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Silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time a bell bell is heard, calling parishioners to worship in the church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoye, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melehovo… These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was in full swing here, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle unfolded. Everything that could burn was on fire, everything was covered with dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Here the Soviet guardsmen and the elite of the Wehrmacht, the SS Panzer Divisions, met head-on.
Before the Prokhorovka tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the zone of the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles in the Voronezh Front took on the largest scale. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans clashed with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards separate tank corps.
"WE'LL HAVE LUNCH IN KURSK!"
Fights on the southern front Kursk Bulge in fact, they began on July 4, when the German units made an attempt to shoot down the outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning on July 5, when the Germans delivered the first massive blow with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Josef Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and some officer shouted to him: “We will have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive zone of the 6th Army. The exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to refresh themselves with dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, the Kempf task force crossed the river. Seversky Donets and struck at the 7th Guards Army.
Gunner "Tiger" of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks of the 3rd tank corps Gerhard Niemann: "Another anti-tank gun is 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, except for one person. He takes aim and fires. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the stern of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Panzer Army took the main blow. In a few hours of battle, as they say, only numbers remained from its 538th and 1008th anti-tank regiments. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the section between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a five-six-kilometer front, the commander of the 4th German tank army, Goth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive strike of aviation and artillery.
The commander of the troops of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hillock, where a command post was equipped. Was half fourth day. But there seemed to be a solar eclipse. The sun was hidden behind clouds of dust. And ahead, in the twilight, bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and caterpillars clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving wrecked and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and again went on the attack.
By the end of July 8, the Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, withdrew to the second army line of defense.
300 KM MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite stormy protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Konev. Stalin ordered the advancement of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as the strengthening of the Voronezh Front by the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march was carried out around the clock under the cover of aviation of the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon the dust had thickly covered the roadside bushes, the wheat fields, the tanks and trucks, and the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulled guns), infantry armored vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The faces of the soldiers were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. The heat was unbearable. The soldiers were tormented by thirst, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially hard on the march for the driver-mechanics. The crews of the tanks tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone replaced the drivers, and on short halts they were allowed to sleep.
Aviation of the 2nd Air Army covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march so reliably that German intelligence failed to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of 8 July. Then, having put the materiel in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and by the end of July 9, strictly at the appointed time, concentrated in the area of ​​​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky.
MANSTEIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle flared up in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling the massive attacks of the enemy, themselves began to deliver strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Panzer Army.
As in previous days, the fiercest fighting flared up in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by separate companies and battalions of "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" advanced. Units of the 1st Panzer Army again took the brunt of the enemy's strikes. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce battles continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochansky direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant-General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group that had settled there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians sat down in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive on a 10-kilometer stretch. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights extends in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group "South" was to deliver three strong strikes in a complex manner, which were supposed to lead to the encirclement and destruction of two groupings of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop success, it was supposed to bring fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking Division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from the Donbass to Kharkov. The start of the attack on Kursk from the north and from the south was scheduled by the German command for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorov directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions in the Prokhorovka direction. The start of the general counter-offensive was scheduled for the morning of 12 July.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than all, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovka direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, who was awarded the highest award of the Third Reich oak leaves to the Knight's Cross.
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks of the SS division "Reich" managed to break into the village of Storozhevoye, threatening the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was thrown. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike force of the German 4th Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
Even less success was achieved by the second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", 3 and 11 Panzer Divisions. Our troops successfully repelled their attacks.
However, north-east of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation arose. The 6th and 7th tank divisions of the enemy broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was thrown: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to launch the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although the preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 08:30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops went on the attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “The artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all available forces to repulse the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle flared up on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 flared up on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikhino. This strip of terrain, up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth, was captured by the enemy as a result of a tense struggle during July 11. The main enemy grouping as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen vehicles of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand types, deployed and operated on the bridgehead. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command dealt its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops with a head-on attack, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis obviously did not expect to meet such a large mass of our combat vehicles and their decisive attack. Management in the advanced units and subunits of the enemy was clearly violated. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they used at the beginning of the offensive in a collision with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield was swirling with smoke and dust, the earth trembled from powerful explosions. The tanks jumped on each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up with a torch or stopped with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades upset the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov, deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the limits of my tank battalion. Ahead of us was the 170th tank brigade. With great speed, she wedged into the location of German tanks, heavy ones, which were in the first wave, and the German tanks pierced our tanks. The tanks went very close to each other, and therefore they fired literally at point-blank range, they simply shot each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes - sixty-five cars.
