China vs Japan: the big game in Asia. Japan and China - the history of relations

There are unresolved issues in China-Japan relations. The most important of these are territorial and historical disputes. Countries have mutual claims on the territory of the Diaoyu Islands (Jap. Senkaku). In addition, China and Japan are constantly arguing about the results of World War II. Japan does not emphasize responsibility for the victims of aggression against the Asian peoples, but, on the contrary, emphasizes its contribution to world development in the post-war period. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe notes that generations that are not related to the war should not "bear the burden of apologies."

After Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister of Japan in 2006, Sino-Japanese relations warmed up, the leaders of the two countries met, laying the foundation for a joint historical study, the purpose of which was new interpretation crimes committed by the Japanese during World War II in China. But already in early 2010, relations deteriorated again due to Japan's accusation of China in refusing to provide it with reserves of vital rare earth metals. And in 2012, they escalated even more because of the disputed territories of the Diaoyu Islands.

On May 23, 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the Great Hall of the People on the development of Sino-Japanese relations. The Secretary General paid close attention to the fact that the foundation of Sino-Japanese friendship is the people. The future of relations between China and Japan is in the hands of the peoples of these countries. Xi Jinping also stressed that any attempt to distort the reality of historical facts is a crime.

According to Professor Zhou Yongsheng of Beijing University of International Relations, in order to promote the development of relations between China and Japan, on the one hand, Japanese leaders need to remain calm and not challenge China on the above controversial issues; On the other hand, it is also necessary to use advantageous opportunities to improve relations between both countries, do not spoil relations, communicate with each other, strengthen mutual trust.

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Both official and unofficial relations have long been established between Japan and China. It should be noted that China (represented by the PRC) and Japan were military adversaries in World War II, which, in fact, led to the termination of relations between the two countries in the 1950s and 1960s.

When, as already noted, in the 1960s. The Soviet Union withdrew its experts from China, and the current cooling in relations between the PRC and the USSR led China to an economic predicament. China had several alternatives, one of which was to start more formal relations with Japan. Tatsunosuke Takashi, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, member of the Japanese Parliament, and director of the Economic Planning Agency, visited China to sign a memorandum on further trade relations between the two countries. Under this agreement, Chinese purchases of industrial enterprises were to be partially financed through medium-term loans issued by the Export-Import Bank of Japan.

The treaty also allowed the PRC to open trade missions in Tokyo, and in 1963 paved the way for Japanese government approval to build a $20 million bank-guaranteed synthetic textile factory in mainland China.

But the protest that followed from the PRC forced Japan to postpone further funding for the construction of this enterprise. The PRC reacted to this change by reducing trade with Japan and intensifying aggressive propaganda against Japan, calling it an "American mongrel." Sino-Japanese relations declined again during the period cultural revolution. The gap was further exacerbated by the growing power and independence of Japan from the United States in the late 1960s. The PRC has been particularly focused on the possibility that Japan may remilitarize again to compensate for the decline in US military presence in Asia brought about by the rule of President Richard Nixon. However, although the turmoil had subsided somewhat, the Japanese government, already under pressure from the pro-Beijing faction of the LDP and opposition elements, sought to take a more forward position.

As a result, the actual diplomatic, foreign policy and foreign economic relations between Japan and China in the second half of the 20th century began to take shape precisely in the 1970s.

In the early 1970s, US officials shocked the Japanese authorities with the development of relations with China. Japan began to develop new trends in establishing and improving relations with the same state. This strategy, deployed shortly after the end of the Cold War, "influenced a sense of uncertainty and unease among the Japanese about China's future course, given the country's sheer size and robust economic growth, and the fact that much of the fruits of that growth are destined for for defense." The Japanese soon followed in the footsteps of American rule and decisively changed their policy towards China.

In December 1971, Chinese and Japanese trade intermediary organizations began discussing the possibility of restoring diplomatic trade relations. The resignation of Premier Sato in July 1972 and the accession to the post of Tanaka Kakuei marked the beginning of a change in Sino-Japanese relations. A visit to Beijing by Prime Minister-elect Tanaka ended with the signing of a joint agreement (Joint Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China) on September 29, 1972, which ended eight years of hostility and friction between China and Japan, establishing diplomatic relations between the states.

The talks were based on three principles put forward by the Chinese side: “It is hereby confirmed that the representatives of China, participating in the negotiations and speaking on behalf of the country, submitted to Japan three principles that are the basis for the normalization of relations between the two countries: a) the Government of the PRC is the sole representative and the legitimate government of China; b) Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC; c) the agreement between Japan and Taiwan is illegal and null and void and must be annulled."

In this agreement, Tokyo acknowledged that the government of Beijing (and not the government of Taipei) is the sole legitimate government of China, while stating that it understands and respects the PRC's position that Taiwan is part of China. Japan had less leverage on China in these negotiations because of China's relationship with the UN and US President Richard Nixon. But Japan's most important concern was to extend its security agreements with the US, expecting China to denounce the move. The Chinese authorities surprised the Japanese by taking a passive stance on the issue of relations between Japan and the United States. A compromise was reached on September 29, 1972. It seemed that Japan agreed to most of China's demands, including the issue of Taiwan. This led to the interaction of the two countries regarding the rapid growth of trade: 28 Japanese and 30 Chinese economic and trade delegations mutually visited each other's countries. Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese friendship treaty and a peace treaty began in 1974, but soon came up against political problem which Japan wanted to avoid.

