When did the Afghan war start? Why did the USSR send troops to Afghanistan

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 - An armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to preserve the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a little curtain in this war, namely, the causes and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

Reason for hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign intervention in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was the result of a struggle for power between the government of Afghanistan and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy the political and financial support of the leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the "April Revolution" - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, the leader of which was in 1978. Nur Mohammad Taraki (was killed on the orders of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the backlog of Afghanistan ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, before the introduction Soviet troops, in Afghanistan began Civil War.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and strife between the supporters of Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and the defense of the Central Asian republics) prompted the Soviet leadership to send troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, without a formal decision on this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In March 1979, during the mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed. But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the evidence negative consequences direct Soviet intervention, and the request was denied.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the strengthening of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing in Afghanistan by the landing method of the 105th Guards Airborne Division. The number of Soviet advisers (including military ones) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the intervention of the USSR was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, which has been kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan, and the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense purposes was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov issued an order to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would become garrisons and guard important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition groups, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed over the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the Salang high mountain pass on the Termez-Kabul road in order to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. Paratroopers of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. were the first to land on the Kabul airfield. Shpak.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. Entering troops is not easy; During the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

Assessment of the situation. More and more reports came from Kabul with requests from H. Amin to bring Soviet troops into the DRA, as well as with assessments of the situation in Afghanistan. Moreover, representatives of various departments often gave conflicting information.

The strategic situation in the Near and Middle East in the late 1970s. was not in favor Soviet Union. The Camp David peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the defeat of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the elections, the military coup in Iraq, the Islamic revolution in Iran significantly weakened the Soviet position in the region. In this regard, the possibility of losing Afghanistan, which had "taken the socialist path of development," was perceived extremely painfully by the Soviet leadership.

According to Soviet analysts of that time, the events in the DRA became part of the world revolutionary process, and the leadership of the USSR was recommended to prevent the export of counter-revolution and to assist the "healthy forces" of Afghanistan in protecting the revolutionary gains. This position was in tune with the mood of the Soviet leaders. It seemed too tempting to have a reliable ally on their southern borders, connected with the Soviet Union by a common ideology and interests. But H. Amin seemed to be a man capable of reorienting himself to the West at any moment. This development was the most feared. Changes in exchange rates in Egypt, Chile, Somalia were still fresh in my memory ... And then "information" surfaced about Amin's involvement in the CIA.

Gradually, the idea arose to eliminate H. Amin and replace him with a more loyal figure. At that time, the leader of the Parcham faction, B. Karmal, was already in Moscow. According to experts, he enjoyed the support of a certain part of the Afghan party members and the population. Therefore, he was asked to lead the struggle to overthrow the regime of H. Amin.

Andropov's letter. In early December, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu.V. Andropov wrote to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. A letter to Brezhnev, in which he described the situation in Afghanistan as critical and proposed measures to ensure the protection of our interests in this region. Obviously, this letter gave a new impetus to the discussion and elaboration of the question of the need for Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan.

The leadership of the USSR came to the conclusion that without the Soviet troops it would be very difficult to create conditions for the removal of Amin from power. There were also no guarantees that the Afghan army would support B. Karmal and his new government. And even if he manages to seize power, will he be able to repel the attacks of the armed opposition?

Last meeting. On December 8, a meeting was held in Brezhnev's office, in which a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took part: Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, M.A. Suslov and D.F. Ustinov. They discussed the situation in Afghanistan and around it for a long time, weighed all the pros and cons of bringing Soviet troops there. Yu.V. Andropov and D.F. Ustinov cited the following arguments in defense of such a move: the efforts allegedly made by the US CIA (Paul Henzi, resident in Ankara) to create a “new Great Ottoman Empire» with the inclusion of the southern republics from the USSR; absence in the south reliable system air defense, that in the case of the deployment of American Pershing missiles in Afghanistan, many vital facilities, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome, were endangered; the possibility of using Afghan uranium deposits by Pakistan and Iraq to create nuclear weapons, establishing northern regions Afghan opposition authorities and the accession of this region to Pakistan. As a result, they decided to work out two options: to eliminate H. Amin by the KGB special services and transfer power in Afghanistan to B. Karmal; send a certain number of troops to Afghan territory for the same purposes.