Wilhelm Res, radio operator of the commander's tank of the Adolf Hitler Panzer Division: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area, they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed, they flew into this ditch, due to their speed overcame three or four meters in it, but then, as it were, froze in a slightly inclined position with a cannon pulled up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the landing on the railroad, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw the Tiger tank, which was standing sideways to me and firing at our tanks. Apparently, he knocked out quite a few of our cars, as the cars came sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our cars. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile, fired. The tank caught fire. I fired another shot, the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I was not up to it. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out a T-III tank and a Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, there was some, you know, a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railway and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps combat log, the attack began without artillery treatment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This made it possible for the enemy to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to heavy losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from a place.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly, one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began to give shells to me one by one, so that I would put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander upstairs kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer. And only after the fourth - "Shot" I heard: "Thank God!"
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower, he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes, located at the same distance from each other, as if they were measured with a compass. The combat formations of the parties mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy at close range, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tigers and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm projectile hit the tower of his T -34, and the other pierced the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver Sergeant Nikolaev and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a funnel, but still one of the "Tigers" noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and sent it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded on impact.
The blow of Soviet armor, new tanks with complete set ammunition thoroughly shook Hauser's battle-weary divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the RSs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour.
As a result of the counter-offensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS Panzer divisions "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler" to the northeast was thwarted, these divisions suffered such losses, after which they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Parts of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Kempf army group south and southeast of Prokhorovka, a fierce struggle also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Kempf army group to the north was stopped by tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took Marshal Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. In one place, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burned-out Panther, rammed by the T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood the Tiger and T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “That's what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, differ dramatically in different sources. Manstein, in his book Lost Victories, writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “Secrecy Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts” refers to 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German losses in tanks was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book The Citadel. Battle of Kursk. If we shift its diagram into a table, we will get the following picture: (the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Panzer Army in the period July 4-17, 1943, see the table).
Kross' data differs from the data from Soviet sources, which can be quite understandable to a certain extent. So, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (at Kross - 244).
But there are also quite incomprehensible discrepancies in the figures. For example, an aerial photograph taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Kross, on July 7, 48 TC lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. As Soviet sources testify, as a result of bombing and assault attacks on the concentrated enemy troops (TD SS "Great Germany" and 11th TD), on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area in the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was burning German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots. According to Kross, there were no losses at all in the German 4th Panzer Army on July 9, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubborn battles, overcoming fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the offensive against Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about the Kross data for 10 and 11 July, according to which there were no casualties in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was during these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that the Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Sergeant M.F. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After the archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle near Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps for July 12, out of 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th tank corps dated 07/13/43, the losses of the corps amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their initial strength. Thus one can get more or less exact figure losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Dead Head" - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for German losses near Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic disparity in numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and the broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burnt German tanks were counted in a small area of ​​the area southwest of Prokhorovka, where on July 12 an oncoming tank battle unfolded. Rotmistrov, in his memoirs, claimed that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people were killed.
But in the late 1990s, the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. So, in the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps, it is said that the losses of the enemy amounted to 68 tanks, among other things (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Kross's data). In a combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943, it is said that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past day. Further, it is reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy took out his wrecked tanks, the number of which exceeds 200 vehicles. Several dozens of destroyed enemy tanks were chalked up to the 18th Panzer Corps.
We can agree with Kross's statement that the losses of tanks are generally difficult to calculate, since the disabled vehicles were repaired and again went into battle. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, with a high degree of probability it can be assumed that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle near Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" operating south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Kross, the losses of the 4th German Panzer Army from July 4 to 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916, which were counted at the beginning of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein's report, claims that between July 5 and 13, the German 4th Panzer Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Panzer Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of the Soviet troops against the 4th German tank army and the Kempf army group, are estimated as follows. 500 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost on the Soviet side, and 300 on the German side. Kross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up wrecked German equipment that could not be repaired and stood in no man's land. After August 1, so many faulty equipment accumulated in German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov that it had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered the biggest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorov battle lies not even in the damage that was inflicted on the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a severe blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