The PRC insisted on the inclusion in the treaty of anti-hegemony clauses directed towards the USSR. Japan, which did not want to be drawn into a Sino-Soviet confrontation, objected, and the USSR, in turn, made it clear that the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese treaty would harm Soviet-Japanese relations. Japan's efforts to find a compromise with China on this issue failed, and negotiations were terminated in September 1975. The situation remained unchanged until the political changes in China that followed the death of Mao Zedong (in 1976, leading to the forefront of economic modernization and interest in relations with Japan, whose investments had importance. Changing its mind, Japan was willing to ignore the warnings and protests of the USSR, and accepted the idea of ​​anti-hegemony as an international principle to help build the foundation for a peace treaty.

In February 1978, a long-term private trade agreement led to an agreement that Japanese-Chinese trade income should rise to US$20 billion by 1985 through exports from Japan of enterprises, equipment, technology, building materials, spare parts for equipment in exchange for coal and oil. This long-term plan, which gave rise to unjustified expectations, proved only overly ambitious, and was rejected the following year, as the PRC was forced to reconsider its development priorities and reduce its obligations. However, the signing of the agreement influenced the desire of both countries to improve relations.

In April 1978, a dispute broke out over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, a chain of small islands north of Taiwan and south of the Ryukyu archipelago, which threatened to stop the growing trend of renewed peace talks. The adaptability of both sides led to decisive action. Negotiations for a peace agreement continued in July, and an agreement was reached in August on the basis of a compromise version of the anti-hegemony clause. The Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and China was signed on August 12 and entered into force on October 23, 1978.

In the 1980s, relations between Japan and China made significant progress. In 1982, there was a major political debate over the issue of revising the presentation of educational material in Japanese textbooks regarding Imperial Japan's war against China in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1983, Beijing also expressed concern about the shift in the US strategic focus in Asia from China to Japan, where Yasuhiro Nakasone was prime minister at the time, threatening the possibility of a Japanese militarism recovery.

By mid-1983, Beijing decided to improve its relations with the Reagan administration (USA) and strengthen ties with Japan. General Secretary Communist Party China (CCP) Hu Yaobang visited Japan in November 1983, and Prime Minister Nakasone made a return visit to China in March 1984. While Japanese enthusiasm for the Chinese market waxed and waned, geostrategic considerations in the 1980s stabilized Tokyo's policy toward Beijing. In fact, Japan's strong involvement in China's economic modernization, in part, influenced its determination to support peaceful domestic development in China, draw China into gradually expanding ties with Japan and the West, reduce China's interest in returning to the provocative foreign policy of the past, and thwart any Soviet- Chinese regroupings against Japan.

It should be noted that in the 1980s, the position of official Tokyo in relation to the USSR coincided with the publicly expressed Chinese concern. These experiences also included accommodation in East Asia of the Soviet military, the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the potential threat it posed to oil shipping routes in the Persian Gulf, and the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Vietnam. In response, Japan and China adopted certain complementary foreign policies designed to politically isolate the USSR and its allies and promote regional stability. In Southeast Asia, both countries provided strong diplomatic support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) efforts to withdraw Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Japan cut off all economic support to Vietnam and provided steady economic aid to Thailand, helping to resettle Indochinese refugees. The PRC has been a key source of support for Thai and Cambodian resistance groups.

In Southwest Asia, both states condemned the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; they refused to recognize the Soviet regime in Kabul and looked for diplomatic and economic means to support Pakistan. In Northeast Asia, Japan and China sought to moderate the behavior of their Korean partners (South and North Korea) in order to ease tensions. In 1983, the PRC and Japan strongly criticized the Soviet proposal to redeploy its armed forces to Asia.

During the rest of the 1980s, Japan faced a huge number of disagreements with the PRC. In late 1985, Chinese representatives expressed strong dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese war criminals. The economic problems were centered on the problem of the influx of Japanese goods into China, which led to a serious trade deficit in the country. Nakasone and other Japanese leaders had the opportunity to refute such official opinion during their visit to Beijing and in other negotiations with Chinese authorities. They assured the Chinese of Japan's large-scale development and commercial assistance. However, it was not easy to appease the Chinese populace: the students held demonstrations against Japan, on the one hand, helping the Chinese government to strengthen their prejudice against their Japanese opponents, but on the other hand, it turned out to be very difficult to change the opinion of the Chinese people than the opinion of the Chinese government.

Meanwhile, the 1987 removal of party leader Hu Yaobang damaged Sino-Japanese relations, as Hu was able to develop personal relationships with Nakasone and other Japanese leaders. The PRC government's brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in the spring of 1989 made Japanese politicians realize that the new situation in China had become extremely delicate and needed to be carefully managed in order to avoid Japan's actions towards China that could permanently push it away from reform. Returning to an earlier point, some reports suggest that Beijing's leaders initially decided that industrialized countries would be able to resume normal business relations with the PRC relatively quickly within a short period of time after the Tiananmen incident. But when this did not happen, the representatives of the PRC made a decisive proposal to the Japanese government to cut ties with most of the developed industrial countries in order to conduct normal economic communication with the PRC, consistent with Tokyo's long-term interests in mainland China.

Japanese leaders, as well as leaders Western Europe and the US, were careful not to isolate China and continue trade and other relationships usually aligned with the policies of other industrialized nations. But they also followed the US leadership in limiting economic relations from China.

