Both official and unofficial relations have long been established between Japan and China. It should be noted that China (represented by the PRC) and Japan were military adversaries in World War II, which, in fact, led to the termination of relations between the two countries in the 1950s-1960s.
When, as already noted, in the 1960s. The Soviet Union withdrew its experts from China, and the current cooling in relations between the PRC and the USSR led China to a difficult economic situation. China had several alternatives, one of which was to start more formal relations with Japan. Tatsunosuke Takashi, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, member of the Japanese Parliament, and director of the Economic Planning Agency, visited China to sign a memorandum on further trade relations between the two countries. Under this agreement, Chinese purchases of industrial enterprises were to be partially financed through medium-term loans issued by the Export-Import Bank of Japan.
The treaty also allowed the PRC to open trade missions in Tokyo, and in 1963 paved the way for Japanese government approval to build a $20 million bank-guaranteed synthetic textile factory in mainland China.
But the protest that followed from the PRC forced Japan to postpone further funding for the construction of this enterprise. The PRC reacted to this change by reducing trade with Japan and intensifying aggressive propaganda against Japan, calling it an "American mongrel." Sino-Japanese relations declined again during the Cultural Revolution. The gap was further exacerbated by the growing power and independence of Japan from the United States in the late 1960s. The PRC has been particularly focused on the possibility that Japan may remilitarize again to compensate for the decline in US military presence in Asia brought about by the rule of President Richard Nixon. However, although the turmoil had subsided somewhat, the Japanese government, already under pressure from the pro-Beijing faction of the LDP and opposition elements, sought to take a more forward position.
As a result, the actual diplomatic, foreign policy and foreign economic relations between Japan and China in the second half of the 20th century began to take shape precisely in the 1970s.
In the early 1970s, US officials shocked the Japanese authorities with the development of relations with China. Japan began to develop new trends in establishing and improving relations with the same state. This strategy, deployed shortly after the end of the Cold War, "influenced a sense of uncertainty and unease among the Japanese about China's future course, given the country's sheer size and robust economic growth, and the fact that much of the fruits of that growth are destined for for defense." The Japanese soon followed in the footsteps of American rule and decisively changed their policy towards China.
In December 1971, Chinese and Japanese trade intermediary organizations began discussing the possibility of restoring diplomatic trade relations. The resignation of Premier Sato in July 1972 and the accession to the post of Tanaka Kakuei marked the beginning of a change in Sino-Japanese relations. A visit to Beijing by Prime Minister-elect Tanaka ended with the signing of a joint agreement (Joint Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China) on September 29, 1972, which ended eight years of hostility and friction between China and Japan, establishing diplomatic relations between the states.
The talks were based on three principles put forward by the Chinese side: “It is hereby confirmed that the representatives of China, participating in the negotiations and speaking on behalf of the country, submitted to Japan three principles that are the basis for the normalization of relations between the two countries: a) the Government of the PRC is the sole representative and the legitimate government of China; b) Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC; c) the agreement between Japan and Taiwan is illegal and null and void and must be annulled."
In this agreement, Tokyo acknowledged that the government of Beijing (and not the government of Taipei) is the sole legitimate government of China, while stating that it understands and respects the PRC's position that Taiwan is part of China. Japan had less leverage on China in these negotiations because of China's relationship with the UN and US President Richard Nixon. But Japan's most important concern was to extend its security agreements with the US, expecting China to denounce the act. The Chinese authorities surprised the Japanese by taking a passive stance on the issue of relations between Japan and the United States. A compromise was reached on September 29, 1972. It seemed that Japan agreed to most of China's demands, including the issue of Taiwan. This led to the interaction of the two countries regarding the rapid growth of trade: 28 Japanese and 30 Chinese economic and trade delegations mutually visited each other's countries. Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese friendship treaty and a peace treaty began in 1974, but soon ran into a political problem that Japan wanted to avoid.
The PRC insisted on the inclusion in the treaty of anti-hegemony clauses directed towards the USSR. Japan, which did not want to be drawn into a Sino-Soviet confrontation, objected, and the USSR, in turn, made it clear that the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese treaty would harm Soviet-Japanese relations. Japan's efforts to find a compromise with China on this issue failed, and negotiations were terminated in September 1975. The situation remained unchanged until the political changes in China that followed the death of Mao Zedong (in 1976, leading to the forefront of economic modernization and interest in relations with Japan, whose investments had importance. Changing its mind, Japan was willing to ignore the warnings and protests of the USSR, and accepted the idea of anti-hegemony as an international principle to help build the foundation for a peace treaty.
In February 1978, a long-term private trade agreement led to an agreement that Japanese-Chinese trade income should rise to US$20 billion by 1985 through exports from Japan of enterprises, equipment, technology, building materials, spare parts for equipment in exchange for coal and oil. This long-term plan, which gave rise to unjustified expectations, proved only overly ambitious, and was rejected the following year, as the PRC was forced to reconsider its development priorities and reduce its obligations. However, the signing of the agreement influenced the desire of both countries to improve relations.
In April 1978, a dispute broke out over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, a chain of small islands north of Taiwan and south of the Ryukyu archipelago, which threatened to stop the growing trend of renewed peace talks. The adaptability of both sides led to decisive action. Negotiations for a peace agreement continued in July, and an agreement was reached in August on the basis of a compromise version of the anti-hegemony clause. The Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and China was signed on August 12 and entered into force on October 23, 1978.
In the 1980s, relations between Japan and China made significant progress. In 1982, there was a major political debate over the revision of the filing educational material in Japanese textbooks regarding Imperial Japan's war against China in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1983, Beijing also expressed concern about the shift in US strategic focus in Asia from China to Japan, where Yasuhiro Nakasone was prime minister at the time, threatening the possibility of a Japanese militarism recovery.
By mid-1983, Beijing decided to improve its relations with the Reagan administration (USA) and strengthen ties with Japan. The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Yaobang visited Japan in November 1983, and Prime Minister Nakasone paid a return visit to China in March 1984. While Japanese enthusiasm for the Chinese market waxed and waned, geostrategic considerations in the 1980s stabilized Tokyo's policy toward Beijing. In fact, Japan's strong involvement in China's economic modernization, in part, influenced its determination to support peaceful domestic development in China, draw China into gradually expanding ties with Japan and the West, reduce China's interest in returning to the provocative foreign policy of the past, and thwart any Soviet- Chinese regroupings against Japan.
It should be noted that in the 1980s, the position of official Tokyo in relation to the USSR coincided with the publicly expressed Chinese concern. These experiences also included the stationing of Soviet military forces in East Asia, the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the potential threat it posed to oil shipping routes in the Persian Gulf, and the increasing military presence of the Soviet Union in Vietnam. In response, Japan and China adopted certain complementary foreign policies designed to politically isolate the USSR and its allies and promote regional stability. In Southeast Asia, both countries provided strong diplomatic support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) efforts to withdraw Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Japan withdrew all economic support to Vietnam and provided steady economic aid to Thailand, helping to resettle Indochinese refugees. The PRC has been a key source of support for Thai and Cambodian resistance groups.
In Southwest Asia, both states condemned the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; they refused to recognize the Soviet regime in Kabul and looked for diplomatic and economic means to support Pakistan. In Northeast Asia, Japan and China sought to moderate the behavior of their Korean partners (South and North Korea) in order to ease tensions. In 1983, the PRC and Japan strongly criticized the Soviet proposal to redeploy its armed forces to Asia.