It is well known that the Prokhorovka battle was won by the Red Army, but few people know that it lasted not one, but six whole days, and the tank battle on July 12, 1943 was only its beginning. But who won it - Rotmistrov or Hausser? Soviet historiography declares an unconditional victory, delicately silent about the price that the tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army paid for it. German historians, on the other hand, put forward their own arguments: by the evening of July 12, the battlefield remained with the Germans, and the ratio of losses is clearly not in favor of the Red Army. Modern Russian researchers also have their own vision of the events that took place in July 1943. Let's try to figure out who won this battle. As an evidence base, we will use the opinion of the candidate of historical sciences V.N.

To begin with, you should deal with the main myth of the Soviet era - the number of tanks that directly took part in the battle. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, referring to the works of Soviet military leaders, gives a figure of 1,500 tanks - 800 Soviet and 700 German. In fact, from the Soviet side, only the 29th and 18th tank corps of the 5th Guards TA Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, with a total of 348 vehicles (2), were included in the strike force.

It is more difficult to quantify the forces of the German side. The II SS Panzer Corps included three motorized divisions. As of July 11, 1943, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler motorized division had 77 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. Motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" - 122 and motorized division of the SS "Das Reich" - 95 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. Total: 294 cars (1). The position in the center (in front of the Prokhorovka station) was occupied by the Leibstandarte, its right flank was covered by the Das Reich, the left by the Dead Head. The battle took place on a relatively small area of ​​terrain up to 8 kilometers wide, crossed by ravines and bounded on one side by the Psel River, and on the other by a railway embankment. It should be noted that most of the tanks of the "Dead Head" division solved tactical tasks of mastering the bend of the Psel River, where the infantrymen and artillerymen of the 5th Guards Army held the defense, and the tanks of the "Das Reich" division were behind the railroad tracks. Thus, the Soviet tankers were opposed by the Leibstandarte division and an unspecified number of tanks of the Totenkopf division (in the sector along the river), as well as the Das Reich division on the attackers' left flank. Therefore, indicate the exact number of tanks that participated in repelling the attack of two tank corps of the 5th Guards. TA is not possible.

Before the attack, on the night of July 11-12. Due to the fact that the 5th Guards. The TA twice changed its starting positions for the attack, its command, concentrating forces in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka station, did not conduct reconnaissance - there was no time. Although the current situation urgently required it: the day before, on July 11, SS units ousted the Soviet infantrymen and dug in half a kilometer from the southern outskirts of Prokhorovka. Pulling up artillery, they created a powerful line of defense in one night, fortifying themselves in all tank-prone areas. About 300 guns were deployed over a 6-kilometer stretch, including rocket-propelled mortars and 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36 anti-aircraft guns. However, the main German "trump card" in this sector of the front was 60 tanks of the Leibstandarte division, most of which were in reserve by morning (behind the anti-tank ditch at a height of 252.2).

Self-propelled guns of the SS division "Das Reich" fire at the positions of the 183rd SD in the Belenikhino area.
July 11, 1943
Source: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/s05.gif

At 5 o'clock in the morning, before the onset of the 5th Guards. TA, the Soviet infantry tried to dislodge the SS from their positions, but, having fallen under the hurricane fire of German artillery, retreated, having suffered heavy losses. At 0830, the command "Steel, steel, steel" sounded, and the Soviet tanks began to advance. A swift attack, as it seems to many to this day, did not work out for Soviet tankers that day. First, the tanks had to make their way through the infantry battle formations, then carefully move forward along the passages in the minefields. And only then, in full view of the Germans, they began to turn into battle formations. In total, 234 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns of two corps operated in the first echelon - the 29th and 18th. The nature of the terrain forced the gradual introduction of forces into battle - in places battalion-by-battalion, with significant time intervals (from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, which, as it turned out later, allowed the Germans to destroy them one by one). The main task for the Soviet tankers, it was the mastery of a powerful German defense unit - the Oktyabrsky state farm, in order to get further room for maneuver.

From the very beginning, the battle became extremely fierce. Four tank brigades, three batteries of self-propelled guns, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled into the German fortified area in waves, but, meeting with powerful resistance, again retreated. Almost immediately after the start of the attack, active bombing of the Soviet troops by groups of German dive bombers began. Considering that the attackers did not have air cover, this sharply worsened their situation. Soviet fighters appeared in the sky very late - only after 13.00.

Attack of the brigades of the 18th TC near the village of Andreevka. July 12, 1943
Source: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/36.jpg

The first, main blow of the two Soviet corps, which looked like a single attack, lasted until about 11.00 and ended with the transition to the defense of the 29th TK, although units of the 18th TK continued to try to take the state farm, bypassing it from the flank. The other part of the tanks of the 18th Corps, supporting the infantry, advanced on the right flank and fought in the villages on the banks of the river. The purpose of this tank group was to strike at the joint between the positions of the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf divisions. On the left flank of the troops, tankers of the 32nd tank brigade of the 29th TK made their way along the railway track.

Soon the attacks of the main forces of the 29th Corps resumed and continued until approximately 13.30-14.00. The tankers nevertheless knocked out the SS men from the Oktyabrsky, while suffering enormous losses - up to 70% of equipment and personnel.