Thus, the 1970s and 1980s marked a turning point in China's transformation into an important actor in world politics and a leading power in the Asia-Pacific region. The internal political and economic transformations that took place in the PRC were combined with the implementation of a strictly determined foreign policy, an important leitmotif of which was a significant rapprochement with the United States, as well as some establishment of diplomatic ties and external relations with Japan, which, however, did not lead to the transformation of China into full-fledged geostrategic opponents of the USSR. A clear and competent policy, the stable course of the Chinese government in international relations, along with the influence of subjective factors in world politics (the ongoing confrontation between the USSR and the USA) and the growing importance of economic interstices in China's relations with the leading actors in world politics, have made it possible to significantly strengthen China's role in the international arena.

• Arbatov A. Big strategic triangle / A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin. -M., 2013.- P.22.
• Eto (Inomata), Naoko. Chinese Foreign Strategy and the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty// International Relations. - 2008. - No152. – P.38-40.
• For details, see: Gao, Haikuan The China-Japan Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests and East Asian Peace and Stability// Asia-Pacific Review. -2008. - Vol. 15 Issue 2. - R. 36-51.

China blames Japan for incident

The latest aggravation of Sino-Japanese relations, which occurred due to the incident with the detention of a Chinese fishing vessel, once again highlighted a whole range of unresolved problems between the countries. All the agreements reached by Beijing and Tokyo on the problem of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea were in jeopardy, and the propaganda campaign in the Chinese media noticeably fueled anti-Japanese sentiments in society, which had been "dormant" in the past few years against the backdrop of some improvement in relations between the countries.

It all started on September 7 with the detention of a Chinese fishing trawler by patrol ships of the Japanese Coast Guard. The Chinese media reported only about the illegal actions of the Japanese side, as well as the collision of a fishing boat with Japanese patrol ships. Details in the information space of the PRC were not specified. In the Japanese press, on the contrary, a broad picture of what happened was given. According to the official version, the Chinese ship crashed first into the Japanese Yonakuni ship, and then into the Mizuki patrol ship. A Chinese trawler tried to escape from Japanese border guards after they demanded it be stopped to check the legality of its fishing in the area of ​​the Diaoyu Islands, which are the subject of a territorial dispute between Beijing and Tokyo. Japan said the Chinese vessel was engaged in illegal fishing in its territorial waters.

China's reaction was immediate. On the same day, at a briefing for journalists, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said that Beijing reserves the right to retaliate in connection with this incident. "Official Beijing expresses serious concern over this incident," the Chinese diplomat stressed, "and has already made a corresponding presentation to the Japanese side." "The Diaoyu Island and its surrounding areas have long belonged to China, which opposes the Japanese side's so-called law enforcement activities there and urges Tokyo to refrain from activities in the area that threaten the safety of Chinese citizens," Jiang Yu said. "In connection with this incident, we reserve the right to respond," - summed up the official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Just a few hours later, on September 7, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao called the Japanese Ambassador to China and made a serious introduction to him in connection with the detention of a Chinese fishing boat in the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku) Islands. In a conversation with the ambassador, the Chinese deputy foreign minister demanded that "Japanese patrol ships stop their illegal activities to detain Chinese fishing boats." This was the beginning of a whole series of protests and harsh statements from Beijing. Japan, in turn, announced its intention to judge the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler according to its own laws.
Over the next few days, China's statements became more and more harsh, and warnings began to be heard in the protests of the Chinese Foreign Ministry about the possible negative impact of this incident on the further development of bilateral relations. "We demand that the Japanese side release the Chinese fishing vessel without any conditions in order to avoid further aggravation of the situation," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said at a regular briefing. "The Diaoyu Islands have been part of Chinese territory since ancient times," she recalled Beijing's official position. In this regard, she stressed, "the detention of a Chinese fishing vessel by the Japanese side on the basis of Japanese law is null and void and illegal." "The Chinese side cannot accept this," she said. Answering a reporter's question about whether this incident will affect the joint Sino-Japanese development of gas fields in the disputed Diaoyu Islands, Jiang Yu noted that "the issue of territorial ownership is very sensitive, the Japanese government itself understands how seriously it can have a serious impact on bilateral relations. generally".

Beijing's next step was to raise the level of official statements. On September 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi protested. For this purpose, the Japanese Ambassador to China was once again summoned to the country's Foreign Ministry. Yang Jiechi demanded that the Japanese side "immediately and unconditionally release the fishing vessel along with the captain and crew."

Japan kept a cool head in response to all these harsh statements from the Chinese foreign ministry and continued to insist on the need for the captain's response before Japanese law. The situation began to gradually change after China, as part of its response, on September 11 announced a decision to suspend negotiations with Japan on the East China Sea, concerning the joint development of oil and gas fields in disputed areas. Negotiations between the two countries concerned the principles of a common understanding of the problems of the East China Sea, including issues of territorial delimitation, their second round was scheduled for mid-September. "The Japanese side ignored China's repeated strong submissions and firm stance, and stubbornly decided to bring the case of the captain of the Chinese ship under the so-called "legal procedure."

