December 3rd, 2016 08:00 pm
While some are trying to prove that there was no conquest of Genghis Khan, and Batu is Alexander Nevsky in disguise, others are writing studies about this based on historical sources.
Here, for example, is a text describing Batu's campaign in Hungary.
The invasion of Batu's armies into Hungary began in March 1241. The Tatars easily overcame the so-called Russian Gates - the Veretsky Pass in the Carpathians, which separated Hungary and Russia. “They had forty thousand warriors armed with axes, who went ahead of the troops, felling the forest, laying roads and removing all obstacles from the path,” says Archdeacon Thomas of Split. - Therefore, they overcame the blockages, built by order of the king, with such ease, as if they were erected not from a pile of powerful fir trees and oaks, but composed of thin straws; in a short time they were scattered and burned, so that it was not difficult to pass them. When they met with the first inhabitants of the country, at first they did not show all their ferocious cruelty and, driving around the villages and taking booty, did not arrange big beatings.
But that was only the beginning. Tatar troops advanced on Hungary from several directions. Ogedei's son Kadan (who made a special appearance during this campaign) and the grandson of Chagadai Buri moved from Galicia, south of Batu's main forces. After passing through the forests “between Russia and Cumania” for three days, they captured the royal residence of Rodna, inhabited mainly by German miners who mined silver here, and 600 Germans, led by Count Aristald, “more skilled than other warriors”, joined their army (subsequently they will be resettled by Buri in the city of Talas [See the amendment in the comments on the name of the city], now Dzhambul, in Kazakhstan). Moving further through gorges and rapids, the Tatars unexpectedly approached the large episcopal city of Varada (now Oradea, in Romania). The deacon here was the Italian Rogerius, later Bishop of Split and Thessaloniki, the author of the “Lamentation Song” about the devastation of the Hungarian land - one of our main sources on the history of the Hungarian war. “Tatars ... quickly taking possession of the city and burning most of it, in the end they left nothing outside the walls of the fortress and, having captured the booty, killed young and old men and women in the squares, in houses and in the fields,” wrote Rogerius (he himself then hid from the Tatars in the forest, but later still captured by them). - ... Having done all this, the Tatars suddenly retreated, taking with them all the booty. Another Mongol commander, Bahatu, crossed the Seret River further south, in Moldavia; "having defeated the people who had gathered for battle, the Tatars began to completely occupy this land." As for Batu himself, he, as already mentioned, acted in the central direction. “The chief master of Batu, after he crossed the gate (Veretsky pass. - A.K.), began to burn villages, and his sword did not spare either sex or age.”
As always, detachments from previously conquered lands acted as part of the Tatar armies. Contemporaries, describing what was happening with horror, named first of all Cumans - Polovtsians, as well as other neighboring peoples. The Tatars, "united with the bloodthirsty people of the Komans, ravaged the country with terrible cruelty," the author of the Cologne Chronicle reported; “Most of this vile people, with an army consisting of all those who joined them, devastate Hungary with unheard-of cruelty,” Count Heinrich of Thuringia wrote to his father-in-law, the Duke of Brabant. The detachments of the Mordovians who acted (as in Poland) in the vanguard of the Mongol troops were especially ferocious. “Ahead of them are certain tribes called Mordans, and they destroy all people indiscriminately,” a certain Hungarian bishop reported to the Parisian bishop Wilhelm (Guillaume) III. “Not one of them dares to put on shoes on his feet until he kills a man… Without hesitation, they devastated all the lands and destroyed everything that came across…” from Cologne, - ... peaceful people who are defeated and subjugated as allies, namely a great many pagans, heretics and false Christians, [they] turn into their warriors. By "heretics" and "false Christians" the Latin authors-monks could also have in mind Christians of the Greek rite, that is, Orthodox Christians, first of all, probably, Alans and Russians. However, we can speak quite definitely about the participation of Russian detachments in the war in Hungary. Actually, the Galicia-Volyn Chronicle unequivocally makes it clear that the campaign in this country did not take place without the participation of Russian governors (recall the Kyiv thousand Dmitr). The “Rutenov” (Russians) are also mentioned as part of the Mongol army by the Croatian chronicler Foma Splitsky, a contemporary and eyewitness of the Tatar invasion: one of these “rutens” defected to the Hungarians on the eve of the decisive battle.
Already in early April, the Mongols' forces were ready to unite. Their forward detachments, as happened in all campaigns, acted against the main enemy forces concentrated at that time near the city of Pest (part of today's Budapest, the capital of Hungary). The Tatars “sent forward a cavalry detachment, which, approaching the Hungarian camp and teasing them with frequent sorties, incited them to fight, wanting to test whether the Hungarians had the courage to fight them,” wrote Foma Splitsky. King Bela, believing that his troops outnumbered the enemy, gave the order to move forward. As expected, the Tatars immediately retreated; the Hungarians began the pursuit and soon reached the Shaio (or Solo; Russian chroniclers called it the Solona River), the right tributary of the Tisza, where they met with the main forces of the Tatars. They were located on the opposite bank of the river, but in such a way that "they were not completely visible to the Hungarians, but only in part." The Hungarians were still very afraid of them. “Seeing that the enemy detachments had gone across the river,” Thomas continues, “[they] camped in front of the river ... The king ordered to set up tents not far from each other, but as close as possible. Having thus arranged the wagons and shields in a circle like camp fortifications, they all settled down as if in a very tight corral, as if covering themselves from all sides with wagons and shields. And the tents turned out to be heaped up, and their ropes were so intertwined and twisted that they completely entangled them all the way, so that it became impossible to move around the camp, and they all seemed to be tied. The Hungarians believed that they were in a fortified place, but it was the main reason for their defeat.