By this time, the battle had acquired the character of separate battles with the anti-tank defense of the enemy. The Soviet tankers did not have a unified command, they attacked in the indicated directions and fired at the tanks and artillery positions of the enemy that appeared in the sectors of fire of their guns.

“... There was such a roar that blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron ... From point-blank shots, turrets turned, twisted guns, armor burst, tanks exploded. We lost the sense of time, we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cockpit of the tank. One thought, one desire: while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols, grabbed them hand-to-hand. I remember the captain, who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of the wrecked German "Tiger" and hit the hatch with his machine gun in order to "smoke out" the Nazis from there ... "(GSS G. I. Penezhko).

By noon, it became clear to the Soviet command that the counterattack plan had failed.

At this time, in the bend of the Psel River, the German division "Dead Head", having captured a section of the eastern bank of the river, pulled up artillery and opened fire on the shock wedge of the 18th TK, which operated on the right flank of the advancing Soviet troops. Observing the advance of the corps and guessing the plan of the Soviet command, the Germans launched a series of counterattacks, using compact tank groups with the support of artillery, aviation and motorized infantry. Fierce oncoming battles began.

Source: http://history.dwnews.com/photo/2014-01-31/59393505-44.html

It was the units of the 18th Corps that carried out the deepest and most massive breakthrough in the German defense zone, going into the rear of the Leibstandarte positions. The headquarters of the 2nd TK SS reported on the situation: “Large enemy forces, 2 regiments with about 40 tanks, attacked our units east of Vasilyevka, through Prelestnoye, Mikhailovka, Andreevka, then, turning south, advanced to the area north of the Komsomolets state farm. The position has been restored. It is obvious that the enemy's intention is to cut off our forces that have advanced to the northeast by attacking from Storozhevoy in the direction of the bend of the railway line and from the north in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm.

Attack of Soviet tanks and infantry near Prokhorovka, July 1943
Source: http://history.dwnews.com/photo/2014-01-31/59393505-49.html

Real maneuver battles of tank groups flared up after formations of the 18th and 29th TCs pushed the SS men to the southwestern slopes of height 252.2. This happened around 14.00-14.30. Then groups of tanks from both Soviet corps began to break through to the west of Andreevka, to Vasilievka, and also to the area of ​​height 241.6, where fierce oncoming tank battles also took place at short distances. On the left flank, separate groups of Soviet tanks broke through along the railway - also in a southwestern direction.

“... The situation escalated to the limit,- recalled the former commander of a tank platoon of the 170th brigade, at that time Lieutenant V.P. Bryukhov. - The battle formations of the troops were mixed up, it was not possible to accurately determine the front line. The situation changed every hour, even every minute. The brigades either advanced, then stopped, then backed away. It seemed that the battlefield was crowded not only with tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns and people, but also with shells, bombs, mines and even bullets. Their soul-chilling tracks flew, intersected and intertwined in a deadly ligature. The terrible blows of armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells shook, pierced and burned through the armor, broke out huge pieces of it, leaving gaping gaps in the armor, crippled and destroyed people. The tanks were on fire. From the explosions, five-ton towers broke off and flew off to the side for 15-20 meters. Sometimes the upper armor plates of the tower were torn off, soaring high into the air. Slamming hatches, they tumbled in the air and fell, instilling fear and horror in the surviving tankers. Often, the entire tank fell apart from strong explosions, at the moment turning into a pile of metal. Most of the tanks stood motionless, mournfully lowering their guns, or burned. Greedy flames licked at the red-hot armor, raising clouds of black smoke. Together with them, tankers were on fire, unable to get out of the tank. Their inhuman cries and pleas for help shocked and clouded the mind. The lucky ones who got out of the burning tanks rolled on the ground, trying to knock the flames off their overalls. Many of them were overtaken by an enemy bullet or a fragment of a shell, taking away their hope for life ... The opponents turned out to be worthy of each other. They fought desperately, toughly, with violent detachment. The situation was constantly changing, it was confusing, unclear and uncertain. The headquarters of corps, brigades and even battalions often did not know the position and condition of their troops ... "

By 15:00, the strength of both Soviet tank corps had dried up. In the brigades, 10-15 vehicles remained in service, and in some even less. However, the counterattack continued, as the Soviet command at all levels received orders not to stop and continue the offensive. It was at this time that the greatest danger arose of the German tank units going over to the counteroffensive, which jeopardized the entire outcome of the battle. From that moment on, attacks were continued mainly by infantry supported by small groups of tanks, which, naturally, could not change the course of the battle in favor of the attackers.

According to the reports from the front line, the fighting ended between 20.00 and 21.00. However, on the Storozhevoy farm, the fighting continued even after midnight, and the Soviet troops failed to hold it.

