Erdogan fell asleep at a meeting with Poroshenko
Briefly about Erdogan's visit to Ukraine.
1. Regarding Turkey's position on Crimea, there is nothing new here. Of course, it would be possible to bargain with Erdogan on this issue, but the price would most likely be exorbitant, starting with the recognition of Northern Cyprus and other geshefts (like getting a go-ahead to clean up Afrin and Rojava) that Erdogan could demand for such a service. Therefore, the issue of Crimea, apparently, remains outside the framework of the agreements concluded between Moscow and Ankara affecting the Middle East. However, officially, Russia did not demand any diplomatic steps from Erdogan related to the recognition of the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Turkey is still a situational fellow traveler, and not a full-fledged ally, to twist her arms on an issue where even Russia's closer allies refrain from an unambiguous position on Crimea.
2. At the same time, the impact of open and behind-the-scenes deals with Moscow forced Erdogan to choose his words so as not to offend Poroshenko too much and at the same time not to make unnecessary problems in relations with Moscow, which he so painfully restored after he himself destroyed them. At the moment, the deal with Russia for Turkey is clearly a priority, so Erdogan did nothing that could cast a shadow of distrust on her. But the visit itself, albeit a working one, on the part of Erdogan is a way to show Moscow that the Turks are aware of the painful problems of Russia in Ukraine (including the patronizing role of Turkey in relation to the Crimean Tatars) and this was very gently reminded, although Poroshenko’s belligerent rhetoric Erdogan in generally ignored and it is quite understandable. He has on the agenda the implementation of strategic deals with Russia and Iran in Syria and Iraq. There is no need to spoil relations with Russia for the sake of the obvious American puppet Turkey, especially given the problems in relations with the United States. Therefore, Erdogan limited himself to a set of on-duty phrases and did not fall for Poroshenko's bait.
3. Turkey was and is interested in trade with Ukraine, as well as promoting the interests of Turkish business (which has survived an unpleasant year of a trade war with Russia and is looking for opportunities for growth - another question is whether Ukraine is able to ensure the growth of mutual trade, as the Turks want), but for the sake of Of course, Erdogan is not ready to follow the lead of Poroshenko and seriously discuss his participation in the sanctions against Russia - there is an epic struggle for Turkish tomatoes, what kind of sanctions are there. It is extremely doubtful that Turkey will also refuse gray schemes for the purchase of coal from the Donbass. Everyone understands that Turkey buys coal from the DPR and LPR in the same way as it used to buy oil from ISIS. In this regard, the Turks are not very picky about the means where they see a direct benefit. For Russia, this, in turn, is a way to attach part of the coal from the Donbass, which does not reach Ukraine in a roundabout way. Therefore, while Poroshenko was bubbling on the topic of "Russian aggression", Erdogan kept his mouth shut on the topic of sanctions and pressure on Russia in general, so as not to talk too much, as it happened quite recently when he forgot himself and began to say that "Assad must go", after which everything was clearly explained to him from Moscow and he began to take back.
PS. And yes, Erdogan was so interested in what was happening that he managed to fall asleep right during a press conference with Poroshenko.
Faithful dear Medvedev. Erdogan is obviously more interested in hearing about the divisions of spheres of influence in the Middle East than about "Russian aggression."
Briefly about Erdogan's visit to Ukraine.
1. Regarding Turkey's position on Crimea, there is nothing new here. Of course, it would be possible to bargain with Erdogan on this issue, but the price would most likely be exorbitant, starting with the recognition of Northern Cyprus and other geshefts (like getting a go-ahead to clean up Afrin and Rojava) that Erdogan could demand for such a service. Therefore, the issue of Crimea, apparently, remains outside the framework of the agreements concluded between Moscow and Ankara affecting the Middle East. However, officially, Russia did not demand any diplomatic steps from Erdogan related to the recognition of the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Turkey is still a situational fellow traveler, and not a full-fledged ally, to twist her arms on an issue where even Russia's closer allies refrain from an unambiguous position on Crimea.
2. At the same time, the impact of open and behind-the-scenes deals with Moscow forced Erdogan to choose his words so as not to offend Poroshenko too much and at the same time not to make unnecessary problems in relations with Moscow, which he so painfully restored after he himself destroyed them. At the moment, the deal with Russia for Turkey is clearly a priority, so Erdogan did nothing that could cast a shadow of distrust on her. But the visit itself, albeit a working one, on the part of Erdogan is a way to show Moscow that the Turks are aware of the painful problems of Russia in Ukraine (including the patronizing role of Turkey in relation to the Crimean Tatars) and this was very gently reminded, although Poroshenko’s belligerent rhetoric Erdogan in generally ignored and it is quite understandable. He has on the agenda the implementation of strategic deals with Russia and Iran in Syria and Iraq. There is no need to spoil relations with Russia for the sake of the obvious American puppet Turkey, especially given the problems in relations with the United States. Therefore, Erdogan limited himself to a set of on-duty phrases and did not fall for Poroshenko's bait.