During the rest of the 1980s, Japan faced a huge number of disagreements with the PRC. In late 1985, Chinese representatives voiced strong dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese war criminals. The economic problems were centered on the problem of the influx of Japanese goods into China, which led to a serious trade deficit in the country. Nakasone and other Japanese leaders were given the opportunity to refute such official opinion during their visit to Beijing and other negotiations with Chinese authorities. They assured the Chinese of Japan's large-scale development and commercial assistance. However, it was not easy to appease the Chinese populace: the students held demonstrations against Japan, on the one hand, helping the Chinese government to strengthen their prejudice against their Japanese opponents, but on the other hand, it turned out to be very difficult to change the opinion of the Chinese people than the opinion of the Chinese government.
Meanwhile, the 1987 removal of party leader Hu Yaobang damaged Sino-Japanese relations, as Hu was able to develop personal relationships with Nakasone and other Japanese leaders. The PRC government's brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in the spring of 1989 made Japanese politicians realize that the new situation in China had become extremely delicate and needed to be carefully managed in order to avoid Japan's actions towards China that could permanently push it away from reform. Returning to an earlier point, some reports suggest that Beijing's leaders initially decided that industrialized countries would be able to resume normal business relations with the PRC relatively quickly within a short period of time after the Tiananmen incident. But when this did not happen, the representatives of the PRC made a decisive proposal to the Japanese government to cut ties with most of the developed industrial countries in order to conduct normal economic communication with the PRC, consistent with Tokyo's long-term interests in mainland China.
Japanese leaders, as well as those of Western Europe and the United States, were careful not to isolate China and to continue trade and other relationships usually aligned with the policies of other industrialized states. But they also followed the US leadership in limiting economic relations from China.
Thus, the 1970s and 1980s marked a turning point in China's transformation into an important actor in world politics and a leading power in the Asia-Pacific region. The internal political and economic transformations that took place in the PRC were combined with the implementation of a strictly determined foreign policy, an important leitmotif of which was a significant rapprochement with the United States, as well as some establishment of diplomatic ties and external relations with Japan, which, however, did not lead to the transformation of China into full-fledged geostrategic opponents of the USSR. A clear and competent policy, the stable course of the Chinese government in international relations, along with the influence of subjective factors in world politics (the ongoing confrontation between the USSR and the USA) and the growing importance of economic interstices in China's relations with the leading actors in world politics, have made it possible to significantly strengthen China's role in the international arena.
- Arbatov A. Big strategic triangle / A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin. -M., 2013.- P.22.
- Eto (Inomata), Naoko. Chinese Foreign Strategy and the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty// International Relations. - 2008. - No152. – P.38-40.
- For details, see: Gao, Haikuan The China-Japan Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests and East Asian Peace and Stability// Asia-Pacific Review. -2008. - Vol. 15 Issue 2. - R. 36-51.
At present, Japan and China are ready to provide each other with all possible assistance in solving many problems. Relations between the countries normalized about 30 years ago. According to representatives of Japan, this is the result of the efforts of both sides. For further peaceful cooperation, it is necessary to take into account the common experience, the lessons of history and previously signed documents.
Today, relations between the two countries are regulated by 3 documents: the 1979 Joint Communiqué, the 1978 Peace and Cooperation Agreement, and the 1998 Joint Japan-China Declaration.
The formation of Japanese imperialism, the rapid economic and military expansion in the Far East determined two main directions of Japanese policy:
the elimination of unequal treaties with Western countries, in geopolitics this direction took shape as Asianism;
expansion into the outer possessions of Asia, which have not yet been particularly claimed by other states.
In Japanese geopolitics, directions are conventionally distinguished as independent and dependent on German geopolitics. The center of independent geopolitical research prior to World War II was the Imperial University in Kyoto. The head of the Kyoto school of geopolitics is S. Komaki, head of the country's first department of geography.
In May 2008, Hu Jintao became the first Chinese president to pay an official state visit to Japan in over 10 years and called for greater cooperation between the two countries. The joint agreement between President Hu and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda reads: "Both countries agree that Japan and China share a great responsibility for world peace and development in the 21st century."
Objectively, Japan is an intermediary between the US and China, capable of influencing both sides. It is Japan that is interested in the existence of Chaimeriki. Any conflict based on the principle “you are for the whites or for the reds” is unprofitable for her. Established economic ties are torn, production is falling, bank capital is under the threat of excessive control, and so on. However, any influence presupposes a strategy and vision of the ideal picture. We can imagine this picture as the preservation of Japanese influence on the United States and further on Europe. That is, Japan is for US dominance in European life. China fits into this picture quite easily, since China is also interested in US dominance in Europe, if the US does not interfere with China's development. But there are serious contradictions between China and Japan in Southeast Asia. However, they can become critical only if all other players - the USA, Korea, Europe and India - are ousted from Southeast Asia. The easiest way to maintain balance is to diversify relationships. China gets a market in Africa and Latin America, a market in Europe, access to oil in the Persian Gulf in exchange for maintaining the interests of other countries in Southeast Asia. We are seeing this picture now. The question is to what extent Japan is able to maintain the rules of the game that are beneficial to it in the long term. The attitude of the Japanese towards the Chinese is ambivalent - a mixture of contempt and reverence. Japan is in the cultural orbit of China, but has fought or plundered China many times. In its own way, it does not benefit from too strong America, the fear of which forced it to abandon the breakthrough and attempts to take first place in the world, and too strong China.
Japan is well aware that a leading role in the world is unattainable. Moreover, one cannot bet on the eternal hegemony of the United States in the world. All hegemons eventually fall into decline. Its successes rest much more on the centralization of control than China's successes. Japan faces a whole range of threats, which it can only eliminate by uniting with China into some kind of alliance that can put an end to US power in the Pacific region. In the event of this alliance, the United States will leave the Far East forever. the Japanese become a nation forever independent of the West. The only question is whether the Japanese have a similar need. Most likely, yes, they do. The entire history of Japan from the first moments of the penetration of Europeans to Far East- struggle for independence. For Japan, the collapse of Russia is objectively beneficial. By taking the Kuriles, Sakhalin, and, possibly, Kamchatka into the bargain, Japan gets the maximum that allows it to go under the protection of China later. From that moment on, Japan no longer needs the United States. As soon as Japan allies itself with China, the multi-billion dollar costs that the country incurs to maintain influence over the United States are released. A rather curious situation arises today. The more China develops, the more beneficial for Japan is the division of Russia. And at the same time, the more China develops, the less profitable for Japan is China's expansion to the south by political and, especially, military methods. When formalizing the union of the Far Eastern states, Japan is objectively interested in maintaining the borders in Southeast Asia. However, it is too difficult to withdraw the US from this region.
Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 1972, bilateral trade and economic ties have developed rapidly. In 2005, the total volume of trade between the two sides increased by more than 160 times. From 1993 to 2003, Japan has consistently been China's largest trading partner. In 2007, the gross trade turnover between China and Japan reached 236 billion dollars, China became Japan's largest trading partner, Japan ranked third among China's trading partners. Sino-Japanese economic relations can develop dynamically and have prospects for steady development due to the following factors:
First, China and Japan are neighboring states separated by a narrow strip of water. Geographical proximity is a favorable condition for the development of international trade and economic cooperation.