Scheme of combat operations in the offensive zone of the main counterattack grouping of the front on July 12, 1943

On July 12, 1943, Soviet troops repulsed the attack of the Nazi troops. In a wide field, near the village of Prokhorovka, two huge tank armies met, total strength tanks exceeded 1,200 units. The battle lasted from morning to evening, and the Soviet troops won a hard but confident victory.

This is how this battle is usually described in Soviet textbooks, from there the description migrated to many Russian textbooks. What is most interesting, in the description itself there is not a word of falsehood. And what is even more interesting, if we take not individual words, the meaning, then we will not find a word of truth. Yes, the Soviet troops won, yes, the battle was in the field, yes, the number of tanks exceeded 1,200 units, yes, all this is true, but ... The Kursk salient was a section of the front curved towards the fascist troops, in fact, a foothold of the Soviet army. Now let's see what a springboard is from the point of view of military science. The enemy can attack from 3 sides, defending a foothold is always very difficult, often impossible at all. That is, statically, strategically, the side that has a foothold is at a disadvantage. But dynamically, tactically, it has a big advantage. It lies in the fact that several points of enemy defense can be attacked from the bridgehead, some even from the rear. In addition, the enemy must reorganize his formations in order to capture a bridgehead, since he cannot be ignored.


So, we came to the correct and logical conclusion: the side that has a bridgehead must either attack or mine the bridgehead and leave. The Soviet troops did neither. They decided to defend the Kursk Bulge, and, having exhausted the advancing German troops, to defeat the enemy armies with a powerful counterattack, freeing a large territory from occupation. Wehrmacht attack plan in general terms, was known to the Soviet troops: the partisans intercepted it and handed it over to the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet defense consisted of three lines of trenches, bunkers and bunkers (long-term camouflaged firing points). The Germans were to advance from the south and from the north. However, on July 4, the day before the offensive, an order followed from Berlin: immediately send two panzer divisions (tank divisions) to Italy, where Mussolini's troops suffered defeat after defeat from local Italian Resistance units. A light tank division was withdrawn from the northern direction of the attack, reinforced by a repair brigade (it was a long way to Italy, and after 3-4 days a repair brigade from another front was supposed to approach the attacking troops) and a tank division (mainly PZ-IV) from the south direction attacks. On the night of the 5th, Soviet troops shelled German positions. They fired mainly at the bushes, the losses of the fascist troops were minimal, but the German officers realized that the Soviet troops were aware of the upcoming offensive. With this in mind, as well as the dispatch of two Panzer divisions to Italy, many were inclined to postpone the offensive. However, early in the morning an order was received: to begin the offensive according to a plan approved in advance (known to the Soviet troops).

The Germans assembled a little more than a thousand tanks on the Kursk Bulge (PZ-III, PZ-IV, PZ-V "Panther" and PZ-VI "Tiger"). PZ-I and PZ-II, which the Germans themselves called "cardboard boxes", can not be taken into account. There were cases when a bullet from a machine gun, fired at close range, pierced the frontal armor of this tank, killed a tanker, pierced the armor of a tank from behind and killed a German infantryman running after the tank. After sending two divisions to Italy, the Germans were left with about 1,000 tanks. All "panthers", numbering 250 units, were assembled in the northern direction in a separate tank corps. "Tigers", numbering 150, stood in a southerly direction. About 600 PZ-III and PZ-IV and 50 "Elephants", or, as they were called in another way, "Ferdinands" were concentrated in approximately equal numbers on both directions of the offensive. It was assumed that the medium tanks of the northern corps would attack first. Three hours later, the southern corps is attacked, also by the forces of medium tanks PZ-III and PZ-IV. "Panthers" at this time march around the positions of the Soviet troops and hit them in the flank. And when the Soviet command decides that the main offensive is coming from the north, and the southern direction is just a diversionary maneuver, the SS panzer divisions will appear on the scene. In total, Germany had 4 Panzer-SS divisions, three of them stood in the southern direction of the Kursk Bulge.

As a result of the fact that two panzer divisions left for Italy, the offensive was later than planned and the northern and southern corps hit at the same time. Many of the "panthers" assembled near Kursk recently left the assembly line and they had certain flaws. Since the repair team left, and most of the tankers had not driven such vehicles before, about 40 Panthers could not take part in the battle for technical reasons. Light tanks were supposed to go in front of the Panther corps, they had to reconnoiter the road for the main striking force of the northern direction. The light tank division was also sent to Italy, there were not enough forces for the initial strike, not to mention reconnaissance. As a result, the "panthers" stumbled upon a minefield, from 50 to 70 vehicles were disabled. After about 150 out of 250 vehicles remained, the command decided to abandon the plan to bypass and attack from the flank with the Panthers, they were forced to attack Soviet positions in the forehead. As a result, in the northern direction, the Germans did not even take the first line of defense out of three. What happened in the south?