China expresses its extreme displeasure and the most serious protest about this," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
The day after this statement, Dai Bingguo, a member of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, demanded the release of the captain of the fishing trawler, whose claims against Tokyo also had to be heard by the Japanese ambassador to China, who was called "on the carpet" late at night, which was also intended to demonstrate the seriousness of Beijing's dissatisfaction with the emerging situation. Dai Bingguo was not verbose, following up on demanding the release of all detained Chinese citizens, he expressed hope that Japan would "make a wise political decision."

China's insistence forced Japan to make its first concessions, and on September 13, 14 crew members of the fishing trawler were released, while the ship's captain remained in the Land of the Rising Sun awaiting the end of the trial. Over the next few days, China did not slacken its pressure, blaming Japan for the aggravation of bilateral relations at the level of official statements. In parallel, active propaganda was carried out in the media, fueling the intensity of passions around this incident and anti-Japanese sentiments in society.

After ten days of continuous statements, official protests and demands to release the detained captain of a Chinese fishing trawler, Beijing has decided to go ahead and declare its sovereign rights to develop the Chunxiao oil and gas field in the East China Sea, which is the subject of a territorial dispute with Japan. "China has full sovereign right and jurisdiction over the Chunxiao oil and gas field," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said. Jiang Yu said, "The actions of the Chinese side in the area of ​​the Chunxiao field are absolutely legal."

Thus, a problem was touched upon, which has long been a stumbling block in relations between Beijing and Tokyo. China and Japan have been unable to agree on issues related to the development of oil and gas fields and the delimitation of control areas in the East China Sea for many years. Beijing does not accept Japan's proposal to divide zones of control along the median line and insists that its rights extend to the borders of China's mainland shelf, which ends almost at the southern Japanese island of Okinawa.

One of Beijing's harshest responses to Tokyo's detention of a fishing trawler captain was a ministerial-level announcement on September 19 to cut off contact with Japan. "The Chinese side has repeatedly stressed that the so-called Japanese side's legal proceedings against the captain of the Chinese vessel are illegal and useless," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said in a statement. According to him, Beijing "demands that the Japanese side immediately and without any conditions release the Chinese captain." "If the Japanese side continues to act in its own way and add new ones to the existing mistakes, then the Chinese side will take tough retaliatory measures," Ma Zhaoxu said, stressing that "the entire responsibility for the consequences will lie with Japan."

It should be noted that the statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry itself did not say anything about the termination of ministerial contacts with Japan. This information appeared on the tape of the Xinhua news agency, citing a source in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The Japanese side, in turn, stated that it had not received a corresponding notification from China.

Beijing's last tough demarche before Japanese prosecutors on September 24 decided to release the captain of a fishing boat from custody was a statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in which Japan was accused of encroaching on China's sovereignty. "Japan's illegal detention of Chinese fishermen and a Chinese boat in the Diaoyu Islands, and the continuation of the so-called domestic law prosecution, is a serious infringement on China's sovereignty and an open challenge from Japan," said Jiang Yu. The incident, she said, "stirred the Chinese public and caused serious damage to Sino-Japanese relations." "Only if Japan immediately corrects its mistake and releases the Chinese captain, can further deterioration of bilateral relations be avoided," the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said. According to her, this requirement must be met immediately if Japan "really values ​​bilateral relations."

Observers indirectly link the release of the Chinese captain to the detention of four Japanese citizens in northern China's Hebei province for illegally filming military installations in a protected area. Information about this appeared on September 23 - on the eve of the relevant decision of the Japanese prosecutor's office. In a laconic report from Xinhua News Agency, it said that "Shijiazhuang City Public Security took action against the four people in accordance with the law after receiving information about their illegal activities." "The case is currently under investigation," the city's public security department said.

With the release of the crew of the fishing vessel and the captain, China did not stop harsh attacks against Japan and demanded compensation and apologies from Tokyo for the incident in the Diaoyu Islands. The detention of the Chinese fishing trawler and crew members, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement, "was a gross violation of China's territorial integrity, and the Chinese government strongly protests this." "In connection with this incident, the Japanese side should apologize and pay compensation," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said. At the same time, the PRC Foreign Ministry stressed that China and Japan are the closest neighbors and that "the continued development of strategic mutually beneficial relations is in the interests of the peoples of the two countries." "Both sides must decide what is available in Sino-Japanese relations through dialogue and consultations," the statement said.

In general, it should be noted that China placed all responsibility for the damage inflicted on bilateral relations on Japan, from which it requires concrete steps to correct the current situation.

Officially, Beijing also categorically denies numerous foreign media speculations about a possible connection between the arrest of four Japanese citizens for illegally filming military installations and the release of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler, which took place the day after. China has also made it clear that it intends to resolve the issue of the detained Japanese citizens on the basis of the legislation in force in the PRC. A number of experts believe that Beijing may be more determined towards the detained Japanese than Tokyo in the case of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat.

The most serious aggravation of relations in recent years

The diplomatic row between Japan and China threatens to become the most serious of those that have occurred in recent years.
A Chinese fishing trawler was detained by the Japanese Coast Guard. During the detention, he twice collided with patrol ships, but was eventually taken under control and towed to the nearest port of Ishigaki Island / Okinawa Prefecture /. The ship's captain was arrested.

Such an incident in itself served as a pretext for a diplomatic scandal, but the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the detention took place in the area of ​​​​the islands, which are the subject of a long-standing territorial dispute between Japan and China. The uninhabited Diaoyu Islands have been mentioned in Chinese chronicles as a territory of the Celestial Empire since the middle of the 14th century. The archipelago came under the control of the Empire of Japan along with Taiwan among the nearby islands after the victory over China in the war of 1894-1895 and received the official name of Senkaku.

