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 Special Forces) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").

December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).

1982

November 3 - Tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of the explosion of a fuel tanker. (Already during the years of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from advancing to the north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).

November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Ziyaul-Khak in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the question of the expediency of the war and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

1983

January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.

February 2 - The village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.

March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Y. Andropov. He thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.

April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."

July - Dushman offensive on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.

August - the hard work of the mission of D. Cordoves to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the war in Afghanistan is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of the Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".

Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.

1984

January 16 - Dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

April 30 - During a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.

October - over Kabul from the Strela MANPADS, dushmans shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft.

1985

April 26 - Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war revolt in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.

June - army operation in Panjshir.

Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".

Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of basic base areas in hard-to-reach places of the country has begun.

1986

February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.

March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to start deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahiddins of the Stinger MANPADS of the ground-to-air class, which makes the combat aviation of the 40th Army vulnerable to ground attack.

April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the dushmans. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.

May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence service KhAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.

July 28 - M. Gorbachev defiantly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7 thousand people). Late term the output will be moved. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.

August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.

Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.

October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.

November 13 - The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.

December — an emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

1987

January 2 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.

February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.

February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.

March - Operation Thunderstorm in the province of Ghazni. Operation Circle in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.

May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul. Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.

Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.

1988

Soviet spetsnaz group preparing for operation in Afghanistan

April 14 - Through the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

June 24 - Opposition detachments captured the center of the province of Wardak - the city of Maidanshahr.

1989

February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant-General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu-Darya (the city of Termez).

War in Afghanistan - results

Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in the war in Afghanistan:

I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.

The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.

The Mujahideen, before the start of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to take a single big city.

Military casualties in Afghanistan

USSR: 15,031 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing

1979 - 86 people

1980 - 1,484 people

1981 - 1,298 people

1982 - 1,948 people

1983 - 1,448 people

1984 - 2,343 people

1985 - 1,868 people

1986 - 1,333 people

1987 - 1,215 people

1988 - 759 people

1989 - 53 people

By rank:
Generals, officers: 2,129
Ensigns: 632
Sergeants and soldiers: 11,549
Workers and employees: 139

Out of 11,294 people 10,751 people discharged from military service for health reasons remained disabled, of which - 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people

Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)

Losses in technology

According to official data, there were 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, no information was published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

For more than 30 years after the Second World War, the Soviet Union was at peace, not taking part in any major military conflicts. So, Soviet military advisers and soldiers participated in wars and conflicts, but they did not take place on the territory of the USSR and, in terms of the scope of participation of Soviet citizens in them, they were essentially insignificant. Thus, the Afghan war became the largest armed conflict since 1945, in which Soviet soldiers and officers took part.

Historical background

Since the 19th century, a peaceful struggle has been going on between the Russian and British empires, aimed at expanding the sphere of influence in the Central Asian region. At the same time, Russia's efforts were aimed at annexing the lands that lay along its southern outskirts (Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara), and Great Britain - at the colonization of India. It was here that already in 1885 the interests of both powers clashed for the first time. However, things did not come to a war, and the parties continued to colonize the lands that were in their spheres of influence. At the same time, Afghanistan was the cornerstone in relations between Russia and Britain, a very advantageous position that would allow for decisive control over the region. At the same time, the country remained neutral, extracting its own benefits from this situation.

Afghan war

The first attempt by the British crown to subjugate Afghanistan was made back in 1838-1842. Then the British expeditionary forces stumbled upon the stubborn resistance of the troops of the Afghan emirate, as well as guerrilla warfare. The result was the victory of Afghanistan, the preservation of its independence and the withdrawal of British troops from the country. Nevertheless, the presence of Britain in the Central Asian region has increased.

The next attempt by the British to take control of Afghanistan was a war that lasted from 1878 to 1880. During this war, the British troops again suffered a series of defeats from the Afghan army, however, the Afghan army, in turn, was defeated. As a result, Afghanistan became a British protectorate, and the southern part of the country was annexed to British India.

However, this state of affairs was temporary. The freedom-loving Afghans did not want to remain under the control of the British, and discontent quickly and massively matured in the country. However, Afghanistan had a real chance to free itself from the British protectorate only after the First World War. In February 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the throne in Afghanistan. He was supported by representatives of the "Young Afghans" and the army, who wanted to finally get rid of the oppression of the British. Already upon accession to the throne, Amanullah Khan announced the independence of the country from Britain, which caused the invasion of British troops. The 50,000-strong Afghan army was quickly defeated, but a powerful national movement practically nullified the military victories of the British. Already in August 1919, a peace treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and Great Britain, according to which Afghanistan became a completely independent state, and its border ran along the Durand line (the modern Afghan-Pakistani border).

In foreign policy, the focus on the young Soviet state became the most obvious. So, Soviet military instructors arrived here, which made it possible to create a fairly combat-ready Air Force, and also participated in hostilities against Afghan rebels.

However, the north of Afghanistan became a refuge for the mass migration of residents of Soviet Central Asia who did not want to accept the new government. Basmachi detachments were also formed here, which then carried out partisan attacks on the territory of the USSR. At the same time, the financing of the armed groups was carried out by Great Britain. In this regard, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to Amanullah Khan, after which the channels of British assistance to the Basmachi were significantly suppressed.

However, in Afghanistan itself, things were far from calm. Already in the autumn of 1928, an uprising broke out in the east of the country by a new pretender to the throne, Khabibullah, who also received support from Great Britain. As a result, Amanullah Khan was forced to flee to Kandahar, and Khabibullah seized power. The result of this was the complete immersion of Afghanistan into the abyss of anarchy, when absolutely everything was subjected to pogroms: schools, hospitals, villages.

Thus, by April 1929, a difficult situation had developed: the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, was in Kandahar, forming an army of people loyal to him. Khabibullah was in Kabul, who continued to impose the cruel laws of Islamic fundamentalism. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to help the legitimate leader of Afghanistan regain power in the country. On April 15, Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet military attache V. Primakov crossed the border of Afghanistan and began active hostilities against the supporters of Khabibullah. Events from the very first days developed unequivocally in favor of the Red Army, and the number of losses correlated approximately 1:200 in its favor. However, the successes of the operation, achieved in a month and a half, were nullified by the flight of Amanullah Khan to India and the cessation of his struggle for power. After that, the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from the country.

