"The 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only did what they could."
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was an objective necessity. About it on round table“Afghanistan is a school of courage”, which was held in the Tyumen Regional Duma, said the chairman of the board of the regional public organization Union of Paratroopers Grigory Grigoriev.
“Afghanistan is not only the name of a country. This word includes the whole gamut of feelings and memories: pain and delight, courage and cowardice, military comradeship and betrayal, fear and risk, cruelty and compassion that the fighters in this country had to experience. It serves as a kind of password for those who fought in the Afghan war,” said Grigory Grigoriev.
The head of the Union analyzed in detail the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. This was the provision of international assistance to the allied government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. There was a danger that the Islamic opposition would come to power and, as a result, the danger of transferring the armed struggle to the territory of the Central Asian republics of the USSR. This is a threat that Islamic fundamentalism will hit all of Central Asia.
It was necessary to prevent the strengthening of the US and NATO on their southern borders, which were arming the Islamic opposition and wishing to transfer military operations to Central Asia. According to one of the Kuwaiti newspapers, the number of military instructors who advised Islamists is as follows: Chinese - 844, French - 619, Americans - 289, Pakistanis - 272, Germans - 56, British - 22, Egyptians - 33, as well as Belgians, Australians, Turks, Spaniards, Italians and others. In fact, 55 states fought against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Another reason for bringing in the army is drug trafficking. Afghanistan was the second largest opium producer in the world. It spread through the Central Asian republics to Russia and Europe. In addition, it was impossible to allow strengthening of the PRC on its southern borders. China has done a lot for the Islamic opposition. Since the late 1960s, relations between the USSR and the PRC were very tense, it came to the use of armed forces. The USSR had a large border with China, which was the line of confrontation, and often the front line. The leadership of the USSR did not want to lengthen this line.
The entry of troops into Afghanistan was a response to the deployment of US missiles in Europe. It was necessary to strengthen our own positions in the region against Iran and Pakistan. The latter was in a state of permanent conflict with India, and Afghanistan was a good springboard for the Union to provide assistance to India. One of the economic reasons is the protection and continuation of the construction of facilities National economy. More than 200 of them were built by Soviet specialists - a dam, a hydroelectric power station, a gas pipeline, a car repair plant, international airfields, a house-building plant, an asphalt concrete plant, the Salang highway, and more. A whole Soviet microdistrict was built in Kabul.
“Entering Afghanistan was necessary for our country. This is not a personal whim of the Soviet leadership and not an adventure. It is impossible to consider the causes of this war in isolation from each other. They must be considered comprehensively, without prejudice, on the basis of documents and testimonies of the participants. Having listed reasons, we ask ourselves, should the USSR sit back and let the Islamic opposition overthrow the pro-Soviet regime? And this despite the fact that the population of the three republics bordering Afghanistan professed Islam. The overthrow of the Soviet regime in favor of Islam would be a dangerous example,” said Grigory Grigoriev.
According to him, behind the Islamic opposition were the interests of the United States, which, having lost its influence in Iran, tried to urgently strengthen its position in the region. Especially Grigory Grigoriev emphasized that the Americans had a medal "For the implementation of national interests." national interest The USSR in the Central Asian region is all the more obvious.
In confirmation, the head of the regional Union of paratroopers read out a letter from a soldier of the 9th company of the 345th separate guards parachute Andrei Tsvetkov’s regiment, written on May 17, 1987: “Father, you write that we are losing health, and sometimes life for Asians. This is far from true. Of course, we are fulfilling our international duty. But besides this, we are also fulfilling a patriotic duty, we are defending the southern borders of our homeland, and therefore you. Here it is main reason our being here. Father, imagine what a threat would hang over the USSR if the Americans were here, and their missiles were on the border.
Thus, the interest of the superpower of the USSR consisted, firstly, in protecting its own borders, and secondly, in counteracting the attempts of another superpower and other countries to gain a foothold in this region. Another reason is the danger of transferring the actions of the Islamic opposition to the territory of the Central Asian republics. After strengthening it Soviet-Afghan the border became one of the most restless: detachments of dushmans constantly attacked Soviet territory. This can be seen as a kind of reconnaissance in combat. The Islamic opposition has never recognized the entry of the Central Asian republics into the USSR.