In 1944, in Japan, there was an internal territorial dispute over the ownership of the islands between the prefectures of Okinawa and Taihoku / Taiwan /, which the Tokyo court decided in favor of the latter. A year later, Japan capitulated in World War II and renounced all of its conquests, and Taiwan in particular. According to the logic of Beijing, together with Taiwan, Tokyo should have returned Senkaku, but Japan retained its sovereignty over the archipelago. Disagreeing with this decision, China first focused on the territorial dispute in 1992, declaring the islands "originally Chinese territory." In 1999, a large gas field was discovered in the East China Sea near Senkaku. All of these factors have fueled a smoldering territorial conflict ever since, which escalates from time to time.

However, this time the PRC's response to the detention of the ship was somewhat unexpected and extremely unpleasant for Japan. In addition to a series of calls to the Foreign Ministry of the Japanese ambassador to China, Beijing reacted by immediately terminating negotiations on joint development of gas fields with Tokyo in the East China Sea. Moreover, the Chinese side transported unknown equipment to the area of ​​gas fields that could be used for drilling, which would be contrary to the Japanese-Chinese agreement. In addition, Beijing stopped exporting rare earth metals to Japan and suspended joint tourism projects. All this caused serious concern in Tokyo.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government responded to China's statements in a rather familiar way, expressing regret for Beijing's unfriendly actions and offering to calmly sort out the situation, but he refused to enter into a dialogue. China was also not satisfied with the release of the detained ship, since the captain of the ship, whom the country's authorities intended to try, remained in custody in Japan. Under Japanese law, he faced three years in prison or about $6,000 in fines. There was a stalemate in the conflict that lasted for two weeks. Everything changed only after in the Chinese province of Hebei for illegal filming of a recycling plant under construction chemical weapons 4 employees of the Japanese company "Fujita" were detained - citizens of Japan.
In Tokyo, this detention was perceived as a signal from the PRC about the desire to exchange the detained Japanese for the captain of the trawler. On the same day, by decision of the prosecutor's office, a Chinese citizen was released from custody and he returned to China on a charter flight.

The decision of the Japanese prosecutor's office to release the captain of the offending vessel received rather skeptical assessments in the Japanese media. Almost no one believed the assurances of the government and personally Prime Minister Naoto Kan that the decision to release was made by the prosecutor's office on their own, and not under pressure from the PRC.

In particular, the Nikkei newspaper doubted that all legal procedures were duly followed when the Chinese citizen was released. Sankei said the incident "damaged Japan's sovereignty and national interests."
Mainichi called the prosecutor's decision "difficult to understand" and considered it "strange for the prosecutor's office" to justify their actions by the state of bilateral relations with another state.

According to the general opinion of the Japanese media, the Japanese leadership behaved short-sightedly, because it misunderstood Beijing's goal in the current diplomatic conflict. Back in mid-September, a prominent American analyst Richard Armitage, during his visit to Tokyo, met with the Secretary General of the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers, Yoshito Sengoku, and drew his attention to the fact that China, by aggravating relations, is testing Japan's position for strength. This was also indicated by the fact that Beijing behaved unexpectedly aggressively and took real and quite serious countermeasures, while earlier all cases of aggravation of the territorial dispute between China and Japan were usually limited to the exchange of a few tough statements. It was clear that the release of the Chinese citizen was not the only thing Beijing was trying to achieve.

And this version was confirmed. The PRC was not satisfied with the return of the captain of the trawler to its homeland and in the next statement of its Foreign Ministry demanded an apology and compensation from Japan, since the detention of the ship was "a gross encroachment on the territorial integrity of China." Moreover, Beijing refused to discuss the release of the four Fujita employees, which was expected in Tokyo in response to the return of the captain. Thus, the release of a Chinese citizen was indeed a diplomatic defeat for Japan, while China was pushing Tokyo to another one - the actual recognition of China's sovereignty over the disputed islands. Of course, the Japanese Foreign Ministry called China's demands unacceptable. Prime Minister Kang said that Japan would not discuss ownership of the archipelago with Beijing.

However, now that the conflict has once again passed into the waiting stage, the advantage is rather on the side of China, since Japan has voluntarily given up a serious lever of influence on the PRC.

The further development of events largely depends on the goals set by Beijing. If China really hopes to convince Tokyo to hand over Senkaku, then the pressure on its part will continue and a protracted crisis will ensue in Sino-Japanese relations. Getting out of it with minimal losses will require major diplomatic efforts from Tokyo. This may become almost the main foreign policy problem that Naoto Kan's cabinet will have to solve.

However, there are several more points of view on the goals of the PRC in this conflict. So, according to Mainichi, the aggravation of relations with Tokyo can be directed, first of all, to the domestic audience. Perhaps the Chinese leadership plays on the national feelings of the population of their country and thus strengthens its authority. In favor of this version is the scope of the protests, which were organized several times at the Japanese diplomatic missions throughout China.
Another opinion about the conflict was voiced by the above-mentioned Richard Armitage. According to him, Beijing's actions are "a warning to Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan regarding the disputed territories." With all these countries, China is engaged in territorial disputes, seeking control over the South China Sea. According to the analyst, Beijing is trying to demonstrate in advance its determination to resolve these issues in its favor.