In 1930, the Red Army again undertook a campaign on the territory of Afghanistan in order to defeat the Basmachi gangs based there and destroy their economic bases and supply bases. However, the Basmachi did not accept the battle and retreated to the central regions of the country, which made the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan not only inexpedient, but also diplomatically dangerous. In this regard, the Red Army left the country.

In Afghanistan itself, the civil war subsided only at the end of 1929, when Khabibullah was overthrown by Nadir Shah (the latter became the king of Afghanistan). After that, the country continued to develop, albeit extremely slowly. Relations with the Soviet Union were quite close, thanks to which the country had many benefits from this, mainly of an economic nature.

At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, popular democratic movements began to emerge in Afghanistan, including the Marxist one. So, the ideological inspirer and leader of the Marxist movement was Nur Mohammed Taraki, a magazine poet. It was he who, on January 1, 1965, announced the creation of the PDPA - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, the composition of the party was heterogeneous - it included both people from the lower strata of society, and from the middle and even upper ones. This inevitably led to a conflict within the party and led to its split already in 1967, when two branches were formed at once: Khalq (People, the most radical faction) and Parcham (Banner, a moderate faction represented mainly by intellectuals).

Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973, when the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud led an anti-monarchist coup and did not come to power as prime minister as a result. The change in the form of government had practically no effect on Soviet-Afghan relations, since Mohammed Daoud continued to maintain close relations with the USSR. The name of the country changed to the Republic of Afghanistan.

Over the next five years, Mohammed Daoud took steps to modernize the Afghan industry and the state as a whole, but his steps did not actually have any results. By 1978, the situation in the country was such that almost all segments of the population were opposed to the vain prime minister. The severity of the political situation can be indicated by the fact that already in 1976 both factions of the PDPA - Khalq and Parcham - agreed on cooperation against the dictatorship of Daoud.

The revolution and the assassination of Mohammed Daoud, which took place on April 28, 1978 under the leadership of the PDPA and the army, became a milestone in the history of the country. Now a regime has been established in Afghanistan that is very similar and akin to the Soviet one, which could not but cause further rapprochement between the two countries. As in the USSR, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the PDPA Nur Mohammed Taraki, who was the leader of the Khalq faction, became the head of state. The name of the state changed to "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".

Beginning of the civil war

However, Afghanistan was still not calm. First of all, after the April (or Saur) revolution, the struggle between the factions of the PDPA intensified. Since it was the “Khalk” wing that received the leading position in the government, the gradual removal of the “Parchamists” from the levers of power began. Another process was the departure from Islamic traditions in the country, the opening of schools, hospitals and factories. Also, an important decree was the gratuitous allocation of land to peasants.

However, all these measures, which were aimed at improving life and thus gaining the support of the people, led in the main to diametrically opposite results. The formation of armed opposition groups began, consisting mainly of peasants, which, in principle, is not surprising. People who have lived for hundreds of years Islamic traditions and those who lost them overnight simply could not accept it. Also dissatisfied with the actions of the Afghan government army, which often, in the fight against the rebels, attacked peaceful villages whose inhabitants were not connected with the opposition.

In 1978, a civil war began, which, in fact, continues in Afghanistan to this day. At its early stage, this war was fought between the Afghan government and armed rebels - the so-called "dushmans". However, in 1978, the actions of the rebels were still insufficiently coordinated and consisted mainly of attacks on Afghan military units and shelling of columns. There were also strikes on party functionaries, but this mainly concerned lower-level party representatives.

However, the main signal that the armed opposition was ripe and ready for decisive action was the uprising in the large city of Herat, which broke out in March 1979. At the same time, there was a real danger of capturing the city, since the Afghan government army was very reluctant to fight against its compatriots, and there were frequent cases of government soldiers going over to the side of the rebels.

It was in this connection that real panic began among the Afghan leadership. It became clear that with the loss of such a large administrative center as Herat, the position of the government would be seriously shaken. A long series of negotiations began between the Afghan and Soviet leadership. In these negotiations, the Afghan government asked to send Soviet troops to help suppress the rebellion. However, the Soviet leadership clearly understood that the intervention of the Soviet Armed Forces in the conflict would only lead to a worsening of the situation, including the international one.

Ultimately, the Afghan government army managed to cope with the Herat rebellion, but the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. It became clear that a civil war was already in full swing in the country. Thus, the Afghan government army was drawn into battles with rebel gangs that controlled mainly rural and mountainous areas. The "people's" Afghan authorities managed to control only a number of large cities (and even then not always completely).

In the same vein, Nur Mohammad Taraki's popularity in Afghanistan began to decline, while his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, was rapidly gaining political weight. Amin was a rather tough politician who believed that only by military means could order be restored to the country.

Undercover intrigues in the Afghan government led to the fact that in mid-September 1979, Nur Mohammad Taraki was removed from all his posts and expelled from the PDPA. The reason for this was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Prime Minister Amin, when he arrived at the residence of Taraki for negotiations. This attempt (or a provocation, because there is still no sufficient evidence that Mohammad Taraki himself was involved in the attempt) made him a clear enemy of Amin, which sentenced the first to death. Taraki was killed in October 1979, and his family and friends were taken to the Puli-Charkhi prison.

Having become the ruler of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin began to purge both the ranks of the clergy and the rival faction - Parcham.

The decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan and the liquidation of Amin

At the same time, Amin realized that he could no longer cope with the rebels on his own. Increasingly, there were cases of transition of soldiers and officers from the Afghan government army to the ranks of the Mujahideen. The only deterrent in the Afghan units were Soviet military advisers, who sometimes prevented such incidents by the force of their authority and character. In the course of numerous negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, having weighed all the pros and cons, at its meeting on December 12, 1979, decided to send a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan.

Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan since July 1979, when a battalion of the 111th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division was deployed to Bagram (a city about 60 km from Kabul, also a major air base in the country). The duties of the battalion were to control and protect the Bagram airfield, where they landed and from which Soviet aircraft took off with supplies for the Afghan leadership. On December 14, 1979, a battalion from the 345th separate airborne regiment arrived here as reinforcements. Also on December 20, the Soviet “Muslim Battalion” was transferred to Kabul, which received this name because of the configuration exclusively by Soviet military personnel from the Central Asian republics. This battalion was included in the security brigade of Amin's palace, allegedly to strengthen the security of the Afghan leader. But few people knew that the Soviet party leadership decided to "remove" the too impulsive and obstinate leader of Afghanistan.