The Islamists did not use such terms as "Soviet Union" or "Soviet troops". Firstly, the word "council" in translation coincides with the Arabic "shura" - an elected Islamic council. It was considered a purely Muslim term. In addition, the opposition did not recognize the influence of the USSR in Central Asia. In their printed publications they preferred to say "Russia" and "Russians" with the addition of insulting epithets "wild", "barbarians", "bloodthirsty".
Grigory Grigoriev cited the words of a lieutenant colonel of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR, a participant in the Afghan war, holder of the Order of the Red Banner of Makarov: “Now it is customary to talk about this war, that, they say, it is not needed, no one threatened anyone from Afghanistan. But in fact, there was a constant attack by bandits and terrorists on our outposts, border detachments, on collective farms with the aim of robbery, cattle theft, taking our people into captivity, and killing party workers. They tried to distribute leaflets in which they called on Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens to fight against the Russian invaders. Constantly had to be on the alert. Not a border, but a front line. And when our border motorized landings and assault groups went there, then the ground caught fire under the feet of the bandits. They were not up to Soviet territory. One task was how to get away from our soldiers, which they did not always succeed in.”
Soviet troops entered the territory of Afghanistan at a distance of 100 km, and the border guards closed the border. 62,000 border guards took part in hostilities and set up outposts. The officers who served before the war in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts and who knew the situation firsthand, in the majority believe that fighting were inevitable, and it is better to wage war on foreign territory. Hafizullah Amin began to seek rapprochement with other states. The Kremlin's fear was caused by the increased activity of Western intelligence services. In particular, the frequent meetings of employees of the American Foreign Ministry with the leaders of the Afghan armed opposition.
On December 12, 1979, a group of the most influential members of the USSR Politburo decided to send troops to Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people and to prevent anti-Afghan actions from neighboring states. The entire period of the Soviet army's stay in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four stages: the introduction and deployment of troops, the introduction of active hostilities, the transition from active operations to supporting Afghan troops, and the participation of Soviet troops in the policy of national reconciliation.
The officers call the operation to bring in troops a classic one. On December 25, at 15.00 Moscow time, several Soviet formations entered deep into Afghanistan from two directions. In addition, military units landed at airfields in Kabul and Bagram. In a few days, the fighters occupied the territory inhabited by 22 million people. On December 27, Amin's palace was taken by storm. Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, wrote in his book “Limited Contingent”: “I am deeply convinced that there are no grounds for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, clearly as well as that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, carried out their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of a limited contingent, then the difference between us was that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.
The losses of Soviet troops in the bloody Afghan war amounted to 15 thousand 51 people.
The conflict grew at a tremendous pace. And already in early December 1979, the authorities decided to bring in Soviet troops, allegedly based on contractual relations providing for good neighborliness and mutual assistance. The official reason for making such a decision was the desire to help a friendly people. But was it really so? The Soviet leadership feared that the coming to power of Islamic radicals with an anti-Soviet attitude would lead to a complete loss of control over the southern borders. Pakistan has also raised concerns. political regime which at that time was largely supervised by the US authorities. Thus, the territory of Afghanistan served as a "layer" between the USSR and Pakistan. And the loss of control over Afghan territory could provoke a serious weakening of state borders. That is, friendly mutual assistance was just a cover under which the Soviet government skillfully concealed the true motive of their actions.
On December 25, Soviet troops entered Afghan territory, initially they were small units. No one imagined that hostilities would drag on for a decade. In addition to military support, the leadership pursued the goal of eliminating Amin, the then current leader of the PDPA, and replacing him with Karmal, who was close to the Soviet regime. Thus, the Soviet authorities planned to fully regain control over Afghan territory.