Japan, as the world's second largest economy, has outpaced China in high and new technology manufacturing, technology-intensive and capital-intensive industries, has advanced technology to save energy and protect environment, has extensive experience in lifting the country by means of technology. And China is the world's largest developing country, in which the economy has developed rapidly in the past 30 years, and a large market demand has formed. Differences in the amount of resources and economic structure determined the greater complementarity between the two parties in the process of economic development.
Third, in recent years, China great effort puts into practice the concept of scientific development, promotes a change in the ways of economic growth, considers energy saving and environmental protection as important economic goals. Japan has advanced technologies environmental protection, moreover, it strives to become a powerful country in environmental protection. This will expand the space for trade, economic and technical cooperation between China and Japan.
Fourth, Japan is a densely populated country, eastern region China's most developed economy is also densely populated. They have some similarities in the field of the environment. Moreover, Japan can provide some experience and models of social development.
Fifth, Sino-Japanese trade and economic relations are developing against the global background, against the background of the globalization of the economy and the trend towards integration of the regional economy. There is a complex interpenetration between the economies of different countries, or, as they say, you have mine, and I have yours. Economic ties between China and Japan have developed against such a background and with such a basic trend, which is why we must keep pace with them. In a sense, Sino-Japanese economic relations are becoming "relationships of global importance" every day. Recently, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, along with other East Asian countries, launched a fund plan aimed at countering potential financial shocks on a global scale. This testified that the economic cooperation of the East Asian countries was already of a certain strategic nature, that economic integration in the East Asian region should also achieve something.
Sixth, economic ties are essentially a kind of mutually beneficial relationship, a feature that characterizes China-China economic ties even more clearly. For example, Japanese government assistance, enterprise investment plays a huge role in China's socio-economic development, on the other hand, the export of Japanese goods to China has greatly contributed to Japan's recovery from the economic depression that has dragged on for 10 years, the export of Chinese products to Japan is beneficial to maintaining a higher living standards of the Japanese people.
It should be said that the current Sino-Japanese ties have acquired a fairly large scale, moreover, they are relatively strong. If both sides can better regulate national psychology and remove political obstacles, they will gain even more momentum and confidence in economic cooperation. In the past ten years, Japan has experienced economic stagnation to some extent, fearing a trend of economic marginalization. Now Asia has become a source of driving force for the growth of the world economy, the future of the Japanese economy must also be in Asia.
In the future, the Chinese economy will develop rapidly by adjusting the industrial structure and improving the technical level, which will give a new impetus to the development of economic and trade relations between China and Japan, while also opening up a new space for cooperation. In the future, if only both parties, taking into account the interests of the whole, act in accordance with the requirements of the time, they will undoubtedly be able to raise new level Sino-Japanese trade and economic relations. (Author of the article is Huang Qing, senior editor of the People's Daily)-o-
中日经贸为什么前景看好
自 １９７２ 年中 日 邦交 正常化 以来 中 日 经贸 关系 发展 ， 至 ２００５ 年 ， 双方 贸易额 增长 １６０ 多 倍。 在 １９９３ 至 ２００３ 年 ， 日本 是 中国 最 大 的 伙伴国。 ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ ２００７ HI ， 中 日 双边 贸易 总额 达 亿 美元 ， 中国 是 最 最 的 贸易 伙伴 ， 日本 是 中国 大 贸易 伙伴。 中 经济 关系 之所以 能 发展 并 具有 发展 的 前景 ， 有 个 因素 因素 因素 因素 因素 因素 因素 因素 因素 HI 其 一 ， 中 日 两 国 是 一 衣 带 、 一 苇可航 苇可航 的 邻国 地理 上 接近 成为 贸易 和 经济 合作 的 良好 条件。 二 日本 作为 世界 经济 大 国 ， 高新 产业 、 、 、 、 、 、 、 、 、 、 HI 密集型 产业 、 资金 密集型 产业 上 中国 ， 拥有 先进 的 环保 环保 和 技术 立国 经验。 中国 是 上 最 大 的 发展中 ， ３０ 年 来 发展 迅速 ， 需求 旺盛。 资源 和 的 差异 差异 差异 差异 差异 差异 差异 差异 差异 HI 了 双方 在 经济 发展 的 过程 有 很 强 的 互补性 其 三 ， 近年 来 ， 中国 着力 实践 发展观 ， 推动 经济 增长 的 转变 ， 节能 环保 成为 重要 经济 目标。 日本 拥有 环保 技术 技术 技术 技术 技术 技术 技术 技术 环保 HI ， 亦 有 成为 环保 大国 的 意向 这 将 进一步 扩大 中 日 经贸 经贸 和 合作 的 空间。 其 ， 日本 是 一 个 人口 稠密 国家 中国 经济 最 的 东部 " 之间 有 若干 环境 相近性。 在 发展 方面 ， 日本 亦 提供 提供 某些 可 的 经验 和 模式 其 五 ， 中 日 经贸 有 一 个 的 大 背景 " 的 趋势。 各 国 经济 之间 呈现 呈现 你 中 有 我 ， 我 中 有 你 你 的 复杂。 中 日 经济 就 是 在 这 种 背景 、 趋势 下 发展 的 ， 也 必须 这样 的 大 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 背景 HI 大 趋势。 在 某 种 意义 上 上, 中 经济 关系 日益 成为 成为 世界 中 的 中日 经济 关系 关系 关系 最近 ， 韩 和 其它 东亚 国家 启动 应对 世界 金融 动荡 的 计划 ， 反映 出 东亚 的 的 的 的 国家 国家 国家 国家 国家 国家 国家 HI 经济 合作 已 具有 一定 的 战略 ， 说明 东亚 地区 在 经济 一体化 也 必须 有所 作为。 其 ， 经济 关系 在 本质 上 一 种 种 互惠 关系 中 日 经济 关系 的 这 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 特点 HIP 。 例如 ， 日本 的 政府 援助 企业 投资 等 对 中国 经济 社会 发展 发展 有助益 ， 另 一 ， 日本 对 华 出口 对 经济 走出 走出 年 很 有 帮助 ， 对 日 出口 则 对 保持 保持 保持 保持 保持 保持 保持 保持 保持 保持 HI 较 高 生活 水平 很 有 帮助 应该 说 ， 当前 中 日 经贸 已 有 相当 规模 ， 而且 比较。 如果 双方 能 更 好 地 民族 心理 消除 政治 ， 在 经济 合作 上 则 有 更 的 的 的 的 的 的 的 的 的 的 的 HI 和 信心。 日本 近 １０ 年 不 大 景气 ， 有 边缘化 的 忧虑。 当前 ， 亚洲 是 世界 增长 的 动力源 ， 日本 经济 前途 也 应该 在 亚洲。 ， 中国 经济 会 在 调整 和 和 和 和 和 和 和 和 调整 HI 技术升级上有较快的发展，这会给中日经贸关系带来一些 新 的 因素 ， 同时 也 会 新 的 合作 空间。 ， 只要 中 日 双方 在 经贸 关系 有 大局观 ， 有 胸怀 ， 采取 君子 顺势 为 为 为 ， 就 一定 能 把 日 推向 推向 推向 推向 推向 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 关系 " 新的高度。
The history of China and Japan is different in nature, goals, methods, periods of cooperation, conflict stages, competitive exacerbations. Cooperation often turned into rivalry. However, the growing interdependence of the two states is forcing Tokyo to take this into account in political, economic, and cultural contacts today as well.