Ivan Kargapoltsev, Beijing Yaroslav Makarov, Tokyo

China and Japan, which have powerful economies and significant political weight, have turned into influential players in world politics at the beginning of the 21st century. The foreign policy aspirations of both countries, the nature of their interrelations have a significant impact on the international situation in Northeast Asia and the formation of the military-political and economic climate in the region. Modern relations between China and Japan are marked by many contradictions. There are a number of historical, political, international and regional issues that separate them. At the same time, both countries are satisfied with the peaceful coexistence that developed after the Second World War, show interest in the development of economic ties and jointly participate in the work of international organizations.

Post-war Sino-Japanese relations, although not warm, did not turn hostile either. While distrust and alienation in political matters persisted, trade and economic ties developed successfully and were supplemented by the growth of Japanese private investment in the Chinese economy. This model of bilateral relations, called in Japan "seikei bunri" ("separation of politics from economics"), and in China - "zheng len, jin zhe" ("cold in politics, hot in economics"), lasted until 1972. ., when there was a normalization of bilateral relations. At the same time, Japan had to sacrifice its many-sided ties with Taiwan, in particular, to break off official contacts with the island and reduce the volume of trade. The prospects for expanding contacts with China at that time seemed more important to Japanese business circles.

In October 1978, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited Japan at the head of a government delegation. During the trip, the delegation members got acquainted with the work of modern Japanese enterprises, where advanced technologies were widely used. In the future, China used the experience of Japan in the modernization of its own economy.

In 1978, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed, which made it possible in the next decade to expand and deepen bilateral contacts in politics, economics and culture. Both sides benefited from the promotion of Japanese goods and capital to the vast Chinese market. In 1979, during a visit to Beijing by Japanese Prime Minister M. Ohira, China was granted a loan in the amount of 350 billion yen to carry out economic reforms. Since then, Japan has become a long-term financial donor to China. The result of this was the expansion of the flow of Japanese private investment and the activation of Japanese corporations in the Chinese market.

The year 2012 was marked in Sino-Japanese relations by the intensification of the struggle for the Diaoyu Islands, or Senkaku, as the Japanese call them. But this year marks 40 years of normalization of relations between the countries. And despite the close cooperation that has covered almost all areas of activity (trade, investment, science and technology, education, cultural exchanges, etc.), "old problems" threaten to completely destroy the "ship of Sino-Japanese friendship", fragments from which will affect the entire system of international relations not only in the region, but also in the world. To understand the causes of the problem, consider the history of relations between the two states from the end of the 19th century to the present day.

Period from the end of the 19th century to 1945

By the time of the first armed conflict, the Great Qing Empire (the Manchu Qing Empire, which included China) was in a weakened position and turned into half dependent on Western countries. First Opium War 1840-1842 v. Great Britain, Second Opium War 1856 - 1860 against Great Britain and France and finally the civil war of 1851-1864. led to the fact that unequal peace treaties were concluded with the European powers. For example, under the Nanjing Treaty signed in 1942, China's ports were opened for free trade, Hong Kong was leased to Great Britain, and the British living in them were exempted from China's legal norms. And according to the Beijing Treaty of 1860, Eastern Manchuria (modern Primorye) was assigned to Russia. Similarly, Japan was forced to conclude similar treaties 1854-1858. However, as a result of economic growth, she was able to abandon unequal treaties by the mid-1890s.

In 1868, the new government of Japan set a course for the modernization of the country and the militarization of the country, following the example of the Western countries of Europe. Having built up forces, a policy of expansion began to be carried out in relation to its neighbors. The army and navy, created and trained according to Western models, gained strength and allowed Japan to think about external expansion, primarily to Korea and China.

Preventing foreign, especially European, control over Korea, and preferably taking it under its own control, has become the main goal of Japanese foreign policy. Already in 1876, Korea, under Japanese military pressure, signed an agreement with Japan, which ended the self-isolation of Korea and opened its ports to Japanese trade. For the next decades, Japan and China vied with varying degrees of success for control of Korea.

In April 1885, Japan and the Qing Empire signed an agreement in Tianjin, according to which Korea, in fact, came under a joint Sino-Japanese protectorate. In 1893-94, an uprising began in Korea. The Korean government, unable to deal with the uprising on its own, turned to China for help. Japan accused the Chinese authorities of violating the Tianjin Treaty, and also sent troops to Korea and then invited China to jointly carry out reforms in Korea. China, considering itself the suzerain state of Korea, refused. Then the Japanese detachment seized the palace and announced the creation of a new pro-Japanese government. The new government turned to Japan with a "request" for the expulsion of Chinese troops from Korea. Thus began the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, which ended with the victory of Japan and the signing of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty in 1985. According to this treaty, China recognized the independence of Korea (which made it possible for Japanese expansion); handed over to Japan forever the island of Taiwan, the islands of Penghu and the Liaodong Peninsula; paid a huge indemnity; opened a number of ports for trade and provided the Japanese with the right to build industrial enterprises in China and import there industrial equipment. And as a result of the defeat in 1898, a weakened China agreed to transfer Port Arthur to Russia in concession for 25 years (which caused the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905).

In 1899-1901. the popular anti-imperialist uprising of the Yihetuan (Boxer Rebellion) broke out against foreign interference in the economy, internal politics and religious life in China. However, it was suppressed by a coalition of foreign powers, which included Japan. And as a result, China has become even more dependent on foreign countries. Signed in 1901, the so-called "Peking Protocol" consolidated all territorial withdrawals from China that occurred in the 1890s, and also guaranteed that no further territorial claims were made against China.