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 dramatically changed the course of world history. About 15,000 Soviet soldiers died in battles with the Afghan Mujahideen, and the Soviet economy suffered huge losses. In fact, this invasion was the beginning of the end Soviet Union. But who lured the "red bear" into the Afghan trap? There are many different versions about this. The most common is that the USSR was lured to Afghanistan by the treacherous Americans. Former CIA director Robert Gates wrote directly to
his memoirs that the American intelligence services began to help the Islamic Mujahideen in Afghanistan long before the entry of Soviet troops there.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to then US President Carter, claimed that the CIA allegedly carried out a covert operation to "lure the Russians into the Afghan trap and ... provide the USSR with its own Vietnam war."
Having provoked the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the Americans and their NATO allies began to supply the Mujahideen with the most modern weapons, including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Actively using them, the Afghan rebels paralyzed the actions of Soviet aviation, and then blocked the army garrisons at their bases. There was a classic situation in which neither side could inflict a decisive military defeat on the other.
Thus, the USSR had to wage a difficult war for almost ten years, which led to the demoralization of the army, the collapse of the economy and, in the end, the collapse of the USSR. Reasoning logically, it should be recognized that the special operation "Vietnam for the Soviets" could indeed be played out by the Americans. However, the US could not
they say to drag the USSR into Afghanistan by the collar. This required appropriate action on the part of the Soviet leadership. And it, as you know, at that time was distinguished by excessive caution and conservatism.
The "Kremlin elders" headed by Brezhnev categorically refused to carry out even the most modest reforms. And suddenly - the invasion of Afghanistan!
Many modern political scientists believe that this could happen only in one case - there were people in the top leadership of the USSR who were very profitable from a military invasion. And here the figure of the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Yuri Andropov, comes to the fore. Already in the summer of 1978, Andropov's subordinates sounded the alarm - the enemy was at the gates. Through the KGB, the Politburo constantly received disturbing information about far-reaching US military plans to use "territories immediately adjacent to our southern border."
Soviet intelligence reports claimed that the US goal was undivided dominance in Afghanistan, which, in turn, would lead to the installation of American missiles.
small and medium range on Afghan territory, in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the USSR. These missiles could easily destroy many important military facilities, including the Baikonur cosmodrome and the Balkhash test site.
In addition, the Kabul station of the KGB constantly discredited the then leader of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin. It was noted that he is closely connected with the Americans, Pakistanis and Chinese, receives expensive gifts from them, has bank accounts in Tokyo and Hong Kong. The flow of negative information eventually affected Brezhnev, and he agreed to send a "limited contingent" of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
On December 27, 1979, the Alfa special forces of the KGB produced. After that, units of the Vitebsk Airborne Division, blocking parts of the Kabul garrison, captured key facilities.
Instead of the odious dictator Amin, Babrak Karmel, "our man in Kabul", hastily brought from Moscow, was put in the chair of the head of the country. Then, within two weeks, motorized rifle units took virtually the entire territory of Afghanistan under their control. In general, the operation went brilliantly.
After the first successful and peaceful months in Afghanistan, bloody battles began, in which virtually the entire 100,000-strong Soviet army group was drawn into. Islamic Mujahideen, armed with modern Western weapons, began guerrilla war. The losses of the personnel of the Soviet army began to number in the hundreds and thousands of servicemen.
It became clear to anyone, even a non-military person, that the troops from Afghanistan had to be urgently withdrawn. However, this did not happen. Moreover, the intensity of hostilities only intensified. Why were the leaders of the USSR unable to escape from the Afghan trap?
As you know, the main power structures in the Soviet Union were the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army. All of them were quite tightly controlled by the party elite. Excessive elevation of any one power structure was not allowed. However, in the late 1970s, for a number of objective reasons, the influence of the army increased dramatically. The army recovered from Khrushchev's hard cuts, re-equipped, and received good funding.
Accordingly, the appetites of the Soviet generals, their claims to a share in the leadership of the country, also increased. These "negative", from the point of view of the party nomenclature, tendencies should be nipped in the bud. Why was the invasion of Afghanistan organized?
By the way, the high command of the army from the very beginning objected to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Soviet military leaders clearly realized that Afghanistan is a huge stone bag without railways and waterways. But they were forced to obey the order of the Politburo.