Since the division, consisting of PZ-IVs, was sent to Italy, the Panzer-SS divisions had not to wait for the decisive moment, but to advance in the open from the very first day of the operation. In the southern direction, the attack of the German troops was extremely successful, two lines of Soviet defense were broken, albeit with fierce battles, albeit with heavy losses but were broken. The third line was still on the defensive. If it fell, the panzer divisions would literally roll out the northern lines of defense, attacking them from the rear. The troops of the neighboring Soviet fronts, in particular the Steppe, were noticeably weaker than the armies defending the Kursk Bulge, in addition, if successful here, the Germans were ready to attack along the entire front, it can be argued that a victory in the Battle of Kursk would put the Soviet troops in front of a difficult task . The Germans could advance on Moscow, attack Stalingrad, or simply move straight to Voronezh and Saratov in order to cut the Volga there and create a defensive position behind Soviet lines.

On July 10, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Soviet troops. The units protecting the third line of the northern defense were removed and hastily thrown to the south. The Germans in the south initially attacked in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe town of Oboyan, then transferred the main blow to the Soviet defense section passing through the Psel River. It was here on July 12 that two Soviet armies, the 5th Panzer and the 5th Combined Arms Guards, attacked three German Panzer-SS divisions. The Soviet tank army, according to the state, consisted of 4 divisions. Each division has 200 tanks. The combined arms army also had a tank division. In total, taking into account the forces defending the area near Prokhorovka, the USSR concentrated about 1200 tanks on this section of the front. That is why it is written in all textbooks that MORE THAN 1200 units of equipment participated in the battle - 1200 from the Soviet Union plus tanks from the Wehrmacht. Let's see how many tanks the Germans had.

The German Panzer division according to the state consists of 10 companies, which are combined into 3 battalions (three companies each) and a separate company. The first battalion consisted of light PZ-I and PZ-II and performed mainly reconnaissance functions. The second and third battalions formed the main striking force(PZ-III and PZ-IV). The 10th separate company was equipped with "panthers" and "tigers". Each company in the state had 10 pieces of equipment, for a total of 120 tanks per division. Panzer-SS divisions consisted of 150 tanks. According to the reports of German officers, by July 12, on the eighth day of the offensive, from 30% to 50% of the personnel and equipment remained in the troops. In total, by the time the battle near Prokhorovka began, the Panzer-SS corps consisted of about 180 tanks. This is about 6.5 times less than there were Soviet tanks.

If the Great Tank Battle took place in an open field, then the fully equipped Panzer-SS divisions would not have survived the number of Soviet tanks, but the fact is that the place of the battle that took place between the village of Prokhorovka and the Drummer collective farm was limited, on the one hand, to the bend river Psel, and with another railway embankment. The width of the field was from 6 to 8 kilometers. According to military science, the distance between advancing tanks should be about 100 meters. With a halving, the effectiveness of the offensive increases by one and a half times, and losses by three. The battlefield was not only narrow, but also rugged with ravines and streams. Therefore, we can safely say that no more than 150 pieces of equipment took part in the battle at the same time. Despite the huge numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, the battle was fought almost "one on one". The difference was that the reserves of the Wehrmacht, unlike the reserves of the Stavka, were severely limited.

From the German side, only three Panzer-SS divisions participated in the battle (there were 4 such divisions in total): “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Das Reich” and “Totencopf” (“Dead Head”). The battle lasted from morning to evening, the Soviet troops lost about 900 tanks, the Panzer-SS Corps about 150, 6 times less. In the evening, the 30 remaining German tanks, seeing the hopelessness of further fighting, retreated. 300 Soviet tanks did not dare to pursue them.

Thus ended the Great Tank Battle.

The winter of 1942-1943 was difficult for the German troops. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses in equipment and manpower. The catastrophe near Stalingrad shook the authority of the Reich, exacerbating internal and external political problems. There was no longer any talk of a German victory in the war; the Germans could only hope to get out of it with the least losses.

To restore political and military prestige, the Nazi elite needed a victorious campaign against their main enemy, the Soviet Union. This is how the idea of ​​Operation Citadel, an offensive near Kursk, was born. Despite the fact that the chances of the success of the operation by many German commanders were extremely skeptical, it nevertheless took place and ended in a completely natural defeat for the Wehrmacht.