There are many versions of why it was decided to remove Hafizulu Amin and put Babrak Karmal in his place, but there is no consensus on this matter. It is likely that after restoring order in Afghanistan with the help of Soviet troops, Amin would become too independent, which, with his close contacts with the United States, threatened the Soviet presence in the country. In the event that the United States of America received an ally in the person of Amin, the threat to the southern borders of the USSR would become clear. Also, do not forget that Amin, with his wide-ranging repressions and the murder of Nur Mohammad Taraki, managed to short term turn against themselves not only the lower strata of Afghan society (who, however, were in their majority in opposition to the regime), but also the Afghan elite. Having concentrated great power in his hands, he was not going to share it with anyone. It would be unreasonable for the Soviet leadership to rely on such a leader, to put it mildly.

By December 25, 1979, two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, two motorized rifle regiments, 2 aviation regiments of fighter-bombers, 2 helicopter regiments, one aviation fighter regiment, airborne -assault brigade and logistics units. Additionally, as a reserve, three more divisions were formed and manned according to the states of wartime. All these troops were part of the 40th Combined Arms Army, which was to enter Afghanistan.

The staffing of the troops was carried out mainly by reservists - residents of the Central Asian republics, called up for military training. So, for example, in the 201st motorized rifle division, whose task was to march and take up positions in the area of ​​​​the city of Kunduz, about half of the personnel were represented by reservists. All this, of course, had a negative impact on the combat training of the units, but given that the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities was not planned, then such a “demonstration of force” made its own sense.

Already on December 25, the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) into Afghanistan began. The units of the 108th motorized rifle division, as well as units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, were the first to enter the territory of Afghanistan, which were landed in Kabul by landing method. Also on that day, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion of the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade entered the country, tasked with guarding the strategically important tunnel at the Salang Pass.

In the period from December 25 to December 31, 1979, almost all units of the 40th Army, which were intended for this, entered the territory of Afghanistan.

As of March 1980, the deployment of units of the 40th Army had the following form:

Kabul - 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division.

Bagram - 345th separate airborne regiment.

Herat - 101st motorized rifle regiment of the 5th motorized rifle division.

Shindand - 5th motorized rifle division.

Kunduz - 201st motorized rifle division and 56th separate air assault brigade.

Kandahar - 70th separate motorized rifle brigade.

Jalalabad - 66th separate motorized rifle brigade.

Ghazni - 191st separate motorized rifle regiment.

Puli-Khumri - 395th motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.

Khanabad - 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.

Faizabad - 860th separate motorized rifle regiment.

Jabal-Ussaraj - 177th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.

Aviation units were based at the airfields: Bagram, Kunduz, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Ghazni and Gardez.

On December 27, 1979, the forces of the Alpha group in the residence of Amin carried out an operation to eliminate the obstinate leader. As a result, Hafizula Amin was eliminated, and on the night of December 28, the new ruler of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, arrived in Kabul. On the same night (from December 27 to 28), Soviet troops, mainly with the forces of the 103rd Airborne Division, occupied a number of important buildings in the Afghan capital and established complete control over them.

Start of the war (1979-1982)

The first losses of the OKSV in Afghanistan began to bear back in December 1979. So, on December 25, when landing at the Kabul airfield, an Il-76 with paratroopers of the 103rd Airborne Division crashed into a mountain. Dozens of soldiers and officers died as a result.

Already from the very first days of the stay of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, our units began to be drawn into hostilities, which at first were of an exclusively episodic nature. So, on January 11, 1980, units of the 186th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stormed the village of Nakhrin not far from Baghlan, suppressing the rebellion of the Afghan artillery regiment. At the same time, the losses during the operation were extremely low (two wounded and two killed, with about 100 Afghans killed).

It is noteworthy that the nature of the first military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was rather the suppression of the uprisings of the Afghan units than the battles with the dushmans, whose detachments were still essentially being created and formed. Also, the tasks of the Soviet units at that time included maintaining control over a number of large settlements in the country, disarming deserters and arranging life.

The first clash of Soviet troops with dushmans was the Kunar operation, which was carried out from late February to mid-March 1980. During this operation, three Soviet battalions carried out a raid against bandit formations in the province of the same name. As a result, having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, our troops lost 52 people killed.

From the beginning of the spring of 1980, the war in Afghanistan unfolded in full. To ensure control over a number of areas, as well as to reduce the effectiveness of the actions of the rebels, Soviet military units began to be regularly involved in military operations, often in cooperation with the Afghan army ("green") or Afghan units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ("tsaranda"). The combat effectiveness of the Afghan government army (unlike the Mujahideen) was at a very low level, which was explained by the unwillingness of ordinary Afghans to fight for what they themselves did not really know.

Although the effectiveness of OKSVA's actions was quite high, losses also increased sharply with an increase in the intensity of hostilities. Naturally, this was hushed up in the official Soviet press, which stated that "Soviet troops are in Afghanistan for maneuvers, as well as to provide international assistance to the fraternal people, which consists in the construction of hospitals, houses and schools."

By the middle of 1980, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a number of tank and anti-aircraft units, which were not needed in the conditions of guerrilla warfare. However, at the same time, the question of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was postponed. It became clear that the Soviet Army was "bogged down" in Afghanistan, and this fact simply could not go unnoticed by the CIA. It was 1980 that marked the beginning of cooperation between the American intelligence services and the Afghan Mujahideen.

1981 for OKSVA is characterized by further intensification of hostilities. During the first half of the year, Soviet troops fought the rebels mainly in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, but already in May the situation in the central region of the country, near Kabul, escalated. Here, actions were intensified by the group of Ahmad Shah Masud, whose fiefdom was the Panjshir Gorge, thanks to which he received the title of "Lion of Panjshir". The purpose of the actions of his grouping was to expand the area of ​​​​control, as well as to pin down Soviet troops in order to prevent their penetration into Panjshir.

Nevertheless, by August 1981, four combined-arms operations had already been carried out by Soviet troops in the Panjshir Gorge. However, as in previous times, Soviet troops occupied the territory of the gorge, destroyed part of the enemy’s manpower and ammunition depots, but could not stay here for a long time - difficulties in supplying them far from the places of permanent deployment of units, as well as the fact that dushmans in such a "deaf" area they acted exceptionally boldly. The effectiveness of the Panjshir operations was seriously reduced by the fact that the rebels left the gorge ahead of time, leaving only barriers from small detachments and mining the paths.