As a result, the generals, bound hand and foot by military operations, did not interfere with the "showdown" in the upper echelon of the party nomenclature. As a result, the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, having closed everything on himself strong structure, became Brezhnev's official successor.
Twenty-six years have already passed since the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Afghanistan. But many participants in those long-standing events have left a spiritual wound that still aches and hurts. How many of our Soviet children, still very young boys, died in the Afghan war! How many mothers shed tears at zinc coffins! How much blood of innocent people has been shed! And all human grief lies in one small word - "war" ...
How many people died in the Afghan war?
According to official data, about 15 thousand Soviet soldiers did not return home to the USSR from Afghanistan. So far, 273 people are listed as missing. More than 53 thousand soldiers were wounded and shell-shocked. The losses in the Afghan war for our country are colossal. Many veterans believe that the Soviet leadership made a big mistake by getting involved in this conflict. How many lives could have been saved if their decision had been different.
Until now, disputes have not ceased on the topic of how many people died in the Afghan war. After all, the official figure does not take into account the pilots who died in the sky, who were transporting cargo, soldiers returning home and came under fire, nurses and nurses who cared for the wounded.
Afghan war 1979-1989
On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was decided to send Russian troops to Afghanistan. They were located on the territory of the country since December 25, 1979 and were supporters of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Troops were brought in to prevent the threat of military intervention from other states. The decision to help Afghanistan from the USSR was made after numerous requests from the leadership of the republic.
The conflict broke out between the opposition (dushmans, or Mujahideen) and the armed forces of the government of Afghanistan. The parties could not share political control over the territory of the republic. A number of European countries, Pakistani intelligence services and the US military provided support to the Mujahideen during the hostilities. They also provided them with the supply of ammunition.
The entry of Soviet troops was carried out in three directions: Khorog - Faizabad, Kushka - Shindad - Kandahar and Termez - Kunduz - Kabul. The airfields of Kandahar, Bagram and Kabul received Russian troops.
Main stages of the war
On December 12, after coordinating his actions with the commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Brezhnev decided to provide military assistance to Afghanistan. On December 25, 1979, at 15:00 Moscow time, the entry of our troops into the republic began. It should be noted that the role of the USSR in the Afghan war is enormous, since Soviet units provided all possible support to the Afghan army.
The main reasons for the failures of the Russian army
At the beginning of the war, luck was on the side of the Soviet troops, proof of this is the operation in Panjshir. The main misfortune for our units was the moment when Stinger missiles were delivered to the Mujahideen, which easily hit the target from a considerable distance. The Soviet military did not have the equipment capable of hitting these missiles in flight. As a result of the use of the Stinger by the Mujahideen, several of our military and transport aircraft were shot down. The situation changed only when the Russian army managed to get a few missiles in their hands.
Change of power
In March 1985, power in the USSR changed, the post of president passed to M. S. Gorbachev. His appointment significantly changed the situation in Afghanistan. Immediately the question arose that the Soviet troops should leave the territory of the country in the near future, and some steps were even taken to implement this.
A change of power also took place in Afghanistan: B. Karmal was replaced by M. Najibullah. The gradual withdrawal of Soviet units began. But even after that, the struggle between the Republicans and Islamists did not stop and continues to this day. However, for the USSR, history Afghan war ended there.
The main reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan
The situation in Afghanistan has never been considered calm due to the fact that the republic is located in a geopolitical region. The main rivals who wanted to have influence in this country were at one time Russian empire and UK. In 1919, the Afghan authorities declared independence from England. Russia, in turn, was one of the first to recognize the new country.
In 1978, Afghanistan received the status of a democratic republic, after which new reforms followed, but not everyone wanted to accept them. This is how the conflict between the Islamists and the Republicans developed, which as a result led to a civil war. When the leadership of the republic realized that they could not cope on their own, they began to ask for help from their ally - the USSR. After some hesitation, the Soviet Union decided to send its troops to Afghanistan.
Book of Memory
Farther and farther away from us is the day when the last units of the USSR left the lands of Afghanistan. This war left a deep, indelible mark, covered in blood, in the history of our country. Thousands of young people who had not yet had time to see the life of the guys did not return home. How scary and painful to remember. What were all these sacrifices for?
Hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers went through serious trials in this war, and not only did not break, but also showed such qualities as courage, heroism, devotion and love for the Motherland. Their fighting spirit was unshakable, and they went through this cruel war with dignity. Many were wounded and treated in military hospitals, but the main wounds that remained in the soul and are still bleeding cannot be cured by even the most experienced doctor. Before the eyes of these people, their comrades bled and died, dying painful death from wounds. The Afghan soldiers have only the eternal memory of their dead friends.
The Book of Memory of the Afghan War has been created in Russia. It immortalizes the names of the heroes who fell on the territory of the republic. Each area has individual books In memory of the soldiers who served in Afghanistan, in which the names of the heroes who died in the Afghan war are inscribed. The pictures from which young handsome guys look at us make the heart shrink from pain. After all, none of these boys are already alive. “In vain the old woman is waiting for her son to go home…” - these words have been engraved in the memory of every Russian since the Second World War and make the heart shrink. So let the eternal memory of the heroes of the Afghan war remain, which will be refreshed by these truly sacred books Memory.
The outcome of the Afghan war for the people is not the result that the state has achieved to resolve the conflict, but the number of human casualties, which is in the thousands.
On April 27-28, 1978, the April Revolution (Saur Revolution) took place in Afghanistan. The reason for the uprising was the arrest of the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The regime of President Mohammed Daoud was overthrown, the head of state himself and his family were killed. Pro-communist forces seized power. The country was declared the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Nur Muhammad Taraki became the head of Afghanistan and its government, Babrak Karmal became his deputy, and Hafizullah Amin became the first deputy prime minister and foreign minister.
The new government launched large-scale reforms aimed at modernizing the country. In Afghanistan, they began to build a secular, socialist state, which was oriented towards the USSR. In particular, the feudal system of land ownership was destroyed in the state (the government expropriated land and real estate from 35-40 thousand large landowners); usury was abolished, which kept thousands of people in the position of slaves; universal suffrage was introduced, women were given equal rights with men, a secular system of local self-government was established, with the support of government agencies the creation of secular public organizations(including youth and women); there was a massive campaign to eradicate illiteracy; a policy of secularization was pursued, limiting the influence of religion and the Muslim clergy in public and political life. As a result, Afghanistan began to quickly turn from an archaic, semi-feudal state into a developed country.
Understandably, these and other reforms met with resistance from the former ruling powers. social groups- large landowners (feudal lords), usurers and part of the clergy. These processes were not to the liking of a number of Islamic states, where archaic norms also dominated. In addition, the government made a number of mistakes. So, they did not take into account the factor that over several centuries of domination, religion not only began to determine the socio-political life of the country, but also became part of the national culture of the population. Therefore, the sharp pressure on Islam, which offended the religious feelings of the people, was seen as a betrayal of the government and the PDPA. As a result, the country began Civil War (1978—1979).
Another factor that weakened the DRA was the struggle for power in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan itself. In July 1978, Babrak Karmal was removed from his post and sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. The confrontation between Nur Muhammad Taraki and his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, led to the fact that Taraki was defeated, all power passed to Amin. On October 2, 1979, on the orders of Amin Taraki, he was killed. Amin was ambitious and brutal in achieving his goals. Terror was launched in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki and Karmal. The repressions also affected the army, which was the main pillar of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which led to a decrease in its combat capability, and so low, mass desertion.
It is also necessary to take into account the factor that the opponents of the PDPA outside the country launched violent activities against the Republic. Versatile assistance to the rebels quickly expanded. In the Western and Islamic states, a huge number of various organizations, movements of the "public concerned about the situation of the Afghan people" were created. They naturally began to provide "fraternal assistance" to the Afghan people suffering under the "yoke" of the pro-communist forces. In principle, there is nothing new under the sun, now we are witnessing a similar process in the Syrian conflict, when the “Syrian Liberation Army” was created quite quickly by various network structures, which is fighting against the “bloody regime” of Bashar al-Assad, by terror and destruction of the infrastructure of the Syrian state.