The surprise of General Ogarkov. December 10, 1979 Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov summoned the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov and informed him that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision to temporarily send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and set the task of training 75-80 thousand people. N.V. Ogarkov was surprised by this decision, saying that 75 thousand people would not stabilize the situation and he was against the introduction of troops, as this was recklessness. But the minister besieged him: “Are you going to teach the Politburo? All you have to do is follow orders…”

On the same day, N.V. Ogarkov was urgently summoned to the office of L.I. Brezhnev, where the so-called "small Politburo" (Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov) gathered. The Chief of the General Staff again tried to convince those present that the Afghan problem must be solved by political means, and not rely on forceful methods. He referred to the traditions of the Afghans, who did not tolerate foreigners on their territory, warned of the likelihood of our troops being drawn into fighting but everything turned out to be in vain.

Board of the Ministry of Defense. In the evening D.F. Ustinov gathered a collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense and said that in the near future, obviously, a decision would be made on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and it was necessary to prepare an appropriate grouping. Directive G 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops. Starting from December 10, D.F. Ustinov began to give verbal instructions to the Chief of the General Staff on the formation of a new combined arms army in the Turkestan Military District, in particular, to prepare an airborne division, a separate parachute regiment for landing, to increase the combat readiness of two divisions in the Turkestan Military District, to understaff the pontoon -bridge regiment in the Kiev military district and send it to the Termez region. All activities were carried out in secret.

The Politburo inclined towards the use of troops even more confidently after receiving from Kabul a report from a representative of the KGB of the USSR with a negative assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. The report said that the Afghan leadership's requests for help had real grounds. The threat of collapse hung over the country's Marxist regime. The sober assessments of the situation by the Soviet military leaders were regarded by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU as a misunderstanding or underestimation of the political importance of the processes taking place in Afghanistan.

The last straw that tipped the scales in favor of sending troops to Afghanistan was the decision of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers at a meeting on December 12 in Brussels, which approved the deployment scenario in Western Europe new American medium-range missiles "Kruz" and "Pershing-2". These missiles could hit almost the entire European part of the USSR.

Final decision. It was on that day - December 12 - that the final decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In the Special Folder of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the protocol of this meeting of the Politburo, written by the secretary of the Central Committee K.U. Chernenko. It can be seen from the protocol that the initiators of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan were Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko. All members of the Politburo voted unanimously for the introduction of troops. However, noteworthy is the absence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was categorically against the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Either he himself chose not to appear at the meeting, or he was advised to do so, or the meeting was held without his knowledge. The latter still looks unlikely.

Cipher telegrams. The cipher telegrams that came later from Afghanistan, as it were, confirmed the correctness of the steps taken by the leadership of the USSR in relation to Afghanistan. According to a representative of the KGB of the USSR, Kh. Amin, during meetings with him on December 12 and 17, said that the Afghan leadership would welcome the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces in a number of strategically important points in the northern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The forms and methods of providing military assistance should be determined by the Soviet side.

The then leadership of the CPSU did not consider it necessary to bring such an important issue as the introduction of troops into a neighboring country for discussion. government agencies authorities - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Neither a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, nor a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, nor any other document on the issue of bringing in troops was adopted. All instructions were given orally, motivated by the need to ensure and mislead H. Amin.

official reason. The officially proclaimed goal of the Soviet military presence in the DRA was formulated unequivocally - to assist in stabilizing the situation and repel possible aggression from outside. Soviet troops were supposed to stand in garrisons and not get involved in an internal conflict and hostilities. They were ordered to protect the local population from gangs, as well as to distribute food, fuel and basic necessities. It was believed that the very presence of Soviet troops would be a powerful stabilizing factor, significantly strengthen the PDPA regime, have a deterrent effect on the opposition movement and ensure the stability of the military-political situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, it was emphasized that if the introduction of troops did happen, then it would be of a short-term nature.

At the same time, he hushed up the most important fact that the first task that our troops will have to solve will be the overthrow and elimination of H. Amin and his replacement by the Soviet protege B. Karmal. Consequently, the reference to the fact that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghan territory was carried out at the request of the legitimate government of the DRA is hardly justified.