By the end of 1981, it became clear that the Dushmans, having an inexhaustible stream of volunteers and supplies from Pakistan, could fight for as long as they wanted. It was for this purpose that the 56th separate airborne assault brigade was deployed from Kunduz to block the mountain paths in the southeast, to the city of Gardez, the capital of the province of Paktia. In addition, the actions of other Soviet units near the southern border of Afghanistan intensified. Indeed, already in the first months of 1982, it was possible to significantly reduce the flow of reinforcements and supplies for the Mujahideen from Pakistan. However, in the following months, due to the intensification of dushman activities in other parts of the country, the situation practically returned to its initial state. Most bright episode, testifying to the increased combat capabilities of the rebels, was the encirclement of an entire battalion (4th airborne assault) of the 56th airborne assault brigade in the Aliheil area. Only thanks to the energetic actions of the brigade leadership, as well as the competent interaction of the military branches (aviation, landing and artillery), the battalion was released with relatively small losses.

The war goes on (1982-1987)

The year 1982 was also marked by a major tragedy at the strategically important for the whole of Afghanistan tunnel through the Salang pass. In November, there was a sabotage action dushman, which consisted in the fact that the exit from one side of the tunnel was blocked by their cars.

As a result of this action, 64 people died Soviet soldiers as well as more than 100 Afghans, including civilians. The rebels, in pursuit of momentary success, did not even stop at the murder of their compatriots, Afghan women and children.

At the end of the same 1982, a meeting was held in Moscow between the President of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq, and the head of the USSR, Yuri Andropov. During the meeting, the conditions for terminating the provision of assistance by Pakistan to the Afghan rebels, as well as the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, were discussed.

During 1983, Soviet troops in Afghanistan continued to carry out operations against armed opposition groups. However, this period is characterized by an increased intensity of hostilities in the area of ​​the Soviet-Afghan border (Marmol operation), as well as the completion of the fighting in the Panjshir Gorge by signing a truce with the armed forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Detachment 177, located in the gorge special purpose according to the results, it was withdrawn from it after 8 months of intense hostilities.

In April, in the province of Nimroz, a large fortified area of ​​the militants Rabati-Jali was defeated. This fortified area also had the functions of a transshipment base for the transport of drugs. After its destruction, the rebels' economic base suffered significant damage, not to mention the fact that they lost a powerful base capable of passing a large number of militants from Iran and Pakistan.

Another "hot" point in the far from calm Afghanistan in the summer of 1983 was the city of Khost, located in the southeast of the country, almost right next to the border of Pakistan. It was on him that the dushmans launched an offensive in July. Their plan was simple: to capture the city and make it the capital of the "rebellious" areas. Taking Khost would allow them to gain recognition in the world.

However, the stubborn defense of Khost made adjustments to the plans of the leadership of the Afghan opposition. Unable to take the city immediately, it was decided to take it into the blockade ring. But this plan also failed. Soviet troops, with massive support from aviation and artillery, managed to thwart an attempt to blockade the city.

The winter of 1983-1984 in the Afghan war is notable for the fact that during it the armed opposition groups did not leave the territory of Afghanistan for the first time, as was the case before. This became the reason for the aggravated situation in the area of ​​Kabul and Jalalabad, where the Mujahideen began equipping bases and fortified areas for a long-term guerrilla war.

It was in this connection that already at the beginning of 1984 it was decided that the Soviet troops would conduct Operation Veil. Its essence was to create a barrier line along the Afghan-Pakistani and partially Afghan-Iranian borders in order to prevent the supply of Mujahideen detachments and intercept caravans going to Afghanistan. Quite large forces were allocated for these purposes. total strength from 6 to 10 thousand people and a large number of aircraft and artillery.

But the operation ultimately did not achieve its goal, since it was almost impossible to completely close the border with Pakistan, especially with such limited, albeit mobile, forces. Only 15-20% of total number caravans from Pakistan.

The year 1984 is mainly characterized by hostilities against the newly created staging posts and fortified areas of dushmans in order to deprive them of long-term bases and ultimately reduce the intensity of their operations. At the same time, the Mujahideen were not only fighting, but also carried out a number of terrorist acts in the cities of the country, such as the explosion of a bus with passengers in Kabul in June of the same year.

In the second half of the 84th year, the rebels intensified in the area of ​​​​the city of Khost, in connection with which a large army operation was carried out here in November-December to escort columns and break through the orders of dushmans who were trying to take the city. As a result, the Mujahideen suffered heavy losses. It is worth noting, however, that the losses of the Soviet troops were very noticeable. Constant explosions on mines, which by 1984 on Afghan roads became almost 10 times more than in the initial period of the war, unexpected shelling of columns and Soviet units already exceeded in terms of losses the usual fire contacts with dushmans.

However, the situation as of January 1985 remained stable. The Afghan government, with the strong support of the Soviet Army, held Kabul and a number of provincial centers. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, "dominated" with might and main in rural and mountainous areas, having serious support among dehkans - Afghan peasants and receiving supplies from Pakistan.

It was with the aim of increasing the number of intercepted caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran that in the spring of 1985, the 15th and 22nd separate GRU special-purpose brigades were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan. Being divided into several detachments, they were dispersed throughout the country, from Kandahar to Jalalabad. Due to their mobility and exceptional combat capability, the special forces of the GRU General Staff managed to significantly reduce the number of caravans conducted from Pakistan, and also, as a result, seriously hit the supply of dushman in a number of areas.

Nevertheless, 1985 was marked primarily by large and bloody operations in the Panjshir Gorge, as well as in the Khost region and in the so-called "green zone" of a number of provinces. These operations ensured the defeat of a number of gangs, as well as the capture of a large number of weapons and ammunition. For example, in the province of Baghlan, serious losses were inflicted on the detachments of the field commander Said Mansur (he himself survived).

The year 1985 is also notable for the fact that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU took a course towards a political solution to the Afghan problem. New trends, caused by the young General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, came in handy in the Afghan issue, and already in February of the following year, 1986, the development of a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.

In 1986, the increased effectiveness of the actions of the Soviet troops against the bases and fortified areas of the Mujahideen was noted, as a result of which the following points were defeated: Karera (March, Kunar province), Javara (April, Khost province), Kokari-Sharshari ( August, Herat province). At the same time, a number of major operations were carried out (for example, in the north of the country, in the provinces of Kunduz and Balkh).