The centers of two main radical opposition organizations were established in Pakistan: the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) headed by G. Hekmatyar and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA) led by B. Rabbani. Other opposition movements have also emerged in Pakistan: the Khales Islamic Party (IP-X), which broke away from the IPA due to disagreements between Hekmatyar and Khales; the "National Islamic Front of Afghanistan" (NIFA) S. Gilani, who advocated the restoration of the monarchy in Afghanistan; Islamic Revolution Movement (DIRA). All these parties were radical and prepared for an armed struggle against the republican regime, creating combat detachments, organizing militant training bases and a supply system. The main efforts of the opposition organizations were focused on working with the tribes, since they already had ready-made armed self-defense units. At the same time, a lot of work was done among the Islamic clergy, which was supposed to turn people against the DRA government. On Pakistani territory in the regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Quetta, Parachinar, Miramshah, near the border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, centers of counter-revolutionary parties, their militant training camps, warehouses with weapons, ammunition, ammunition, and transshipment bases appear. The Pakistani authorities did not oppose this activity, actually becoming allies of the counter-revolutionary forces.
Great importance to the growth of the forces of counter-revolutionary organizations was the appearance in Pakistan and Iran of Afghan refugee camps. It was they who became the main support base of the opposition, the suppliers of "cannon fodder". Opposition leaders concentrated in their hands the distribution of humanitarian aid that came from Western countries, having received an excellent tool for controlling refugees. From the end of 1978, detachments and groups began to be sent from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Scales armed resistance DRA government began to constantly increase. In early 1979, the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated sharply. The armed struggle against the government unfolded in the central provinces - Hazarajat, where the influence of Kabul was traditionally weak. The Tajiks of Nuristan opposed the government. Groups that arrived from Pakistan began to recruit opposition groups among the local population. Increased anti-government propaganda in the army. The rebels began to commit sabotage against infrastructure facilities, power lines, telephone communications, and blocked roads. Terror unfolded against citizens loyal to the government. In Afghanistan, they began to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty about the future.
It is clear that under these conditions, the Afghan leadership from March - April 1979 began to ask the USSR for help by military force. Kabul tried to drag the USSR into the war. Such requests were transmitted through the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, A. M. Puzanov, the representative of the KGB, Lieutenant General B. S. Ivanov, and the chief military adviser, Lieutenant General L. N. Gorelov. Also, such requests were transmitted through Soviet party and government officials who visited Afghanistan. So, on April 14, 1979, Amin transmitted through Gorelov a request to provide the DRA with 15-20 Soviet helicopters with ammunition and crews for use in the border and central regions against rebels and terrorists.
The situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen. The Soviet representatives began to fear for the lives of our citizens and the property of the USSR in Afghanistan, as well as for the facilities built with the help of the Soviet Union. Thankfully there were precedents. So, in March 1979, the American ambassador A. Dabbs was kidnapped in Kabul. The kidnappers, members of the Maoist group National Oppression, demanded the release of their comrades from prison. The government did not make concessions and organized an assault. In the skirmish, the ambassador was mortally wounded. The United States reduced almost all relations with Kabul to zero and recalled its employees. On March 15-20, there was a mutiny in Herat, soldiers of the garrison took part in it. The rebellion was crushed by government troops. During this event, two citizens of the USSR were killed. On March 21, a conspiracy was uncovered in the garrison of Jalalabad.
Ambassador Puzanov and KGB representative Ivanov, in connection with a possible further aggravation of the situation, proposed to consider the issue of deploying Soviet troops to protect structures and important objects. In particular, it was proposed to deploy troops at the Bagram military airfield and Kabul airport. This made it possible to build up forces in the country, or to ensure the evacuation of Soviet citizens. It was also proposed to send military advisers to Afghanistan and create a single scientific center in the Kabul region for more effective training of the new DRA army. Then there was a proposal to send a detachment of Soviet helicopters to Shindand to organize the training of Afghan helicopter crews.