In general, the decision of the Soviet leadership to send troops to the DRA was made without an appropriate analysis of the situation and a forecast of the development of the situation, an assessment of the causes, nature, scale and methods of resolving the conflict, and also without setting clear general political and strategic goals. As a result, Afghanistan for the Soviet Union became a "quagmire" like the one Vietnam was for the United States.

Afghan war- civil war in Afghanistan 1979-2001, in which in 1979-1989. Soviet troops were involved.

Crisis of the pro-Soviet regime

The crisis of the semi-feudal state in Afghanistan led to an increase in political upheaval in the 1970s. The pro-communist coup of 1978 and radical anti-feudal reforms destabilized the situation in the country. Repressions against all those dissatisfied with the regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) met with armed resistance from the population of the country. A resistance movement began to grow under the banner of Islam. Repression and the outbreak of war caused a flow of refugees to neighboring Pakistan. Already by the mid-1980s, their number reached more than 3 million people. Tens of thousands of them returned to Afghanistan with weapons supplied by NATO countries seeking to overthrow the PDPA regime.

The resistance to the communists was led by supporters of the Islamic state. Partisans were called fighters for the faith - Mujahideen.

Amin became the President of Afghanistan. In Moscow, Amin was considered an unpredictable leader who could reorient himself towards the United States or China in order to bring about an end to the war. Then a hostile state would have arisen at the borders of the USSR. To prevent this threat, the leaders of the Soviet Union decided to overthrow Amin, replace him with a more moderate leader Babarak Karmal, and at the same time a decision was made to introduce a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

After the entry of Soviet troops

The favorable geopolitical position of this small and poor country in the center of Eurasia predetermined the fact that for several hundred years the world powers have been fighting for control over it. In recent decades, Afghanistan has been the hottest spot on the planet.

Pre-war years: 1973-1978

Officially, the civil war in Afghanistan began in 1978, but the events that took place a few years before led to it. For many decades, the state system in Afghanistan was a monarchy. In 1973 the statesman and general Mohammed Daoud overthrew his cousin King Zahir Shah and established his own authoritarian regime, which neither the local Islamists nor the communists liked. Daoud's attempts at reform failed. The situation in the country was unstable, conspiracies were constantly organized against the Daoud government, in most cases they were able to be suppressed.

The coming to power of the left party PDPA: 1978-1979

In the end, in 1978, the left-wing People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) carried out the April Revolution, or, as it is also called, the Saur Revolution. The PDPA came to power, and President Mohammed Daoud and his entire family were killed in the presidential palace. The PDPA proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. From that moment on, a real civil war began in the country.

Afghan War: 1979-1989

The confrontation of local Islamists with the PDPA authorities, constant rebellions and uprisings became a reason for the PDPA to turn to the USSR for help. Initially, the Soviet Union did not want armed intervention. However, the fear that forces hostile to the USSR would come to power in Afghanistan forced the Soviet leadership to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

The Afghan war for the USSR began with the fact that the Soviet troops eliminated the leader of the PDPA, objectionable to the Soviet leadership Hafizullah Amin, who was suspected of having links with the CIA. Instead, he began to lead the state Barak Karmal.

The USSR expected that the war would not be long, but it dragged on for 10 years. government forces and Soviet soldiers the Mujahideen opposed - Afghans who joined armed groups and adhered to radical Islamic ideology. Support for the Mujahideen was provided by part of the local population, as well as foreign countries. The United States, with the help of Pakistan, armed the Mujahideen and provided them with financial assistance as part of Operation Cyclone.

In 1986, the new president of Afghanistan became Mohammad Najibullah and in 1987 the government set the course for national reconciliation. Around the same years, the name of the country began to be called the Republic of Afghanistan, a new constitution was adopted.

In 1988-1989, the USSR withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan. For the Soviet Union, this war turned out to be essentially meaningless. In spite of a large number of conducted military operations, it was not possible to suppress the opposition forces, and the civil war in the country continued.

The struggle of the government of Afghanistan with the Mujahideen: 1989-1992

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the government continued to fight the Mujahideen. Foreign supporters of the Mujahideen believed that the ruling regime would soon fall, but the government continued to receive assistance from the USSR. In addition, the government troops were given the Soviet military equipment. Therefore, the hopes for an early victory of the Mujahideen did not come true.