One of key points The Battle of Kursk was a tank battle near Prokhorovka. In terms of the amount of equipment involved, it was one of the largest for the entire period of the Second World War. Candidate of Historical Sciences Valery Nikolaevich Zamulin tells us about the details of this battle.

Valery Nikolaevich, on July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of the Battle of Kursk took place near the Prokhorovka station. Although there is a lot of information about this event, it is often contradictory ...

Let's start with the fact that the battle for Prokhorovka took place not only on July 12th. This day can be called the climax and its most dramatic moment. And it began on July 10, when the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps began to fulfill the order of the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, General G. Goth: to take Prokhorovka in order to further strike at the rear of the Soviet troops defending here, primarily the 69th Army . The corps included three motorized SS divisions: "Dead Head", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Das Reich". The battle continued until 16 July. On the night of July 17, German troops began to withdraw from this area to their original positions along the Belgorod-Tomarovka-Borisovka line.

Data on the battle on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka in Soviet, American and German sources differ significantly from each other, including the number of armored vehicles. How many tanks were involved?

The main events with the use of a significant number of armored vehicles on July 12 near Prokhorovka unfolded in two areas. To the west of the station, on the so-called "tank field", for about 9-10 hours of battle, 514 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and 210 German tanks and assault guns operated. South of the station, 158 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns fought against 119 German vehicles. Total 1001 armored units. This is according to documents declassified in the late 1990s.

The figure of 1,500 vehicles on both sides, common in Soviet official historiography, was deliberately overstated; it first appeared in the report of the headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank Army for July 1943, and then migrated to historical literature.

Why was it necessary to inflate the numbers on the number of vehicles in battle?

It was important for the army command to show that the high losses suffered by the troops in 10 hours of battle were not the result of mistakes or miscalculations, the army simply participated in a grandiose, unprecedented battle. Consequently, the losses during such a battle could not be small. In the open press, these data were first given in the brochure “The Battle of Kursk. Brief essay which was published in 1945. The figure of 1500 cars can still be found in print and electronic publications.

What armored vehicles were used by the opposing sides near Prokhorovka?

The Soviet side - mainly medium tanks T-34, armed with a short-barreled 76-mm cannon (there were about 70%), and light T-70s with a 45-mm gun, as well as three regiments of self-propelled artillery mounts: SU-76, SU- 122 and SU-152. In addition, in the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, there were two regiments of English tanks "Churchill Mk IV". As for the heavy KV-1s, during the entire 7 days of the battle there were only two of them, but they were not used directly in the battles.

The SS divisions had at their disposal regular tanks Pz.Kpfw III, Pz.Kpfw IV, StuG self-propelled guns, as well as Hummel and Vespe self-propelled guns for fire support of armored attacks. "Tigers" were also, but not enough. For example, on the eve of the famous battle, on the evening of July 11, only 15 Tigers were listed as operational in three SS divisions. Moreover, in the division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", parts of which were on the "tank field", there were only 4 vehicles.

As for the Panther tanks and the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, often mentioned in connection with the events near Prokhorovka, they have never been here. The Panther battalion was planned to be transferred here by the beginning of the battle, but they were partially killed by the soldiers of the 1st Panzer Army of General M. E. Katukov west of Prokhorovka, and partially they were out of action for technical reasons. And the Ferdinands operated in the north of the Kursk Bulge, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Ponyri station.

I want to emphasize that the main role in disrupting our counterattack on July 12 was played by difficult terrain conditions and the fact that the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" went on the defensive on the evening of July 11. And the biggest losses were not inflicted on us by enemy tanks, but by artillery.

When it comes to this battle, the picture is often presented of a huge field on which the tanks converged "hand to hand". How was it really?

There are many stereotypes regarding the Prokhorov battle, but they are, as a rule, far from reality. Firstly, in the strike area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank Army, the conditions of the terrain did not allow the deployment of the very “armored avalanche” that we often hear and read about in the context of the battle. If this were possible, then the German positions would have been crushed in the first hour of the battle, because the main blow was delivered by the 18th and 29th tank corps, which numbered 368 tanks and self-propelled guns. Theoretically, this is 60 tanks per kilometer, not counting the self-propelled guns.

But even more than 200 tanks of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were in the second echelon of the army. In the event of the successful implementation of the initial plan of the counterattack of the Soviet command, this would have been an inevitable disaster for the Germans, even despite the fact that our guards were opposed by the SS corps - the most powerful and prepared formation of the enemy.

However, the Soviet tank brigades were squeezed in a gorge to the west of the station, between the floodplain of the Psyol River, deep ravines and the Storozhevoye tract. In this area, the tank-passable section is only up to 900 meters, that is, a tank battalion of a full staff (26 tanks) could hardly turn into a line here, and there is no need to talk about a brigade, let alone a corps.