On May 4, 1986, at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, the former head of the Afghan security service (KHAD), was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new head of state announced a new - exclusively political - course towards solving intra-Afghan problems.

At the same time, M. Gorbachev announced the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan of a number of military units numbering up to 7 thousand people. However, the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan took place only 4 months later, in October. This move was rather psychological, aimed at showing the Western powers the readiness of the Soviet Union to resolve the Afghan issue by peaceful means. The fact that a number of withdrawn units practically did not participate in hostilities, and the personnel of a number of newly formed regiments consisted exclusively of soldiers who had served 2 years and were demobilized, did not bother anyone. That is why this step of the Soviet leadership was a very serious victory with minimal casualties.

Also important event that opened the page for a new, final period of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, was the proclamation by the Afghan government of a course towards national reconciliation. This course already provided for a ceasefire in January 15, 1987 unilaterally. However, the plans of the new Afghan leadership remained just plans. The Afghan armed opposition regarded this policy as a cause of weakness and stepped up efforts to fight against government troops throughout the country.

Final stage of the war (1987-1989)

The year 1987 is characterized by the complete failure of the policy of national reconciliation put forward by M. Najibullah. The rebels were not going to follow the example of government troops, and the fighting continued throughout the country. However, it was precisely from 1987 that the Soviet troops operated mainly through large-scale army operations, which were successful thanks to the competent interaction of all branches of the military. The largest operations during this period were: “Strike” (Kunduz province), “Thunderstorm” (Ghazni province), “Circle” (Logar and Kabul provinces), “South-87” (Kandahar province).

Separately, it is also worth mentioning the operation "Magistral" to release the city of Khost. It was this city that for more than 5 years was stubbornly defended by both Afghan and Soviet forces and, as a result, was still surrounded. However, the supply of the Khost garrison was carried out by air. The result of the operation "Magistral" was the complete release of the Gardez-Khost highway in January 1988 and the defeat of a number of rebel gangs.

April 14, 1988 in Geneva, the ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement on a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. The guarantors of these agreements were the USSR and the USA. In addition, the USSR pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan within 9 months. The United States and Pakistan pledged to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

The first period of withdrawal of the OKSV from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. During it, Soviet units were withdrawn from the Panjshir Gorge, Kunduz, Kandahar, Gardez and other points of the country. As a result, a kind of "vacuum" was initially formed, which was quickly filled by the rebels. Already in August-October, dushmans occupied a number of large settlements in Afghanistan, including Kunduz and Khanabad. The number of the limited contingent of Soviet troops was about half of what it was as of January 1, 1988 - 50 thousand people.

By November, the Afghan government army, with the support of Soviet troops, controlled only about 30% of the country's territory, while after the departure of the Soviet units, entire provinces came under the control of the rebels.

On November 15, the second and final stage withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. This period is characterized by a significantly reduced intensity of hostilities. The last operation for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was Operation Typhoon in the provinces of Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa. It was carried out at the request of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA M. Najibullah, who thus wanted to seriously weaken the forces of the rebels in the end before facing them one on one. Nevertheless, although the losses of dushmans were quite large, they were not critical, but this operation somewhat complicated the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan.

On February 15, 1989, the commander of the 40th Army, General B. Gromov, was the last to cross the bridge over the Pyanj border river, thereby completing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviet war in Afghanistan ended.

Side tactics

During the Afghan War, both sides widely used tactics that originated during the Second World War in Yugoslavia, and also developed in the wars for the freedom of Algeria and Vietnam. At the same time, the USSR, which previously supported the rebels who fought against the armies of the capitalist countries, now faced a serious guerrilla struggle itself.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet army had practically no experience in combating modern partisan movements, which caused a number of command errors and serious losses in the first operations. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops had good combat skills and seriously outnumbered the Afghan rebels technically, materially and morally.

A striking example of the initial period of hostilities of the Soviet army in Afghanistan was the capture of a bridge across the Kokcha River. This bridge was captured in late 1979 - early 1980 and was held by large forces of dushman (up to 1500 people). The Soviet forces consisted of up to 70 people (the 1st airborne company of the 1st airborne assault brigade of the 56th airborne assault brigade, reinforced with AGS-17 crews).

As a result of the battle, the Soviet troops drove the rebels from their positions and occupied the bridge, with losses of 7 dead and 10 wounded. Dushman losses were much greater. This operation was considered successful, and the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.P. Kozlov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the future, Soviet tactics were significantly developed and became more flexible. To defeat the bases of the Mujahideen, the Soviet units (usually at first no more than a battalion, divided into battle groups for ease of control, went out on a military operation) walked through the mountains or were delivered by helicopters. The firepower of combat groups almost always made it possible to suppress the firing points of dushmans, as well as to destroy their ambushes. In addition to small arms, combat groups were often reinforced by mortar and AGS crews. In rare cases, battle groups were even given SPTG calculations (mounted anti-tank grenade launchers), which usually practically did not participate in combat operations.

In cases where the enemy was hiding in villages or green zones, the Soviet units themselves or interacting with the "greens" (Afghan government army) carried out a "search" (search for dushmans on the territory) of a given area.

Parts of the special purpose of the GRU, used to intercept caravans, interacted more closely with aviation. Helicopters delivered them to ambush sites, from where they were already operating, intercepting, inspecting caravans, or eliminating them if necessary.

The supply of Soviet troops was carried out by means of columns marching along the Afghan roads with everything necessary. These columns are without fail, in addition to trucks, they were also equipped with military equipment (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and ZSU). However, with all precautions, dushman attacks on columns were a very frequent occurrence, and more and more broken and burned equipment became. Notorious throughout Afghanistan was the road near the village of Mukhamed-Aga in the province of Logar (the so-called "mukhamedka") - almost every column was fired upon here. It is noteworthy that the drivers of the cars in the columns had instructions - during the shelling, by increasing the speed, try to get out of the fire as soon as possible.

The Soviet army also massively used aircraft and artillery. If Vietnam became the “star” hour for American helicopters, then for the Soviet army aviation, it was the Afghan war that became such a time. The Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were not only mobile and reliable means of delivering personnel to the required areas, but also excellent means of supporting ground troops, as well as suppressing enemy firing points. In total, during the years of the Afghan war, the USSR lost 333 helicopters.