Acquaintance of countries begins its report from the year 57. At this time, the Chinese record in their historical texts about the transfer of the golden seal by the emperor of the Later Han dynasty to the people of Wa (as the Japanese were called). The arrival of the ambassadors of the country Na with tribute to speaks of the dependence of the still small country on the Chinese rulers.
According to legend, the first Chinese emperor, Qin Shi Huang, equips the Chinese to Japan in order to search for the potion of immortality. The envoys told about many traditions of a kindred, as the Japanese declared, nation (they declared kinship with the descendants of Wu Taibo - wang of the Wu state during the Warring States). Special, close contacts between the two countries took place during the reign of the Tang dynasty. Japan sent a considerable number of students to study in China. The Chinese welcomed them kindly. Those, in turn, were amazed by the beauty, grandeur.
Close cooperation resulted in the dissemination among the population of Japan, culture, traditions of the Celestial Empire (Chinese calculus according to the lunar calendar, etc.), copying of architectural buildings, urban design. For example, the capitals of Japan and China were built according to the rules of Feng Shui. The Japanese use includes use. became the basis for Japanese writing. However, the model of Chinese imperial rule in the state of Japan did not last long. Since the 10th century, clan power has been established, family competition among the Japanese elite.
The first armed conflict took place in 663 on the Paekkang River. It was attended by the army of the Chinese emperor Tang and the state of Silla on the one hand, and the troops of the state of Yamato (Japan) and the Korean country of Baekche on the other hand. Silla pursued a specific goal: the capture of Baekje. The destruction of 300 Yamato ships hastened the fall of Baekje. This historical fact separated Japan from China for some time, she had to polish her naval skills and shipbuilding. The Ryukyu Islands have become a transshipment link in trade between countries.
Beginning in 1633, commercial transactions with China were limited to the Tokugawa shogunate, which did not particularly concern the Chinese imperial court in. Trade relations between Japan and China resumed only in the 20th century.
In the 13th century, Japan was torn apart by civil wars. At this time, Japanese pirates begin their victorious march. They have become a serious problem for Korea and China. Kublai, the Chinese emperor of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, sends envoys to Japan to stop pirate raids. But one of the messengers is beheaded by the Japanese government. The emperor could not bear such humiliation, he invades Japan by sea. The centuries-old experience of navigation did not bring victory to Khubilai. The invasion of Japan was unsuccessful.
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, one of those who unified Japan, dreamed of conquering China. But Korea became an obstacle, not allowing Japanese troops to cross its borders. Another military conflict began between Japan and China. In 1592, the Chinese army was defeated in Pyongyang. A year later, in a great Chinese battle, under the leadership of Li Zhusun, an army of forty-five thousand drove out the Japanese, capturing Pyongyang. The Japanese counter-offensive was unsuccessful, they retreated. Four years of truce, the title of "King of Japan" did not calm Hideyoshi, he is conducting another campaign. Its result was the destruction of Korean cities, culture, the extermination of the population, the devastation of the treasury of China. The policy of isolation until the middle of the 19th century was dominant in Japan. The events of subsequent centuries widened the crack in the relations between the two powers.
1894 - First Sino-Japanese War. China leaves Manchuria, losing a large number of ordinary people, paying huge compensations.
1915 - the famous 21 demands in which Japan actually demanded submission from China. China gives Japan territory in Shandong.
1931 - Japan, having occupied Manchuria, creates a new country, Manchukoku. Resistance to the Japanese invasion, diplomatic dialogues, civil war contributed to the turbulent era of nationalist leadership.
A shameful fact in the history of Japan was the Nanjing massacre in 1937: Japanese soldiers exterminated 500,000 Chinese. Experiments in the creation of bacteriological weapons (Detachment 731) on civilians and servicemen were distinguished by inhumanity. The famous did not save the Chinese from the Japanese occupation.
Only after the complete surrender of Japan on September 9, 1945, the troops leave China, which was disturbed by a civil war for several more years.
It can be boldly stated that the events from 1894 to 1945 largely influenced the current and future Japanese-Chinese relations. The following questions were the cornerstone:
1) Japan is rewriting history books that deny its aggression against China.
2) The question of Taiwan. China puts forward a protest against the actions of Japan, which are aimed at creating two Chinas.
3) Claims to the Diaoyu Islands belonging to the province of Taiwan, which has belonged to China since ancient times.
4) The chemical weapons left behind by the Japanese after the occupation are still a threat to the population today (the environmental disaster from the decomposition of chemical weapons has been worrying the population for decades).
Since 1979, relations between Japan and China have been moving to a higher quality and more productive level. Japan provides China with low-interest loans and transfers one and a half billion in aid. The main investment was Japanese technology, culture of production, technical assistance in the development of the automotive industry, the communicative sphere.
The rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo will no doubt last for a long time to come.
*** "We hereby award you the title of 'Queen of Wa, friendly to Wei'... May your reign, O Queen, be peaceful and your deeds disinterested." — from a letter from Emperor Cao Rui to the Japanese Empress Himiko in 238 AD, Wei Zhi (History of the Kingdom of Wei, c. 297 AD) ***
*** “From the emperor of the country where the sun rises to the emperor of the country where the sun sets,” from a letter from Empress Suiko to Emperor Yangdi of the Sui dynasty dated 607 AD. e., "Nihon shoki" ("Annals of Japan", 720 AD)
The specter of two of the world's strongest countries competing for power and influence is shaping the ideas of scholars and observers who argue that the future of Asia, and perhaps even the world, will be shaped by the United States and China. From economics to political influence and security issues, American and Chinese politics are seen as inherently contradictory, creating an uneasy relationship between Washington and Beijing that affects many other countries in Asia and beyond.
However, this scenario often ignores another aspect of intra-Asian competition that may well be just as important as in the case of America and China. For millennia, the relationship between China and Japan has been more interdependent, competitive, and weighty than the recent ties between Washington and Beijing. Each side aspired to dominance or at least the greatest influence in Asia, and it was this rivalry that determined the relationship of each of them with their neighbors at various stages of history.
Today, there is little doubt that Sino-American competition has the greatest direct impact on the entire Asian region, especially in the field of security. America's longstanding alliances, including with Japan, and the provision of such benefits public safety, like freedom of navigation, remain major alternative strategies to Beijing's security policy. In any potential clash between the two major Asian powers, one of the antagonists is naturally China and the United States. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the Sino-Japanese rivalry as something of secondary importance. These two Asian states will undoubtedly compete long after US foreign policy is shaped, whether Washington withdraws from Asia, reluctantly accepts Chinese hegemony, or bolsters its security and political presence. Moreover, Asian countries themselves understand that Sino-Japanese relations represent a new great game in Asia, and in many ways, eternal competition.
Several centuries before the appearance of the first historical data about Japan, not to mention the formation of the first centralized state, the envoys of its largest clan appeared at the court of the Han Dynasty and its successors. The first arrivals in the Eastern Han were representatives of the Wa people in 57 AD. e., although some documents date the first meetings between the Chinese and Japanese communities to the end of the second century BC. e. It is quite natural that these references to Sino-Japanese relations are closely related to China's invasion of the Korean Peninsula, with which ancient Japan has been trading since ancient times. And observers of the time were not surprised by the Wei court's expectation of reverence for China. Slightly more surprising, perhaps, is the seventh-century attempt by a newly-minted island state, just beginning to unite, to proclaim not only equality with the most powerful country in Asia, but also superiority over it.