On June 14, Amin, through Gorelov, asked to send Soviet crews for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to Afghanistan to protect the government and airfields in Bagram and Shindand. On July 11, Taraki offered to deploy several Soviet special groups in Kabul, each up to a battalion, so that they could respond if the situation in the Afghan capital escalated. On July 18-19, in conversations with B.N. Ponomarev, who visited Afghanistan, Taraki and Amin repeatedly raised the issue of bringing two Soviet divisions into the Democratic Republic in case of an emergency at the request of the Afghan government. The Soviet government rejected this proposal, as well as previously announced. Moscow believed that the Afghan government itself should solve internal problems.
On July 20, during the suppression of a rebellion in the province of Paktia, two Soviet citizens were killed. On July 21, Amin limit the wish of Taraki to the Soviet ambassador - to provide the DRV with 8-10 Soviet helicopters with crews. It must be said that by the middle of 1979 the situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border had deteriorated sharply. The number of Afghan refugees has grown to 100,000. Some of them were used to replenish the ranks of gangs. Amin again raises the issue of deploying Soviet units in Kabul in case of an emergency. On August 5, a mutiny broke out in Kabul at the deployment site of the 26th parachute regiment and commando battalion. On August 11, in the province of Paktika, as a result of a heavy battle with superior rebel forces, units of the 12th Infantry Division were defeated, some soldiers surrendered, some deserted. On the same day, Amin informed Moscow of the need to send Soviet troops to Kabul as soon as possible. Soviet advisers, in order to somehow “appease” the Afghan leadership, offered to make a small concession - to send one special battalion and transport helicopters with Soviet crews to Kabul, and also consider sending two more special battalions (one to send to guard the military airfield in Bagram, the other to Bala Hissar fortress on the outskirts of Kabul).
On August 20, Amin, in a conversation with General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky, asked the USSR to send a paratrooper formation to Afghanistan and replace the calculations of anti-aircraft batteries covering Kabul with Soviet calculations. Amin said that in the Kabul region they had to keep a large number of troops that could be used to fight the insurgents if Moscow sent 1.5-2 thousand paratroopers to the Afghan capital.
The situation in Afghanistan became even more complicated after the coup d'état, when Amin seized full power, and Taraki was arrested and killed. The Soviet leadership was unhappy with this event, but in order to keep the situation under control, they recognized Amin as the leader of Afghanistan. Under Amin, repression in Afghanistan was intensified; he chose violence as the main method of dealing with opponents. Hiding behind socialist slogans, Amin headed for the establishment of an authoritarian dictatorship in the country, turning the party into an appendage of the regime. At first, Amin continued to pursue the feudal lords and eliminated all opponents in the party, supporters of Taraki. Then literally everyone who expressed dissatisfaction, could be potentially dangerous to the regime of personal power, was subjected to repression. At the same time, terror acquired a massive character, which led to sharp growth people fleeing to Pakistan and Iran. The social base of the opposition has grown even more. Many prominent party members and participants in the 1978 revolution were forced to flee the country. At the same time, Amin tried to shift part of the responsibility to the USSR, stating that the steps of the Afghan leadership were being taken allegedly at the direction of Moscow. At the same time, Amin continued to ask to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. In October and November, Amin asked to send a Soviet battalion to Kabul to protect him personally.
It is also necessary to take into account the influence on the leadership of the USSR of such factors as the growth of assistance to the Afghan opposition from the United States, Pakistan and a number of Arab states. There was a threat of Afghanistan leaving the sphere of influence of the USSR and the establishment of a hostile regime there. On the southern borders of Afghanistan, the Pakistani army periodically held military demonstrations. With the political and military-material support of the West and a number of Muslim countries, by the end of 1979, the rebels had increased the number of their formations to 40 thousand bayonets and deployed military operations in 12 out of 27 provinces of the country. Almost the entire countryside, about 70% of the territory of Afghanistan, was under the control of the opposition. In December 1979 due to purges and repressions among the command staff of the army, the combat effectiveness and organization of the armed forces were at a minimum level.