Dushman tactics consisted mainly in inflicting as much damage as possible on Soviet troops and actions on their communications, as well as (for example, near Khost in 1983-1988 or in general at the final stage of the war) in mastering settlements. Ambushes, attacks on columns, mining of mountain paths and even terrorist attacks in Kabul and other large cities - these measures had their results, albeit sometimes very doubtful. There were also frequent cases of the destruction of families by the Mujahideen, and even entire villages, in any way collaborating with the "infidels".

In the event that a group of dushmans was in danger, it easily dissolved in the mountains, which were native to the Afghans. However, the retreat was not always successful for the dushmans, and in such cases the group died or was captured.

At the beginning of the war (1979-1983), the Mujahideen, as a rule, went to spend the winter in Pakistan, where they had equipped field camps and bases. However, starting from 1983, they began to equip similar bases on the territory of Afghanistan, and often these bases were discovered and destroyed by Soviet troops. Replenishment in the ranks of the Mujahideen came mainly from the defeated villages or from deserted soldiers of the Afghan government army.

The results of the Afghan war and its significance

The result of the Afghan war was that the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, with the support of Soviet troops, was able to hold out much longer than it would have held out without it (the regime finally fell in 1992). However, at the same time, the confidence of the Afghan people in the PDPA was completely undermined, and therefore no political solution to intra-Afghan problems could be found.

The USSR, which was created near the southern border, somewhat fettered the Soviet forces, preventing them from effectively solving other foreign policy problems in the 1980s, such as, for example, the crisis in Poland. Ultimately, this circumstance seriously affected the balance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a consequence, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The American leadership, barely recovering from the Vietnam War, was interested in tying the USSR in Afghanistan, and therefore provided serious support to the Afghan rebels. However, in reality, the Afghan insurgency was little controlled, as a result of which, already in the mid-90s, it was completely discredited in the eyes of almost the whole world.

In military terms, the Soviet Army gained a very extensive experience in fighting partisans in mountainous areas, which, however, was little taken into account after 6 years - during the war in Chechnya. Nevertheless, OKSVA honorably fulfilled all the military tasks assigned to it, in the words of General B. Gromov, "returned to the Motherland in an organized manner."

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a prolonged political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of the Afghan society sympathizing with them, with political and financial support of foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.
The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. friendly regime in Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).
To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging special unit of the KGB "Vympel" killed the incumbent President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the protege of the USSR, the former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, B. Karmal, became the new leader of Afghanistan, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.

background
« Big game»
Afghanistan is located in the very center of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.
Since the beginning of the 19th century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan began between the Russian and British empires, called The Great Game.
Anglo-Afghan Wars
The British attempted to forcefully dominate Afghanistan by sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. Thus began the first English afghan war. Initially, success accompanied the British - they managed to overthrow Emir Dost-Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. The rule of Shuja Khan, however, did not last long and in 1842 he was overthrown. Afghanistan concluded a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.
Meanwhile, Russian empire continued to move south. In the 1860-1880s, the accession of Central Asia to Russia was basically completed.
The British, worried about the rapid advance of Russian troops to the borders of Afghanistan, began the second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878. The stubborn struggle lasted two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal Emir Abdur-Rahman on the throne and thus maintaining control over the country.
In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint agreements between Russia and Britain.
Independence of Afghanistan
In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared the independence of Afghanistan from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.
The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided significant economic and military assistance to Afghanistan.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely impoverished population, over half of which was illiterate.

Republic of Dauda
In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'état took place in the country. Power was seized by a relative of Zahir Shah, Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.
Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and attempted reforms, but most of them failed. The first republican period in the history of Afghanistan is characterized by strong political instability, rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. The Islamists raised several uprisings, but they were all crushed by government forces.
Daoud's reign ended with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.
Saur Revolution
On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, proclaiming the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the backlog of Afghanistan ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

The course of the war
Making a decision on the introduction of Soviet troops
In March 1979, during a mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the evidence negative consequences direct Soviet intervention, and the request was denied.
However, the Herat rebellion forced the strengthening of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing in Afghanistan by the landing method of the 105th Guards Airborne Division.
British soldiers in Kandahar, second Anglo-Afghan war
The further development of the situation in Afghanistan - the armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle, and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet guides. It warily followed the activities of Amin at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA who were supporters of Taraki. Repression also affected the army, the main pillar of the PDPA, which led to the fall of its already low morale, caused mass desertion and riots. The Soviet leadership was afraid that further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, information was received through the KGB about Amin's connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.
As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement by a leader more loyal to the USSR. As such, B. Karmal was considered, whose candidacy was supported by the chairman of the KGB, Yu. V. Andropov.
When developing an operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use the requests of Amin himself for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979, there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a special-purpose detachment of the GRU - specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to protect Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. Chief of the General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.
The decision to send troops was made at a meeting of the Politburo on December 12, 1979.
To the position in "A".
1. Approve the considerations and measures set out in vols. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F., Gromyko A. A. Allow them to make adjustments of an unprincipled nature during the implementation of these measures. Questions that require the decision of the Central Committee must be submitted to the Politburo in a timely manner. The implementation of all these measures is to be assigned to TT. Andropova Yu. V., Ustinova D. F., Gromyko A. A.
2. Instruct TT. Yu.V.
According to V. I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A. N. Kosygin, and from that moment A. N. Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage .
Mohammed Daoud
On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev, which began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Airborne Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding the Soviet military in Bagram since July 7, 1979. transport aircraft and helicopters.
At the same time, B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet military personnel. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Amin, but he survived, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a "Muslim battalion" was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which entered the guard brigade of Amin's palace, which greatly facilitated the preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, in mid-December, 2 special groups of the KGB also arrived in Afghanistan.
Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan military district, the field command of the 40th combined arms army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, units of combat and logistics support were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps command, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, parts of aviation technical and airfield support. Three more divisions were mobilized as a reserve in both districts. More than 50,000 people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up to complete the units, about 8,000 cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. It was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for the transfer to Afghanistan, which was transferred to airfields in the Turkestan military district on December 14.
By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported that the troops were ready to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed Directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:
"A decision was made to bring some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of our country into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states."
The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan, and the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense purposes was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov issued an order to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would become garrisons and guard important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition groups, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed over the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya border river, which was tasked with capturing the Salang high mountain pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure unhindered passage of Soviet troops.
The streets of Kabul the day after the revolution, April 28, 1978
In Kabul, by noon on December 27, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed the landing method and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in the designated areas of Kabul, where they received the task of blocking the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. The 357th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Airborne Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield after a skirmish with Afghan servicemen. They also provided protection for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.
Storming of Amin's Palace
On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, during the assault Amin was killed. Government offices in Kabul were captured by Soviet paratroopers.
On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and radio Kabul broadcast the appeal of this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the "second stage of the revolution" was proclaimed.