The large-scale nature of Sino-Japanese relations became evident from the early stages: the competition for influence, the claims of both sides for superiority and complexity in the context of the geopolitical balance in Asia. And although two millennia have already passed, the foundation of these relations has changed little. However, now a new variable has been added to the equation. Over the past centuries, at a certain point in time, the power, influence and presence international relations only one of the two powers differed, and today both of them are strong, united, global players, well aware of strengths opponent and their own weaknesses.
Most American and even Asian observers believe that in the foreseeable future, the situation in Asia, and even around the world, will be determined precisely by Sino-American relations. However, competition between China and Japan has existed for much longer, and therefore its significance should not be underestimated. As the U.S. begins a period of introspection and adjustment of foreign and security policy after Iraq and Afghanistan, the ongoing struggle to maintain vast global commitments, and the determination of Donald Trump's intended foreign policy adjustment, the age-old rivalry between Tokyo and Beijing is about to enter an even more intense phase. . It is these dynamics that are likely to shape the future of Asia, as well as the relationship between Washington and Beijing, in the coming decades.
The claim that Asia's future will be decided between China and Japan may sound fanciful, especially after two decades of extraordinary economic growth that has seen China become the world's largest economy (at least in terms of purchasing power parity) and a parallel 25 years of economic stagnation in Japan. Yet, in 1980, the same claim would have sounded just as unrealistic, except when Japan had been accumulating economic returns in double-digit and high-single digits for several years, while China was barely able to pull itself out of a generation-long economic return. the catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Just a few decades ago, it was predicted that Japan would become a world financial power in the full sense of the word, and only the United States would be able to resist it.
However, for most of history, comparing Japan to China was simply not practical. Island powers are rarely able to compete with cohesive continental states. Since the emergence of the unified Chinese empires starting with the Qin Empire in 221 BC. e., Japan has always lagged behind its continental neighbor. Even during periods of disunity, many disparate and competing parts of China were either the same size as Japan or larger. Thus, during the half century of the Three Kingdoms era, when Japan's Queen Wa paid homage to the kingdom of Wei, each of the three domains - Wei, Shu, and Wu - controlled more territory than Japan's nascent imperial house. China's natural sense of superiority is reflected in the very word used to refer to Japan, Wa, which means "dwarf people" or, as alternative translation, "submissive people", which corresponded to the Chinese ideology regarding other ethnic groups in antiquity. Similarly, due to Japan's geographic isolation from the continent, the dangerous crossing of the Sea of Japan to Korea was only rarely attempted by intrepid Buddhist monks and merchants. Early Chinese chronicles repeatedly described Japan as a country "in the middle of the ocean", emphasizing its isolation and difference from continental states. Long periods of Japanese political isolation, such as the Heian period (794-1185) or the Edo period (1603-1868), also indicated that Japan was largely outside the mainstream of Asian historical development for centuries.
Origin modern world turned the traditional inequality between Japan and China on its head. Indeed, what the Chinese continue to call the “age of humiliation,” from the Opium War of 1839 to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, largely coincided with Japan’s rise to become the world’s first major non-Western power. As the centuries-old Qing dynasty collapsed, and with it China's thousand-year-old imperial system, Japan became a modern nation-state that would inflict military defeat on two of the greatest empires of its time: China itself in 1895 and Tsarist Russia a decade later. Japan's disastrous decision to invade Manchuria in the 1930s and fight simultaneously with the United States and other European powers led to the devastation of all of Asia. However, as China plunged into decades of military dictatorship after the 1911 revolution and then into civil war between the nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek and the communists of Mao Zedong, Japan after the devastation of 1945 became the second largest economy in the world.
Since 1990, however, the tide has changed, and China has assumed an even more dominant position in the world, something that Tokyo, at the height of its post-war dominance, could only dream of. If we imagine an international power as a three-legged stool based on political influence, economic dynamism and military strength, then Japan fully developed its economic potential only after the Second World War, and then lost its position a few decades later. Beijing, meanwhile, has dominated international political forums as it builds the world's second-largest military and becomes a trading partner for more than 100 nations around the world.
And yet, in comparative terms, both China and Japan are now rich and powerful states. Despite a generation of economic stagnation, Japan remains the third largest economy in the world. It spends roughly $50 billion a year on its military, resulting in one of the most advanced and well-trained armies on the planet. On the continent, the second most powerful country in the world after the United States is China, with its audacious Belt and Road initiative, free trade proposals and a growing area of military influence. This approximate parity is something new in the context of the relationship between Japan and China, and perhaps also the most important, but not often recognized factor. It also became an incentive for intense competition between the parties in Asia.
In fact, competition between countries does not lead to aggression or any particularly contentious relationship. Indeed, looking at Sino-Japanese relations from the perspective of 2017 may distort how traditionally their ties have been uneasy. For long periods of its history, Japan has regarded China as a beacon in a dark sea—the most advanced civilization in Asia and a model of political, economic, and sociocultural forms. And although sometimes this admiration turned into an attempt to declare equality, if not superiority, as in the era of the Tang dynasty (7th-10th century) or a millennium later during the reign of the Tokugawa shoguns (17th-19th centuries), talk about the lack of interaction between two sides would be a mistake. Similarly, the Chinese reformers realized that in the late nineteenth century, Japan had made such significant strides in modernizing its feudal system that it had for a time become a role model itself. It is no coincidence that in the early years of the twentieth century, the father of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, Sun Yat-sen, lived during his exile from China in Japan. Even after Japan's brutal invasion and occupation of China in the Pacific theater of war, Japanese politicians in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, tried to find a way with China mutual language, restore relations, and even contemplated a new era of Sino-Japanese relations that would later shape the Cold War in Asia.
Such fragile hopes, not to mention mutual respect, now seem simply impossible. For more than a decade, Japan and China have been locked in a seemingly unbreakable vicious circle in their relationship, characterized by suspicion and increasingly tight security, political and economic maneuvering. With the exception of the actual Japanese invasions of China in 1894-95 and 1937-45, the history of Japanese-Chinese competition has often been as rhetorical and intellectual as it is real. The current competition is more direct even under the conditions of Sino-Japanese economic integration and globalization.
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InoSMI 21.03.2017The current atmosphere of Japanese-Chinese hostility and distrust is clearly expressed. A series of opinion polls conducted by the Japanese non-profit think tank Genron NPO in 2015-16 revealed the dire state of relations between the two countries. In 2016, 78% of Chinese and 71% of Japanese surveyed described relations between their states as "bad" or "relatively bad". From 2015 to 2016, both sectors of the audience also saw a significant increase in expectations of worsening relations, from 13.6% to 20.5% for China and from 6.6% to 10.1% for Japan. When asked whether Sino-Japanese relations are a potential source of conflict in Asia, 46.3% of Japanese and 71.6% of Chinese answered yes. The same findings can be seen in other surveys, such as the one conducted in 2016 by the Pew Research Center: 86% of Japanese and 81% of Chinese held unfavorable views of each other.
The reasons for such high public distrust largely reflect the unresolved political disputes between Beijing and Tokyo. A Genron NPO survey showed that more than 60% of Chinese, for example, argued their unfavorable impression of Japan by the latter’s lack of excuses and remorse over World War II, as well as the nationalization in September 2012 of the Senkaku Islands, which China calls Diaoyu and considers its own. territory.