On December 2, Amin, at a meeting with the new Soviet chief military adviser, Colonel General S. Magometov, asked to temporarily send a Soviet reinforced regiment to Badakhshan. December 3 during new meeting with Magometov, the head of Afghanistan offered to send units of the Soviet police to the DRA.
The leadership of the USSR decides to save the "people's" power
The problem arose before the Soviet leadership - what to do next? Taking into account the strategic interests of Moscow in the region, it was decided not to break with Kabul and act in accordance with the situation in the country, although the elimination of Taraki was perceived as a counter-revolution. At the same time, Moscow was concerned about the data that since the autumn of 1979, Amin began to study the possibilities of reorienting Afghanistan towards the United States and China. Amin's terror in the country also caused concern, which could lead to the complete destruction of progressive, patriotic and democratic forces in the country. Amin's regime could critically weaken the progressive forces of Afghanistan and lead to the victory of the reactionary, conservative forces associated with Muslim countries and the United States. The statements of Islamic radicals, who promised that in the event of victory in Afghanistan, the struggle "under the green banner of jihad" would be transferred to the territory of Soviet Central Asia, also caused concern. Representatives of the PDPA - Karmal, Vatanjar, Gulyabzoy, Sarvari, Kavyani and others, created underground structures in the country and began to prepare new coup.
Moscow also took into account the international situation that had developed in the late 1970s. The development of the process of "détente" between the USSR and the USA at that time slowed down. D. Carter's government unilaterally froze the deadline for ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty. NATO began to consider an annual increase in military budgets until the end of the 20th century. The United States created "forces rapid response". In December 1979, the NATO Council approved a program for the production and deployment in Europe of a number of new American nuclear weapons systems. Washington continued its policy of rapprochement with China, playing the "Chinese card" against the Soviet Union. The American military presence in the Persian Gulf zone was strengthened.
As a result, after long hesitation, a decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. From point of view Big Games- it was a completely justified decision. Moscow could not allow the conservative forces, which were guided by the geopolitical opponents of the Soviet Union, to gain the upper hand in Afghanistan. However, it was necessary not only to send troops to protect people's republic, which is to change Amin's regime. At that time, Babrak Karmal, who arrived from Czechoslovakia, lived in Moscow. Considering that he was very popular among the members of the PDPA, the decision was made in his favor.
At the suggestion of Amin, in December 1979, two battalions were transferred from the USSR to strengthen the protection of the residence of the head of state and the airfield in Bagram. Among the Soviet soldiers, Karmal also arrived, who until the end of the month was among the Soviet soldiers in Bagram. Gradually, the leadership of the SSR came to the conclusion that without the Soviet troops it would be impossible to create conditions for the removal of Amin from power.
In early December 1979, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, informed a narrow circle of trusted persons that a decision could be made in the near future on the use of the army in Afghanistan. The objections of the Chief of the General Staff N. V. Ogarkov were not taken into account. On December 12, 1979, at the suggestion of the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which included Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko and Ponomarev, L. I. Brezhnev decided to provide military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan "by bringing a contingent of Soviet troops into its territory." The leadership of the General Staff, headed by its chief N.V. Ogarkov, his first deputy army general S.F. Akhromeev and the head of the Main Operational Directorate General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Army General I. G. Pavlovsky opposed this decision. They believed that the appearance of Soviet troops in Afghanistan would lead to an intensification of the insurgency in the country, which would be directed primarily against Soviet soldiers. Their opinion was not taken into account.
There was no decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or any other government document on the introduction of troops. All orders were given orally. Only in June 1980, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved this decision. Initially, it was proposed that the Soviet troops would only help local residents defend against invading gangs, provide humanitarian assistance. The troops were to be garrisoned in large settlements without getting involved in serious military conflicts. Thus, the presence of Soviet troops was supposed to stabilize the internal situation in the country and prevent external forces from interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan.
On December 24, 1979, at a meeting of the top leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Defense Minister Ustinov announced that a decision had been made to satisfy the request of the Afghan leadership to bring Soviet troops into this country "in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring countries…”. On the same day, a directive was sent to the troops, which defined specific tasks for entry and deployment on the territory of Afghanistan.