Main events
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979.
1979
In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Airborne Regiment (111pdp) of the 105th Airborne Division (105th Airborne Division) arrived in Bagram, and the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after regular reorganization in 1979 year - a separate battalion 345opdp. These were the first military units and parts of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.
From December 9 to 12, the first "Muslim battalion" arrived in Afghanistan - 154ooSpN 15obrSpN.
On December 14, another separate battalion 345opdp arrived in Bagram.
On December 25, columns of the 40th Army (40A) of the Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.
On the evening of December 27, Operation Storm took place - the assault on Amin's palace.
1980
Mujahideen of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, 1987.
January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and start of hostilities - raids against rebel detachments in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, by forces of a no less reinforced battalion and the use of army firepower, including the Air Force to suppress resistance.
February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the passage of the tunnel by units of 186msp and 2zrbr, in the absence of a commandant's service, a traffic jam formed in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen of the 2zrbr suffocated. No data are available for suffocated Afghans.
February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in the mountain infantry regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of the OKSV units against the Mujahideen - Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region entered into heavy bloody battles, due to the blocking of the 3rd Airborne Battalion by dushmans in the Asmara Gorge. 33 people were killed, 40 people were injured, one soldier was missing.
April – The US Congress authorizes $15,000,000 in "direct and open aid" to the Afghan opposition.
- the first military operation in Panjshir.
Opposition forces in Afghanistan, according to the CIA, in September 1985.
May 11 - the death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
August 3 - battle near the village of Shaest. In the Mashkhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the city of Faizabad, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st MSD was ambushed, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
August 12 - the arrival of the special forces of the KGB of the USSR "Karpaty" in the country.
September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach is appointed Commander of the 40th Army.
1981
September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; the death of Major General Khakhalov.
October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").
December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province).
1982
An Afghan Mujahideen with a Strela-2 man-portable anti-aircraft missile system, August 26, 1988.
April 5 - During a military operation in western Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iran. Iranian combat aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which for the first time a mass landing was carried out in Afghanistan: over 4,000 airborne troops were parachuted during the first three days alone. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various branches of the armed forces took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously for all 120 km into the depths of the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was taken.
November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel.
November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani President, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the expediency of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.
1983
Taj Beck Palace in Kabul in 1987, headquarters of OKSVA, former residence of Amin.
January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen kidnapped a group of Soviet "civilian specialists" numbering 16 people.
February 2 - Hostages kidnapped in Mazar-i-Sharif and located in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Yu. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."
July - offensive of the Mujahideen on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
August - the hard work of D. Cordoves' mission to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".
Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.
1984
Kunar Province, 1987.
January 16 - the Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.
April 30 - in the Khazar Gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft from the Strela MANPADS over Kabul.
1985
April 21 - The death of the Maravar company.
April 26 - Soviet and Afghan POWs revolt in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.
May 25 - Kunar operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara Gorge, Kunar province, 4th company of the 149th Guards. Motor Rifle Regiment. Once in the ring surrounded by the Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - "Black Storks" guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
June - army operation in Panjshir.
Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".
October 16-17 - Shutulskaya tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of stronghold fortified areas in hard-to-reach areas of the country began.
On November 22, 1985, while performing a task, an outpost of the Motomaneuverable Group (MMG) of the Panfilov Border Detachment of the Eastern Border District of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. In the battle near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of the province of Badakhshan, 19 border guards were killed. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan war of 1979-1989.
1986
Warriors of the air assault brigade stationed in Gardez.
February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.
May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.
June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsaj of the 783rd ORB of the 201st MSD - Jarav Gorge, in which 18 scouts died, 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7,000 people). The withdrawal date will be rescheduled at a later date. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.
August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.
August 18-26 - Military operation "Trap" under the command of General of the Army V. I. Varennikov. The assault on the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area in the province of Herat.
Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from 173ooSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of Stinger MANPADS in the amount of three pieces in the Kandahar region.
October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
November 13 - At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years. If we don’t change approaches, then we will fight for another 20-30 years.” Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeev said: “There is not a single military task that would be set, but not solved, but there is no result.<…>We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We have lost the fight for the Afghan people." At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
December - an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates the speediest end to the fratricidal war.
1987
Mi-8MT in the sky and on the ground (1987).
January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.
February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.
February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
March 8 - shelling by Mujahideen of the city of Panj, Tajik SSR.
March - Operation "Thunderstorm" in the province of Ghazni.
March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Asadabad battalion, defeated a large Mujahideen base in Karer.
- Operation "Circle" in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.
April 9 - Mujahideen attacked the Soviet frontier post. When repelling an attack, 2 Soviet servicemen are killed, 20 Mujahideen are destroyed.
April 12 - the defeat of the base of the rebels Milov in the province of Nangarhar.
May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.
- Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.
Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the state border.
November 23 - the beginning of Operation Highway to deblock the city of Khost.
1988
The Soviet group of Special Forces is preparing to go on a mission, in Afghanistan, 1988.
January 7-8 - battle at height 3234.
April 14 - With the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
June 24 - Opposition detachments captured the center of the province of Wardak - the city of Maidanshehr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maidanshehr carried out an operation to destroy the Khurkabul base area.
August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz
1989
January 23-26 - operation "Typhoon", Kunduz province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
February 4 - The last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Military Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to the official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (Termez). He declared: "There was not a single Soviet soldier left behind me." This statement was not true, since both Soviet military personnel who were captured by the Mujahideen and border guard units remained in Afghanistan, covering the withdrawal of troops and returning to the territory of the USSR only in the afternoon of February 15. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR performed the tasks of protecting the Soviet-Afghan border by separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