Indeed, the question of history haunts Sino-Japanese relations. Astute Chinese leaders used him as a moral "club" to strike at Tokyo. A Pew Research Center poll revealed that a vast majority of Chinese — 77% — believe that Japan has not yet sufficiently apologized for the war, and more than 50% of Japanese do not agree. Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors 18 Class A war criminals, in December 2013 was yet another provocation in the eyes of the Chinese that seemed to play down Japan's remorse for the war amid Abe's modest military buildup. and challenging Chinese claims in the East China Sea. A visit to China in the spring of 2017 did not reveal a decline in anti-Japanese representations on Chinese television; at least a third, if not more, of the programs broadcast during the evening hours talked about the Japanese invasion of China, given the plausibility that fluent Japanese-speaking actors brought.
If the Chinese are focused on the past, then the Japanese are most concerned about the present and the future. In the same polls, almost 65% of Japanese said that their negative attitude towards China was due to the never-ending dispute over the Senkaku Islands, and more than 50% attributed the unfavorable impression to "seemingly hegemonic actions by the Chinese." Thus, 80% of Japanese and 59% of Chinese polled by the Pew Research Center said they were either "very" or "somewhat" concerned about the possibility of military conflict as a result of territorial disputes between their countries.
Such negative impressions and fear of war arise despite almost unprecedented levels of economic interaction. Even amid China's recent economic downturn, according to the CIA World Factbook, Japan remained China's third largest trading partner, accounting for 6% of exports and about 9% of imports; China turned out to be the largest trading partner for Japan, while the shares of exports and imports amounted to 17.5% and 25%, respectively. Although exact numbers are hard to come by, it is claimed that ten million Chinese are directly or indirectly employed by Japanese firms, most of them on the mainland. The neoliberal assumption that wider economic ties raise the threshold for security conflicts is not uncommon in Sino-Japanese relations, and both proponents and critics of the concept may argue that this moment their interpretation is correct. Since the decline in relations under Junichiro Koizumi's administration, Japanese scholars such as Masaya Inoue have described them as seirei keinetsu: cool politically and warm economically. That relationship is also reflected in the rise in the number of Chinese tourists traveling to Japan (nearly 6.4 million in 2016) and the Chinese National Tourism Administration's claims that about 2.5 million Japanese visited the country, surpassing these numbers. only South Korean tourists can do it.
However, the developing Sino-Japanese economic relations could not remain unaffected by geopolitical tensions. Disputes over the Senkaku archipelago led to a sharp decline in Japanese foreign direct investment in China in 2013 and 2014, with investment falling by 20 percent and 50 percent year-on-year, respectively. This decline was accompanied by a similar increase in Japanese investment in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.
The negative attitude of Japanese business towards China is reflected in the political and intellectual spheres. Japanese analysts worried for years about the long-term effects of China's rise, and then these fears turned into open anxiety, especially after China's economy overtook Japan's in 2011. Since the political crisis sparked by the repeated incidents in the Senkaku Islands began in 2010, politicians in Tokyo have interpreted Beijing's actions as a show of newfound national strength and become frustrated with the United States for its seemingly arrogant attitude towards Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea. In 2016, at an international conference I attended, a senior Japanese diplomat lambasted Washington and other Asian capitals for using mere rhetoric to fight China's expansion in Asian waters and warned that it would probably be too late to dampen Beijing's ardour. in the process of gaining military dominance. "You don't understand," he repeated with unusual bluntness, denouncing what he considered (like perhaps his superiors) to be unjustified complacency in connection with China's claims throughout Asia. It is not difficult to understand that some leading ideologues and officials view China as a five-minute deadly threat to Japan's freedom of action.
As for Chinese officials, almost all of them treat Japan and its future prospects with disdain. One of the leading scientists told me that the number of wealthy Chinese citizens already exceeded the total population of Japan, and therefore there could be no question of any competition between the parties; according to him, Japan is simply not able to stay afloat, and therefore its influence (and ability to resist China) is doomed to disappear. A similar almost entirely negative view of Japan was demonstrated by my visit to one of China's most influential think tanks. Numerous analysts have expressed skepticism about Japan's intentions in the South China Sea, demonstrating concern about Japan's growing activity in the region. “Japan wants to get out of the [post-war] American system and end the alliance,” argued one analyst. Another criticized Tokyo for its "destructive role" in Asia and for building a shaky alliance against China. Underlying much of this sentiment among the Chinese elite is a refusal to recognize Japan's legitimacy as a core Asian state, along with fears that Japan is the only Asian country—other than, perhaps, India—that could prevent China from achieving certain goals, such as maritime dominance during inland seas Asia.
The sense of distrust between China and Japan is not only a testament to long-standing tensions, but also to both countries' uncertainty about their positions in Asia. Taken together, such instability and tension breed competition, even as large-scale economic relations are maintained.
China's and Japan's foreign policy in Asia increasingly seems to be aimed at countering each other's influence—or blocking goals. Such a competitive approach is carried out in the context of the deep economic interactions noted above, as well as the superficial hospitality of regular diplomatic exchanges. In fact, one of the most immediate conflicts is in the area of regional trade and investment.
With the start of economic modernization and the creation of a post-war political alliance with the United States, Japan helped shape the nascent economic institutions and agreements in Asia. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), founded in Manila in 1966, has always been led by the Japanese President in close cooperation with the World Bank. These two institutions set most of the standards for sovereign lending, including expectations for political reform and broad national development. In addition to ADB, Japan has also spent hundreds of billions of dollars of official development assistance since 1954. By 2003 it had disbursed $221 billion globally, and in 2014 it was still spending about $7 billion in official aid; 3.7 billion of this amount was spent in East and South Asia, especially in Southeast Asia and Myanmar. Political scientists Barbara Stallings and Yoon Mi Kim noted that overall, more than 60% foreign aid Japan accounts for Eastern, Southern and Central Asia. Japanese aid has traditionally focused on infrastructure development, water supply and sanitation, healthcare, and human resource development.
As for China, in terms of organizational initiatives and assistance, it has always lagged behind Japan, although in the 1950s it also began to provide assistance abroad. Scholars note that assessing China's development assistance to neighbors is hampered in part by duplication of commercial transactions with foreign countries. In addition, more than half of aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa and only 30% goes to East, South and Central Asia.
In recent years, Beijing has begun to increase its activity in both areas as part of a comprehensive regional foreign policy. Perhaps most notable has been China's recent efforts to diversify Asia's regional financial architecture through the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The corresponding proposal was announced in 2013, and the bank officially opened in January 2016 and soon attracted the participation of almost all states, with the exception of Japan and the United States. The AIIB explicitly sought to "democratize" the regional lending process, as Beijing had long complained about ADB's harsh rules and governance, which gave China less than 7% of total voting shares, while Japan and the United States secured 15% each. Providing China with a dominant position, Beijing owns 32% of the shares of the AIIB and 27.5% of the votes; the next largest shareholder is India with 9% of the shares and just over 8% of the votes. Compared with ADB assets of about $160 billion and $30 billion in loan terms, the AIIB still has a long way to go towards achieving a size that is commensurate with its ambitions. It was originally given $100 billion, but only ten of those have been paid out to date, on track to the $20 billion goal. Given its initially small base, the AIIB disbursed only 1.7 billion in loans in its first year, with another 2 billion planned for 2017.