3. Turkey was and is interested in trade with Ukraine, as well as promoting the interests of Turkish business (which has survived an unpleasant year of a trade war with Russia and is looking for opportunities for growth - another question is whether Ukraine is able to ensure the growth of mutual trade, as the Turks want), but for the sake of Of course, Erdogan is not ready to follow the lead of Poroshenko and seriously discuss his participation in the sanctions against Russia - there is an epic struggle for Turkish tomatoes, what kind of sanctions are there. It is extremely doubtful that Turkey will also refuse gray schemes for the purchase of coal from the Donbass. Everyone understands that Turkey buys coal from the DPR and LPR in the same way as it used to buy oil from ISIS. In this regard, the Turks are not very picky about the means where they see a direct benefit. For Russia, this, in turn, is a way to attach part of the coal from the Donbass, which does not reach Ukraine in a roundabout way. Therefore, while Poroshenko was bubbling on the topic of Russian aggression, Erdogan kept his mouth shut on the topic of sanctions and pressure on Russia in general, so as not to talk too much, as it happened quite recently, when he forgot and began to say that "Assad must leave", after which he from Moscow they explained everything intelligibly and he began to take back.
PS. And yes, Erdogan was so interested in what was happening that he managed to fall asleep right during a press conference with Poroshenko.
10.10.2017 09:11
Briefly about Erdogan's visit to Ukraine.
1. Regarding Turkey's position on Crimea, there is nothing new here. Of course, it would be possible to bargain with Erdogan on this issue, but the price would most likely be exorbitant, starting with the recognition of Northern Cyprus and other geshefts (like getting a go-ahead to clean up Afrin and Rojava) that Erdogan could demand for such a service. Therefore, the issue of Crimea, apparently, remains outside the framework of the agreements concluded between Moscow and Ankara affecting the Middle East. However, officially, Russia did not demand any diplomatic steps from Erdogan related to the recognition of the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Turkey is still a situational fellow traveler, and not a full-fledged ally, to twist her arms on an issue where even Russia's closer allies refrain from an unambiguous position on Crimea.
2. At the same time, the impact of open and behind-the-scenes deals with Moscow forced Erdogan to choose his words so as not to offend Poroshenko too much and at the same time not to make unnecessary problems in relations with Moscow, which he so painfully restored after he himself destroyed them. At the moment, the deal with Russia for Turkey is clearly a priority, so Erdogan did nothing that could cast a shadow of distrust on her. But the visit itself, albeit a working one, on the part of Erdogan is a way to show Moscow that the Turks are aware of the painful problems of Russia in Ukraine (including the patronizing role of Turkey in relation to the Crimean Tatars) and this was very gently reminded, although Poroshenko’s belligerent rhetoric Erdogan in generally ignored and it is quite understandable. He has on the agenda the implementation of strategic deals with Russia and Iran in Syria and Iraq. There is no need to spoil relations with Russia for the sake of the obvious American puppet Turkey, especially given the problems in relations with the United States. Therefore, Erdogan limited himself to a set of on-duty phrases and did not fall for Poroshenko's bait.
3. Turkey was and is interested in trade with Ukraine, as well as promoting the interests of Turkish business (which has survived an unpleasant year of a trade war with Russia and is looking for opportunities for growth - another question is whether Ukraine is able to ensure the growth of mutual trade, as the Turks want), but for the sake of Of course, Erdogan is not ready to follow the lead of Poroshenko and seriously discuss his participation in the sanctions against Russia - there is an epic struggle for Turkish tomatoes, what kind of sanctions are there. It is extremely doubtful that Turkey will also refuse gray schemes for the purchase of coal from the Donbass. Everyone understands that Turkey buys coal from the DPR and LPR in the same way as it used to buy oil from ISIS. In this regard, the Turks are not very picky about the means where they see a direct benefit. For Russia, this, in turn, is a way to attach part of the coal from the Donbass, which does not reach Ukraine in a roundabout way. Therefore, while Poroshenko was bubbling on the topic of Russian aggression, Erdogan kept his mouth shut on the topic of sanctions and pressure on Russia in general, so as not to talk too much, as it happened quite recently, when he forgot and began to say that "Assad must leave", after which he from Moscow they explained everything intelligibly and he began to take back.
PS. And yes, Erdogan was so interested in what was happening that he managed to fall asleep right during a press conference with Poroshenko.
Faithful dear Medvedev. Erdogan is obviously more interested in hearing about the divisions of spheres of influence in the Middle East than about "Russian aggression."