The 29th Corps of General I.F. Kirichenko, operating along the Belgorod-Prokhorovka railway, could simultaneously move no more than 30-35 tanks between the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252 in two echelons. Therefore, it was not possible to create a "tank skating rink", the formation was introduced into the battle in small units, with a significant interval for the dynamics of the battle, under heavy enemy fire. Our troops already suffered significant losses at the beginning of the attack, and the broken tanks made the task of the crews following them even more difficult.

On the way of the neighboring 18th Corps of General B.S. Bakharov to the Oktyabrsky state farm there was a large beam, passable for tanks in only one place. And even after crossing it, our tanks could not immediately turn into an offensive line, they had to go several hundred meters more under enemy fire. That is, the real offensive of the Soviet troops looked like this: our combat vehicles went in three or four groups of 30-35 vehicles in two echelons, one brigade after another with an interval of 30 minutes to an hour.

Estimates of the losses of the parties in the Prokhorov tank battle, cited by different historians, differ significantly. Which numbers are closest to reality?

The most confusing situation is with the analysis of the losses of German troops. They talk about 80, 130 and even 350 tanks and self-propelled guns. There are even stupid things - 5 German tanks. Some historians, to whom I belong, consider the most plausible such figure of losses throughout the SS corps for the entire day of July 12, 1943 - 155-163 vehicles, and irretrievable within 20-30 units.

A small number of deadweight losses can be misleading, but the SS men were badly battered. Despite the fact that they controlled the territory of the battlefield near Prokhorovka until July 17 and could take out their equipment, a large part of the damaged vehicles that could be restored were sent to Germany for repairs. This is not an irretrievable loss, but a long-term one.

Our troops on July 12 lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns. Of these, 193 tanks and 14 self-propelled guns are irrevocable. The high percentage of irretrievable losses is explained by the fact that the battlefield, as a rule, remained behind the Nazis and we could not completely evacuate the damaged equipment. And the Germans blew up all our tanks during the retreat.

On the night of the 13th, the command of the Voronezh Front received data indicating that the 5th Guards Tank Army, due to huge losses, was actually incapacitated. The best tank formation, which was aimed at a breakthrough to the Dnieper, was killed in ten hours at a small station, advancing two kilometers in the center and retreating 4.5 kilometers on the flanks. The neighboring 5th Guards Army, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, who also participated in the counterattack, was also in a difficult situation.

Therefore, Rotmistrov's guardsmen were not able to hold the flanks of the 69th Army, which was defending south of Prokhorovka, although they fought heroically. Therefore, on the night of July 15, the SS corps and the 3rd Panzer Corps moving from the south of Belgorod managed to surround the entire 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army, consisting of four rifle divisions, in the Donets interfluve. At dawn, these forces nevertheless left the encirclement, but with heavy losses. These events ended the Battle of Prokhorov.

How important was the Battle of Prokhorov for the Red Army for the victory at Kursk?

On July 12, 1943, during the battle, a frontal counterattack was carried out, the main content of which was the battle between the SS corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army west of Prokhorovka. The goal - the defeat of the SS corps - was not achieved, because in those conditions it was impossible to do this. The enemy kept a powerful grouping of Soviet troops and inflicted great damage on it. Soviet propaganda distorted its essence, inflated it to "the greatest tank battle of all time." He was not like that.

Nevertheless, the result of a tank battle is precisely a victory, and far from being a "combat draw", as, for example, the German military historian Colonel Karl Frieser believes. Undoubtedly, the battle for Prokhorovka is the culminating moment of the Kursk defensive operation, after which the tension of the battles in the south of the Kursk salient subsided sharply. But once again I want to emphasize that in many publications a common logical error is made: after this, then because of this! One should not put an equal sign between the events called the Battle of Prokhorovka and the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Tank combat is only a part, albeit an important one, of this battle.

The Soviet troops in the battle for Prokhorovka, of course, solved their task, preventing the last line of defense from breaking through and inflicting serious losses on the enemy.

About the interlocutor: Zamulin Valery Nikolaevich - military historian, candidate of sciences. In 2009 he defended his dissertation on the problems of the history of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front on July 5-23, 1943. From March 1996 to August 2009, he worked first as a director, and then as a deputy director for scientific work of the federal state cultural institution “State Military Historical Museum-Reserve “Prokhorovskoe Pole””. Author of more than 60 scientific publications, including five monographs in Russian and English. With his participation, a number of documentaries and television programs were prepared on Russian federal channels, as well as several radio programs on the history of the Battle of Kursk.