At the same time, after the collapse of the USSR, the situation of the government worsened, Russia stopped supplying weapons to Afghanistan. At the same time, some prominent military men who had previously fought on the side of President Najibullah went over to the side of the opposition. The president completely lost control over the country and announced that he agreed to resign. The Mujahideen entered Kabul, and the PDPA regime finally fell.

"Internecine" wars of the Mujahideen: 1992-2001

Having come to power, the field commanders of the Mujahideen began to conduct hostilities among themselves. The new government soon collapsed. Under these conditions, the Islamist Taliban movement was formed in the south of the country under the leadership of Muhammad Omar. The opponent of the Taliban was an association of field commanders called the Northern Alliance.

In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul, executed former president Najibullah, who took refuge in the building of the UN mission, and proclaimed the state of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which practically no one officially recognized. Although the Taliban did not completely control the country, they introduced Sharia norms in the occupied territory. Women were forbidden to work and study. Music, television, computers, the Internet, chess, and fine arts were also banned. Thieves' hands were cut off, and they were stoned for infidelity. The Taliban were also notable for their extreme religious intolerance towards those who adhered to a different faith.

Taliban granted political asylum former leader terrorist organization al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden, which initially fought against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and then began the fight against the United States.

NATO in Afghanistan: 2001 - present

After the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, new stage war that is still going on. The United States suspected terrorist number one Osama bin Laden of organizing the attacks and demanded that the Taliban extradite him and the leadership of Al-Qaeda. The Taliban refused to do so, and in October 2001, American and British troops, supported by the Northern Alliance, began offensive operation in Afghanistan. Already in the first months of the war, they managed to overthrow the Taliban regime and remove them from power.

The NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contingent was deployed in the country, a new government appeared in the country, which was headed by Hamid Karzai. In 2004, after the adoption new constitution he was elected president of the country.

At the same time, the Taliban went underground and began guerrilla war. In 2002, the troops of the international coalition carried out Operation Anaconda against al-Qaeda militants, as a result of which many militants were killed. The Americans called the operation successful, at the same time, the command underestimated the strength of the militants, and the actions of the coalition troops were not properly coordinated, which caused many problems during the operation.

In subsequent years, the Taliban began to gradually gain strength and carry out suicide attacks, in which both military personnel of the contingent and civilians died. At the same time, ISAF forces began to gradually move to the south of the country, where the Taliban had strengthened. In 2006-2007, fierce fighting took place in these regions of the country. Due to the escalation of the conflict and the intensification of hostilities, civilians began to die at the hands of coalition soldiers. In addition, disagreements began between the allies. In addition, in 2008, the Taliban began to attack the Pakistani supply route for the contingent, and NATO turned to Russia with a request to provide an air corridor for supplying troops. In addition, in the same year, there was an assassination attempt on Hamid Karzai, and the Taliban released 400 members of the movement from Kandahar prison. Taliban propaganda among the local population led to the fact that civilians began to show dissatisfaction with the presence of NATO in the country.

The Taliban continued to wage guerrilla warfare, avoiding major clashes with coalition troops. At the same time, more and more Americans began to speak out in favor of the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.

A major victory for the Americans was the elimination of Osama bin Laden in 2011 in Pakistan. In the same year, NATO decided to gradually withdraw the contingent from the country and transfer responsibility for security in Afghanistan to local authorities. In the summer of 2011, the withdrawal of troops began.

In 2012 the President of the United States Barack Obama said that the Afghan government controls the areas where 75% of the population of Afghanistan lives, and by 2014 the authorities will have to control the entire territory of the country.

February 13, 2013 . After 2014, between 3,000 and 9,000 American soldiers should remain in Afghanistan. In the same year, a new international peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan should start, which does not involve the conduct of hostilities.

Afghanistan has traditionally been a fairly calm country, as calm as a Muslim state can be with its inherent constant internecine struggle. By 1973-1974, intra-clan confrontations began to intensify, and in 1978 this resulted in the so-called “April” or “Saur revolution” (which means “bull revolution” in translation).