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Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:
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I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.
The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.
Before the Limited Contingent, no one has ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan. All the combat operations that the 40th Army had to conduct from 1980 until almost the last days of our stay in the country were either preemptive or retaliatory. Together with government troops, we carried out military operations only to exclude attacks on our garrisons, airfields, motorcades and communications that were used to transport goods.
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Indeed, before the beginning of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, the Mujahideen never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov's opinion that the 40th Army was not faced with the task of military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who in 1985-1987 was the deputy head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 40th army, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued the same goals - to suppress the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthen the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition formations only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence), the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the leadership of Afghanistan actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000 military units (army, police, state security).
Sign "Warrior-internationalist of the USSR"
After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries declared a boycott Olympic Games 1980, held in Moscow.
Humanitarian consequences
The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a considerable percentage of whom remain there to this day. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the problem of refugees around the world.
The bitterness of the belligerents reached extreme limits. It is known that the Mujahideen subjected prisoners to torture, among which such as the "red tulip" is widely known. Weapons were used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from rockets left over from the departure of the Soviet army, the inhabitants used rockets to build houses, as ceilings, window and door beams, however, statements by the US administration about the use of the 40th Army chemical weapons, voiced in March 1982, were never documented.
Side losses
The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more were in the ranks of refugees, many of whom left the country” . Apparently, there is no exact division of victims into government army soldiers, Mujahideen and civilians.

After the end of the war in the USSR, the figures of the dead Soviet soldiers were published, broken down by years.
1979
86 people
1980
1484 people
1981
1298 people
1982
1948 people
1983
1446 people
1984
2343 people
1985
1868 people
1986
1333 people
1987
1215 people
1988
759 people
1989
53 people
Total - 13 833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. In the future, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of injuries and illnesses after their dismissal from the armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and in accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:
Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28
Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand cases.
According to Vladimir Sidelnikov, Professor of the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not include servicemen who died from wounds and diseases in hospitals in the USSR.
In a study of the Afghan war, conducted by officers of the General Staff under the direction of prof. Valentina Runova, gives an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in action, those who died of wounds and disease, and those who died in accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

And the republican system was established. This served as an impetus for the start of a civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty breaking of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, increased the resistance of the population to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, while NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

The introduction and placement of OKSV in the DRA was carried out from December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into the territory of Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat composition of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly refined in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four regiments of front-line and two regiments of army aviation, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, since 1985 - General of the Army Valentin Varennikov. The direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, who was subordinate to the command of the troops of the TurkVO.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, roads vital for the country, carried out convoys with cargo through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, the OKSV conducted active hostilities of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous shelling of their garrisons and transport columns by opposition detachments, began to conduct military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive enemy armed groups. Thus, the Soviet troops introduced into Afghanistan became involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, which received the most assistance from Pakistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.

Stage 3: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six Soviet regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. The participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

Even after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, the USSR continued to seek opportunities for a political solution to the intra-Afghan conflict. From August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, from April 1986 - to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988 in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, under which the USSR and the USA assumed obligations. Deadlines were set for the withdrawal of Soviet troops: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the rest of the units after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which ended on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620,000 servicemen completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525,200 people in the OKSV.

The losses of the military personnel of the 40th Army were: killed and dead - 13,833 people, including 1979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the hostilities in Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel were killed state security, 28 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers. 172 officers stopped their service in the Armed Forces due to injuries. 6,669 "Afghans" became disabled, including 1,479 disabled people of the first group.

For military and other services, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked the crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15,000 Soviet servicemen, the emergence of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, exacerbated the already severe socio-economic crisis that the Soviet Union found itself in in the second half of the 1970s, and made the burden of military spending unbearable for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The real causes of the war were the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth at the expense of the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

Since the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form in the region, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which began to spread everywhere in abundance. The political rift in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow erroneously imagined, but along religious lines.

The entry of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States as the arena of some “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow's misunderstanding of its national interests, an incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in one's own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, political myopia.

Afghanistan showed the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy to the real state of affairs in the world.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by growing instability in the Middle East, which was the result of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. 1979 turned out to be especially stormy: the leader Arab world Egypt concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, causing an uproar in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a pretext for an armed conflict and finds it in a war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (senior), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi sponsors various terrorist groups; Turkey's centre-left government resigns.

The situation is also radicalizing in peripheral Afghanistan. In April 1978, the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a "client" of the USSR, counting on financial, economic and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent, relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. For all the decades that have passed since then, not to be found in Soviet history references to Afghanistan in a negative context. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West has tacitly acknowledged this fact and has never been interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from a monarchy to a republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April "revolution" of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, the leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many participants in the coup were well known - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) worked closely with them.

It seemed that Moscow had nothing to lose from regime change. However, the “socialists” repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures provoked resistance from the population. Throughout 1978 social base"Socialists" steadily narrowed. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began to send groups of their servicemen in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as to support the opposition with weapons. China has been active. In parallel, historically existing and earlier contradictions between the leaders of the "socialists" intensified.

As a result, a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more out of 34 provinces remained under its control.

On March 18, 1979, Taraki, in a lengthy telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government, A. Kosygin, explains the current situation and insistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. Despair, the consciousness of hopelessness, comes through in every word of Taraki. He returns each question of the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin wonders why, they say, you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin's naive, ideologically motivated proposals to rely on "workers", Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet premier proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov almost the same thing.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his colleagues in the Politburo about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly sensible considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean war on the population. There seems to be a reason to revise or at least correct the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, and so on. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin suggested to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send troops. Then it was necessary to answer the question: what to do in the event of an inevitable fall of the regime, about which the regime itself warns? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of waiting and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

In the Politburo, 3 groups are gradually distinguished: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The ailing Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on problems that need to be addressed. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making appropriate decisions.

During the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increase pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help the troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, are heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin takes place in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power, removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since that time, Moscow has set itself the goal of achieving the elimination of Amin, whom it does not trust, to bring to power "its own" person - Karmal, and to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into a dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these actions, in themselves reasonable, but committed without agreement and secretly from the Soviet side, are considered as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to withdraw Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, issues of a special operation by the Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, which should be covered by the second, parallel and subordinate to the first operation of introducing a "limited" contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with the support of Amin among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives were replaced with new ones, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin.

By December 1, the study of issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note on this matter. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the introduction of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, he was actively resisted by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov. It came to his open clashes and squabbles in raised tones with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and big losses that these actions will weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border, there was no border crossing either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was eliminated and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. The troops gradually began to enter - more and more.