Many in Asia support the apparent rivalry between China and Japan in aid and finance. Officials Desperate infrastructure-hungry countries such as Indonesia are hoping for a lucky break in the ADB-AIIB competition, in which Japan's high social and environmental standards will help improve the quality of Chinese credit, and China's lower cost structure will make projects more affordable. With $26 trillion in infrastructure needs by 2030, the more additional sources of funding and assistance are available, the better, according to the ADB, even if Tokyo and Beijing see both financial institutions as tools to achieve more substantial goals.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has tied the AIIB to his ambitious, if not grandiose, Belt and Road Initiative, turning the new bank into a virtual infrastructure lending complex alongside the old China Development Bank and the new Silk Road Fund. Compared to Japan, China has focused most of its foreign aid on infrastructure, and the Belt and Road Initiative is the latest and largest implementation of this priority. It is this initiative, also known as the "new Silk Road", that represents one of the key challenges for Japan's economic presence in Asia. At the first Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017, Xi pledged to invest $1 trillion in infrastructure spanning Eurasia and beyond, trying to basically link land and sea trade routes in the context of a new global economic architecture. Xi also pledged that the Belt and Road Initiative will seek to reduce poverty in both Asia and the world. Despite the widespread suspicion that the sums invested in the initiative will turn out to be much lower than promised, Xi's scheme is both a political and an economic program.
Functioning as a quasi-trade agreement, the Belt and Road Initiative also highlights Tokyo-Beijing competition in free trade. Despite what many see as a fearful and sluggish trade policy, the Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima proposed the creation of an "Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area" in fact as early as 1966, although in earnest the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum The idea began to be perceived only in the mid-2000s. In 2003, Japan and ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began negotiations on a free trade agreement, which came into force in 2008.
Japan's main impetus for free trade was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which it formally joined in 2013. Linking Japan to the United States and ten other Pacific nations, the TPP would account for almost 40% of world output and a quarter of world trade. However, with the US withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017, the future of the pact was in doubt. Prime Minister Abe is unenthusiastic about the prospect of renegotiating the pact, given the political capital spent on launching it. For Japan, the TPP continues to be a functional element of a larger unity of interest based on the expansion of trade and investment and the adoption of common regulatory schemes.
China has been striving to catch up with Japan on the trade front for the past decade, signing its own free trade agreement with ASEAN in 2010 and renewing it in 2015, with the aim of achieving bilateral trade in 2020 total amount one trillion dollars, and investments - in the amount of 150 billion. More importantly, in 2011, China adopted an ASEAN initiative known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to link ten ASEAN states with six dialogue partners: China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. RCEP, which accounts for nearly 40% of global production and nearly 3.5 billion people, is increasingly seen as the Chinese alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
While Japan and Australia have sought, in particular, to slow down a final RCEP deal, Beijing has received a huge boost from the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has resulted in the widespread belief that China has emerged as the world's economic powerhouse. Tokyo is not particularly successful in combating such an opinion, but continues to offer alternatives to China's dominant economic initiatives. One of these approaches is to continue negotiations under the RCEP, and the other is to jointly finance certain projects between ADB and AIIB. Such joint competition between Japan and China may become the norm in the context of regional economic relations, even though each side seeks to maximize its influence both in the institutions of power and with Asian states.
When it comes to security issues, the struggle between Beijing and Tokyo for influence and power in Asia is far less ambiguous. In the case of Japan, which is well known for its pacifist society and various restrictions on its military, it may seem strange that over the past decade China and Japan have sought to break out of stereotypical security structures. Beijing is focused on the United States, which it considers a serious threat to its freedom of action in the Asia-Pacific region. But observers should not ignore the degree of concern about Japan among Chinese politicians and analysts, some of whom see the threat posed by it as greater than even the American one.
Neither Japan nor China have real allies in Asia, a fact often overlooked when discussing their regional foreign policy. They dominate or have the potential to dominate their smaller neighbors, making it difficult to build trust. Moreover, Asia has memories of each as an imperialist power, providing yet another reason for often tacit wariness.
For Japan, this distrust is exacerbated by its onerous attempt to deal with the legacy of World War II, and by the feeling in most Asian states that it has not apologized enough for its aggression and atrocities. Yet Japan's longstanding pacifist constitution and its limited military presence in Asia after 1945 helped ease suspicions about its intentions. Since the 1970s, Tokyo has prioritized building ties with the countries of Southeast Asia, although the latter have until recently focused mainly on trade.
Returning to power in 2012, Prime Minister Abe decided to increase Japan's defense spending and begin building up security cooperation in the region. After a decade of decline, each of Abe's defense budgets has been increasingly substantial since 2013, now totaling about $50 billion a year. Then, by reforming post-war legal restrictions such as arms bans and collective self-defense, Abe tried to offer Japan's support as a way to weaken China's growing military presence in Asia. The sale of maritime patrol boats and aircraft to other countries, including Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, is intended to help build the capacity of these states in territorial disputes with China over the Spratly archipelago and the Paracel Islands. Similarly, Tokyo hoped to sell the next generation of its submarines to Australia, as well as provide India with amphibious search and rescue aircraft, although both of these plans ultimately either failed or were put on hold.
Despite such setbacks, Japan has expanded its security cooperation with various Asian states, including in the South China Sea. She officially joined the Indian-American naval exercises "Malabar", and in July 2017 sent her largest helicopter carrier to the exercises after three months of calls in the ports of Southeast Asia. The Japan Coast Guard is still actively engaged with countries in the region and plans to establish a joint maritime security organization with the Southeast Asian Coast Guard to help them deal not only with piracy and natural disasters, but also improve their ability to control and protect disputed territories in Southeast Asia. - China Sea. And most recently, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono announced a $500 million maritime security initiative in Southeast Asia to build capacity between nations along the busiest waterways.
If Tokyo was trying to build bridges to Asian countries, then Beijing was building artificial islands in an attempt to gain recognition as the dominant Asian security power. China faces a more complex security equation in Asia than Japan, given disputes in the East China and South China Seas, as well as territorial disputes with neighbors, including major countries like India. The dramatic growth of China's military forces over the past two decades has led not only to a more efficient navy and air force, but also to a policy aimed at defending and even extending its claims. The resonant land reclaiming and base building on the Spratly Islands exemplify Beijing's decision to defend its claims and back them up with a military presence that dwarfs the efforts of other rivals in the South China Sea. Similarly, China's increased maritime exercises in areas far from claimed territories, such as Malaysia's James Reef, have worried states that see Beijing's growing capability as a likely threat.
China has certainly made an attempt to resolve these issues through maritime diplomacy, namely the ongoing series of negotiations with ASEAN states on the South China Sea Code of Conduct and joint exercises with Malaysia. However, repeated acts of intimidation or outright warnings against Asian states have chilled all goodwill and made smaller states wonder how long it is worth condoning China's expansionist activities. In addition, the region is concerned that Beijing categorically rejects the decision of the International Court of Justice of The Hague regarding its claims to territory in the South China Sea. Unlike Japan, China did not seek to win friends through the supply of defensive equipment; the bulk of China's military sales in Asia go to North Korea, Bangladesh and Burma, forming a shaky structure, along with Pakistan (the largest consumer of Chinese arms supplies), isolated from those cooperating with Japan and the United States.
China's approach, which is a combination of pragmatic politics and limited power politics, is more likely to achieve its goals, at least in the short term, if not longer. Small states have no illusions about their ability to successfully resist Chinese encroachment; they hope either for Beijing's natural restraint or for an impossible task that will allow collective pressure to influence China's decision-making process. In this situation, Japan acts, first of all, as a "third wheel". Although Tokyo is able to defend its own territories in the East China Sea, it knows that its power in the region is limited. This requires not only continuing, if not strengthening, allied relations with the United States, but also an approach that would help complicate Beijing's decision-making, for example, by providing defensive equipment to the countries of Southeast Asia. Tokyo understands that it has the potential to help thwart—but not contain—Chinese expansion in Asia. In other words, Asia faces competing security strategies from its two most powerful countries: Japan seeks popularity; China - inspire fear.