As a result of this revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. Afghanistan was declared a Democratic Republic. Nur Mohammed Taraki, who belonged to the Khalq group, became the president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal of the Parcham faction became Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister, while Hafizullah Amin of Khalq received the posts of Second Vice President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. They were convinced that the development of the country along the path of socialism, relying on the support of the USSR, would create the best opportunities for modernization and overcoming economic and social backwardness. However, most of the tribal leaders and Muslim clergy rejected the idea of ​​transformation. In the context of the interethnic, religious war that had begun on July 19, Taraki and Amin raised the question of bringing in two Soviet divisions in case of emergency.

On October 10, Taraki's death from a long, serious illness was officially announced. Although later it became known that the officers of the presidential guard had strangled him two days before on the orders of Amin. The hunt for Taraki's supporters has passed. By November 1979, a civil war had actually begun in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, under H. Amin, this little Afghan Pol Pot, authority new government was undermined by mass arrests, executions of unwanted, hasty, unresponsive national traditions reforms, executions of Muslim theologians. The number of many formations of the Afghan army in 1979 was reduced by three to four times, the number of officers - even 10 times. Gradually, the idea arose to create conditions for replacing Amin with a more progressive figure. In December 1979, during the storming of the presidential palace by Soviet special forces, Amin died. Soviet military units entered Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal became the head of the party and state. The course towards "building socialism" continued.

Opposition forces began an open struggle against the authorities. Armed detachments of the Mujahideen began to be created. Unable to cope with the opposition, the government took a number of steps towards reconciliation. In 1987, Najibullah became the new president of the country. In 1988, a number of agreements were concluded on a political settlement in Afghanistan with the participation of Pakistan, the USSR and the USA. In accordance with them, all Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Despite the agreements, attempts by the authorities to bring about national reconciliation failed. In 1992, armed detachments of the Mujahideen captured Kabul. Power passed to the Jihad Council. The country was proclaimed Islamic State. The head of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, B. Rabbani, began to perform the functions of the country's president. At the same time, the struggle for power in the center and in the localities continued between the commanders of military formations belonging to different parties and national groups.

In 1995, the Islamic movement "Taliban" joined the fight. Its organizers are the Taliban - former students of theological schools, trained in the opposition's military camps.

In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and then most of the country. In the fall of 2001, after the Taliban government refused to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United States, a military operation was carried out in Afghanistan to overthrow the government. Along with the Americans, the forces of the armed anti-Taliban opposition took part in it. The Taliban have left Kabul. In December 2001, a new interim administration of Afghanistan was formed. Elected in 2004 new president countries. The current president of the country is Hamid Karzai.

Afghan war - the tragedy of our country

The fate of Afghanistan could not help worrying us. The USSR had a common border with it, about 2,400 km long. Since 1919, we have provided Afghanistan with the most extensive assistance. For example, by 1978 we ranked first among all countries in the world in terms of the amount of economic assistance provided. Over 3,000 Afghan officers were trained by us even before the April 1979 revolution. All this cannot be thrown off the scales of history.

The decision to send troops was made behind closed doors several top leaders of the state. True, there were doubts. But the last word left to L.I. Brezhnev. December 25, 1979 at 15:00 Moscow time began the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

Documentary reference: “The losses of personnel of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 amounted to: 13,833 people from the 40th Army were killed, died from wounds. 49,985 people were injured, 6,759 became disabled, 330 are wanted, 312 of them are missing. In addition, military advisers - 180 people, translators, specialists from other ministries and departments - 584 people.

Over 200,000 people were awarded orders and medals during the war years. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 71 "Afghans" (Tajik, Russian, Ingush, Tatar, Ukrainian, etc.). Twenty-five of them received this title posthumously. A monument is dedicated to all of them in the ancient fortress of Balla Hissar. The faceted spire of a majestic arrow shot up into the blue azure of the sky. five pointed star and a laurel branch crown it. At the bottom, on black granite, is carved in Russian and Darg: "To the soldiers-internationalists." This monument was built in 1985 at the expense of the youth of Afghanistan as a token of deep gratitude to the Soviet soldier for his selfless help.

And all the dead were taken to their native land from distant Afghanistan by planes called "Black Tulip"