After the victorious Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japan has increased political and economic pressure on China in order to seize new territories. In 1914, Japan seized the Shandong Peninsula (at that time a German colony in China) under the pretext of entering the First World War. In 1915, Japan put forward the so-called "21 Demands", which became a national humiliation of China, since Japan actually demanded that China submit to its influence.

In 1932 Japan created a puppet state on the territory of Chinese Manchuria, and in 1937 unleashed aggression against China. Despite the numerical superiority over the Japanese, the effectiveness and combat effectiveness of the Chinese troops was very low, the Chinese army suffered 8.4 times more losses than Japanese. The actions of the armed forces of the Western Allies, as well as the armed forces of the USSR, saved China from complete defeat. In total, according to the results of the war, Chinese sources give a figure of 35 million - the total number of losses (armed forces and civilians). A very significant source in subsequent relations was the fact that terror tactics were used against the local population, illustrative examples of which are the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 (according to documents and records, Japanese soldiers killed more than 200,000 civilians and the Chinese military in 28 massacres, and at least 150,000 more people were killed in individual cases. The maximum estimate of all victims is 500,000). Also at that time, inhuman experiments on prisoners of war and the civilian population (Chinese, Manchu, Russian, Mongols, and Koreans) were characteristic in the creation of bacteriological weapons (Detachment 731).

Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945. The Japanese-Chinese, like the Second World War in Asia, ended due to the complete surrender of Japan to the allies. After the withdrawal of Japan in 1945. from China, in the latter there was a civil war for several more years.

Having considered this period, we can say that it was then that the cornerstone of the contradictions in modern Sino-Japanese relations was laid. The long chain of Japanese invasions and war crimes in China between 1894 and 1945, as well as contemporary attitude Japan to its past, have become the main source of influence on the current and future Sino-Japanese relations. We can list several of the most important issues on which the negative attitude of the Chinese public towards Japan is based.

First: China is concerned about the problem of Japan's understanding of the historical past. For example, during 2001, ignoring historical facts, Japan has falsified history books that deny Japanese aggression in China. And, former Minister of Justice Seisuke Okuno believes that "Japan did not fight against other Asian countries, but against Europe and the United States. Asia opposed white supremacy and won independence." In the opinion of official Beijing and the Chinese population, Japan as a whole did not realize its criminality in the course of aggression, or at least failed to express a "public apology" in a sufficiently convincing form to the Asian public. The theme of "apology" can hardly be understood by Europeans or Americans, but it is very important for Asian peoples, especially former victims of Japanese aggression.

Second: the Taiwan issue. China has clearly expressed its position on the relationship between Japan and Taiwan. Namely, China is not opposed to holding official contacts between them, but is categorically opposed to Japan's actions aimed at creating two Chinas.

Third, the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. The Diaoyu Islands are part of Taiwan Province. And Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times.

Fourth: the question of chemical weapons left behind by the Japanese occupiers in China. During the Japanese aggression against China, Japan, openly violating the international convention, used chemical weapons, which led to numerous poisonings of the Chinese military and ordinary citizens. After the announcement of the surrender of Japan, its units left a large number of chemical weapons in China. Until now, these weapons are in many places in China. Due to half a century of erosion, the remains of chemical weapons often decompose and leak, which leads to a serious threat to the life and property security of the Chinese people, and also poses a threat to the ecological environment.

Period from 1945 to the present day

In 1972, when Beijing and Tokyo normalized bilateral relations, the top leadership of the PRC, for the sake of the future of Sino-Japanese relations, recognized that the responsibility for the war lay with the Japanese military-political elite. Japan agreed with this wording, and the joint communiqué stated that the Japanese side fully acknowledges the responsibility for the serious damage inflicted by Japan on the Chinese people and deeply regrets it. It is likely that this was a far-sighted move by the Chinese leadership, in particular Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. By formally refusing Japanese reparations, Beijing ultimately won both in politics and in the economy. In politics, this was expressed in the fact that by its actions, Beijing, to a certain extent, contributed to the rupture of Tokyo with Taiwan and the recognition by Japan of mainland China as a legitimate subject of international law.

The economic benefit consisted in the fact that the children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren of those who destroyed China, in Japanese, conscientiously assisted in its revival. Today it is difficult to dispute the thesis that in the development of the Chinese economy, which is now integrated into the world economy, a very important role was played by Japanese economic assistance, which began to be provided in 1978, after the conclusion of the Treaty on Peace and Cooperation. The Japanese side stated that without the creation of the necessary infrastructure in the Chinese economy by the beginning of the 1980s, the development of subsequent investments would have been impossible. Japan laid the foundation for this infrastructure.

From 1979 to 2001, Japan provided China with low-interest loans (0.79-3.50% per annum) in the amount of 3 billion dollars. The United States (with payment by installments up to 40 years) also transferred 1.4 billion dollars to the PRC. United States as a grant. It should be noted that Japan has invested in China for more than just financial resources, - Japanese technology, the Japanese concept of the scientific and technical base of industry, the highest culture of production. With Japan's technical assistance, many branches of industry (automobile and machine tool building), science-intensive industries, and equipment for the energy complex were created or reconstructed. The transport and communications sector was developed to an unthinkable level for the former China.