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Die Welt 12.06.2016A deeper manifestation of Sino-Japanese rivalry is the model of Asian national development tacitly proposed by each side. It's not that Beijing is waiting for Pacific governments to embrace communism or for Tokyo to help establish parliamentary democracy. It is rather a fundamental question of how each state is treated by its neighbors and the influence of the parties in the region through the perception of their national strength, government effectiveness, social dynamism and the opportunities provided by the system.
Admittedly, this is a highly subjective approach, and evidence as to which of the two countries is more influential is likely to be anecdotal, inferential, and circumstantial rather than unequivocally informative. And this is not the same as the ubiquitous concept of using non-military methods. Non-coercive power is usually considered an element of national power and, in particular, the attractiveness of a particular system with regard to creating conditions through which given state can achieve political goals. While Beijing and Tokyo are clearly interested in advancing their national interests, the issue differs from how each side perceives and benefits from their policies.
Long gone are the days when Mahathir Mohamad could proclaim Japan as a role model from a Malaysian perspective, and China viewed Japan's modernization model as a paradigm. Tokyo's hopes of using its economic ties to Southeast Asia - the so-called "flock of flying geese" concept - for wider political influence were dashed by the rise of China in the 1990s. Beijing is the largest trading partner for all Asian states, where it occupies a central position. But Sino-Japanese relations have remained largely business-like amid lingering fears of overconfidence and Beijing's fears of being overwhelmed economically. In the short term, China may seem more influential due to its economic power, but even this translates into political success only in places. Nor is there an increase in the number of Asian states trying to imitate China's political model.
Alternatively, Tokyo and Beijing continue to compete for position and influence. Each of them negotiates with basically the same set of Asian entities, thus providing what Asians almost five minutes to consider market competition, in which small states are able to make better deals than if they deal with only one of the two sides. Moreover, both China and Japan base their policies in part on perceptions of US policy in Asia. Japan's alliance with the United States effectively unites Tokyo and Washington in a single bloc against Beijing, and also creates deep uncertainty about American intentions. Japan's concern about the plausibility of American promises to continue its involvement in the Asia-Pacific region sets the stage for Tokyo's plans for military modernization, partly to become a more effective partner and partly to avoid overdependence. At the same time, uncertainty about long term policy America is reinforced by Japan's desire to deepen relations and cooperation with India, Vietnam and other countries that share its concerns about the growing military power of China. Similarly, Beijing's response to the Obama administration's involvement in the South China Sea territorial dispute has been a program of land reclamation and base building on the Spratly Islands. The same can be said about China's finance and free trade initiatives, which are aimed at least in part at weakening the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was heavily promoted (but not initiated) by Washington, or the continued influence of the World Bank on regional lending.
From a purely material point of view, Japan will be left behind in any direct competition. Its days of economic glory are long gone, and it has never been particularly successful in transforming its still relatively powerful economy into political influence. The realization of the failure of its political system reinforces the feeling that Japan will most likely never regain the dynamism that characterized it in the first decades after the war.
However, Japan, as a stable democracy with a mostly satisfied, highly educated and healthy population, is still considered a benchmark for many Asian states. Having solved the problem of environmental pollution long ago and having a low crime rate, Japan is an attractive model for developing societies. Moderate foreign policy and minimal foreign military operations, combined with generous foreign aid, make Japan the most popular country in Asia, according to one Pew Research Center poll in 2015 — 71% of respondents were positive. China's approval rating was only 57%, and a third of respondents were negative.
But Japan's current reputation and attractiveness are only beneficial to a certain extent. When asked in 2016 by Japan's Genron NPO about Japan's potential rise in influence by 2026, 11.6% of Chinese and 23% of South Koreans answered yes; Surprisingly, only 28.5% of the Japanese themselves thought so. When Genron asked the same question about China in 2015, it turned out that 82.5% of Chinese, 80% of South Koreans and 60% of Japanese expect its growth in Asia by 2025. Two decades of China's economic growth and the stagnation of the Japanese economy are undoubtedly the cause of these results, but China's recent political initiatives under Xi Jinping probably also play a role.
Although Japan scored lower in regional opinion polls, China has sparked a wave of expectations that its might will become the dominant power in Asia, if not the world. This facilitated the process of bringing Asian states into cooperation or a wary neutrality. The AIIB is just one example of the convergence of Asian countries on the Chinese proposal; Others include the One Belt, One Road initiative. Beijing has also used its influence in a negative way, for example by putting pressure on Southeast Asian states such as Cambodia and Laos to counter harsh criticism of China's territorial claims in joint ASEAN communiqués.
At times, China's dominance worked against it, and Japan took advantage of the region's concerns about its power. When ASEAN member states proposed what became the East Asia Summit in the early 2000s, with China, Japan and South Korea, Tokyo, together with Singapore, successfully lobbied for Australia, India, and New Zealand to become full members. This addition of three more democracies was aimed at weakening China's influence in what was expected to be the largest pan-Asian multilateral initiative, and therefore was openly condemned by the Chinese media.
Neither Japan nor China has succeeded in establishing itself as the undisputed great power of Asia. The countries of Southeast Asia want, above all, not to be dragged into the Sino-Japanese—or, almost equivalently, Sino-American/Japanese—political and security dispute. Scholars Bhubhindar Singh, Sara Theo and Benjamin Ho argue that in recent years, ASEAN states have begun to pay more attention to relations between the United States and China, since it is the United States that has allies among the countries of Southeast Asia and it is the United States that has become involved in the dispute over territories in the South - China Sea.
However, Sino-Japanese relations are considered critical in the context of Asian stability in the short and long term. While this particular concern focuses more on security issues than on the more serious issues of national patterns, when national development comes into focus, the focus on China and Japan becomes even clearer. No one dismisses the continued importance of the United States in the context of Asia's short and medium term future, but awareness of the long history of Sino-Japanese relations and competition is a key element of a broader regional perception of power, leadership, and threat that will have a significant impact on Asia in the coming decades.
It would be banal, but useful, to say that neither Japan nor China can leave Asia. They are connected to each other and to their neighbors, and both have strained relations with the US. Economic ties between Japan and China are likely to deepen in the future, even if both sides begin to look for alternative opportunities and strive to structure Asian trade and economic relations in the most beneficial ways from the point of view of their interests. Without a doubt, there will be episodes of very intense political cooperation between Beijing and Tokyo, as well as a minimum number of ordinary diplomatic conventions. Exchanges at the local level will continue - at least thanks to millions of tourists.
However, as the history and civilizational achievements of these countries show, they will remain the two most powerful states in Asia, and this implies constant competition. Whether Japan remains allied with the United States or not, and whether China's aspirations to form a Pan-Asian Belt and Road Community succeed, the parties will not give up their attempts to influence the political, economic and security situation in Asia. Given the fact that the United States continues to challenge its global commitments and interests, leading to periods of relative attrition in Asia, China and Japan will remain bound by the complex, often tense and competitive relationship that is the never-ending big game in Asia.
Michael Oslin studies contemporary Asian issues at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He wrote this article while he was a permanent fellow of the American Enterprise Institute.
The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.