In 1998 Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a state visit to Japan, and in 1999. Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to China. The parties defined the framework of relations of friendship, cooperation and partnership aimed at peace and development, emphasized the priorities and directions for intensifying business cooperation in various fields.

In 1999, the volume of trade between China and Japan amounted to 66 billion US dollars. Japan has always been the main source of investment in the PRC. As of the end of June 1999 The PRC has approved approximately 20,000 investment projects by Japanese enterprises in the PRC. The contractual capital investment amounted to 37 billion dollars, and the volume of practical capital investments exceeded 26 billion US dollars.

May 2000 China was visited by an unprecedented scale (more than 5,000 people) mission from Japan to intensify cultural and friendly ties between Japan and China. Chinese President Jiang Zemin delivered an important speech on the strengthening and development of Sino-Japanese friendship, which evoked a positive response from the masses of the two countries. And following the results of a visit to China, in April 2003. Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi agreed that Sino-Japanese relations should develop in the spirit of "learning from the past and turning to the future."

However, despite the positive dynamics in the development of relations between China and Japan, there are also contradictions - the problems of the Diaoyu archipelago and the oil and gas industry in the East China Sea. AT political sphere The PRC (as a permanent member of the UN Security Council) seeks to oppose Japan's political rise. The PRC also strives for political and economic leadership in ASEAN, South Asia, Africa and Latin America, counteracting Japan's foreign policy, primarily through investment intervention. In the military-political field, the PRC openly opposes Japan's participation in the deployment of regional missile defense systems, seeing this as a threat to its policy of "military containment" of Taiwan's independence through an open threat of a missile strike. Also, the PRC in a very offensive form expresses concern about Tokyo's military innovations. As a response to Japan's military actions, the PRC seeks to increase its "advantages" as a nuclear power by implementing a program to develop and improve national strategic nuclear forces, as well as modernizing their Armed Forces.

Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands

The territorial dispute between China and Japan escalated after Tokyo officially decided to acquire the three islands that make up the Senkaku (Diaoyu) archipelago. Beijing, which considered these lands part of the PRC, declared the deal illegal and invalid.

The formal reason for the aggravation is the actions of the Japanese side. It was she who initiated the transfer of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands from private to public ownership. Legally, this action has nothing to do with the issue of sovereignty: even if a Chinese buys land in Japan, this does not mean that it will come under Chinese sovereignty.

The Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands are located in the East China Sea, 170 kilometers northeast of Taiwan. According to Beijing, China first discovered the archipelago in 1371. In 1885, according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the first Sino-Japanese war, the islands passed into the possession of Japan.

After World War II, the islands were under US control and were transferred to Tokyo in 1972. Taiwan and mainland China believe that Japan holds the islands illegally. In turn, the Japanese government says that China and Taiwan began to lay claim to the islands since the 1970s, when it became clear that the area was rich in minerals. Within the existing picture of the world, any stone that sticks out from under the water is not just a stone, but another 200 miles of an exclusive economic zone. Accordingly, this is a shelf, fish and much more. And as it turned out, there is a natural gas field near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands.

In September 2012 The Japanese government bought three of the five islands from a private owner. China demanded the annulment of this agreement and sent 4 patrol ships to the archipelago. Japan opposed these actions, threatening to use force.

In China, the transition of the islands to state ownership was perceived as a violation of the status quo, which, from the Chinese point of view, mutual understanding has been maintained since the normalization of relations.

There is a more fundamental reason for the aggravation of the Sino-Japanese conflict. China's economic and political strength, based on a long period of successful economic growth, has been increasing year by year. The growth of the Chinese economy contributes to the deepening of economic cooperation with major partners, including Japan. The volume of trade between the two countries last year reached 345 billion US dollars. Japan is the largest investor in the Chinese economy and China is its leading trading partner in both imports and exports.

It would seem that the two countries need to resolutely avoid any disputes. After all, a serious conflict will cause irreparable damage to both countries, each of which is experiencing economic difficulties. But economic considerations do not always determine relations between countries. Economic interdependence is, of course, a deterrent to the Sino-Japanese confrontation. But there are also considerations of a political, nationalist, psychological nature.

Under public pressure, official Beijing is expanding the sphere of "core interests": if earlier it was mainly about Taiwan, now it is the Diaoyu, and the islands in the South China Sea, and Tibet, and Xinjiang, and issues of providing the economy with the missing resources.

Japan is extremely sensitive to any concessions or compromises. Any politician who tries to find a compromise solution to numerous territorial disputes - and Japan has them not only with China, but also with all other neighbors: Russia, Korea, Taiwan - is instantly attacked by the nationalist public and declared a traitor.

What are the prospects for conflict? In the current situation, its growth is hardly possible. Both countries are too interested in each other to afford a serious confrontation. Attempts at sanctions and pressure from Beijing are unlikely to lead to anything. Such attempts have already been made before, but the Chinese economy depends on Japan no less than the Japanese on the Chinese. Therefore, any sanctions will hit both sides. But the resolution of the conflict through compromise is also unlikely.

Most likely, the conflict will continue to develop in waves, then fading, then flaring up again. At the same time, much will depend on the development of China. If it goes well, and the country's power grows, then Beijing may become less and less accommodating, which will aggravate the situation. If China's economy hits hard, then Beijing's leaders will have to deal with more pressing issues.