Here, on the banks of the Chaillot, near the town of Mohi, a battle took place that decided the fate of Hungary. It took place on April 11, 1241 - just two days after the equally fateful battle of Legnica, in which the forces of the Polish prince Henry were defeated. The coordination of actions of individual Mongolian detachments is amazing! In just three days, they defeated the armies of the strongest rulers Central Europe and conquered two mighty and previously prosperous states!
The battle of Shio was extremely fierce, and success did not immediately come to the side of the Mongols. All the main leaders of the Mongol army, who were then in Hungary, took part in the battle - Batu himself, his first commanders Subedei and Buraldai, princes Kadan, Shiban and others. For us, the battle of Chaillot is of particular interest, since it was then that it was the only time during the entire Western campaign! - The sources reflected both the personal participation of Batu in hostilities, and his role in achieving victory. Researchers restoring the course of the battle were generally lucky. A detailed story about him has been preserved in various and completely unrelated sources - both Western, Latin, and Eastern - Persian and Chinese. These stories complement each other well, allowing you to see the key moments of the battle through the eyes of both the Hungarians themselves and their Tatar opponents. (This is also the only case of its kind in the history of the Western campaign.) Moreover, in describing many details, the sources are unanimous: they all agree that initially the preponderance of forces was on the side of King Bela; what key point the battle became a battle for a bridge across the river; that, finally, personal intervention in the events of Batu significantly influenced their course. However, the overall picture of what was happening is restored with difficulty - and only thanks to a scrupulous comparison of sources, their "overlay" on each other. The actions of Batu are especially difficult to interpret. Let's talk about them in more detail, especially since the opportunity to look at it directly in a combat situation is given to us for the first and last time.
According to the testimony of Archdeacon Thomas of Split, on the eve of the battle, Batu, "the senior leader of the Tatar army", "climbing the hill, carefully examined the location of the Hungarian army." This reconnaissance predetermined the outcome of the battle. Returning to the army, Batu made an inspired speech, and in it he touched on the numerical superiority of the Hungarians, which obviously embarrassed his soldiers.
My friends, - this is how Batu's speech is conveyed by the Split chronicler, - we should not lose courage: even though there are a great many of these people, they will not be able to escape from our hands, because they are ruled carelessly and stupidly. After all, I saw that they, like a flock without a shepherd, were locked up as if in a tight pen.
Having said this, Batu "ordered all his detachments, built in their usual order, that same night to attack the bridge that connected the banks of the river and was not far from the camp of the Hungarians."
How reliable is this evidence? Answering this question, it should be taken into account that the theme of “carelessness” and “stupidity” of the rulers of the Hungarian land is the key one in the work of Archdeacon Thomas, who does not get tired of denouncing the inactivity and disunity of the Hungarian barons and King Bela himself. And therefore, the speech put into the mouth of the leader of the Tatar army, obviously, belongs to the Split chronicler himself; in any case, its content is fully consistent with his view of what is happening. However, Batu's speech before the battle (or even during the battle) is also reported by another contemporary of the events - the Franciscan monk Giovanni del Plano Carpini. The latter believed that if the Hungarians had not faltered at the decisive moment and "courageously resisted" the Tatars, they "would have gone beyond their limits, since the Tatars had such fear that everyone tried to escape." They were stopped by Batu, who, "drawing his sword before their face, resisted them." Batu's speech Plano Carpini conveys in such very lofty and not entirely clear terms:
Do not run, because if you run, then no one will escape, and if we must die, then it is better that we all die, since what Genghis Khan predicted will come true, that we should be killed; and if now the time has come for it, let us better endure it.
"And thus they were inspired, remained, and ruined Hungary."
Plano Carpini does not provide other details of the battle. But his companion, a member of the same embassy, Benedict Polyak, on the contrary, reports a lot of interesting things about the battle of Chaillot, and one that finds a match in the sources coming from the camp of the Tatars themselves. Referring to their stories, Benedict also writes that Batu, after the Tatars fled from the Hungarians, "drawn his sword and forced them to return to battle." True, there is not a word about any speech by Batu.
Plano Carpini's version is even more bewildering than Thomas of Split's story. The words attributed by him to Batu seem completely unthinkable. In fact, the Europeans could talk about the inevitable death of the Mongols (and strongly hope for it!) But not the leader of the Mongol army. The mentioned imaginary prediction of Genghis Khan, the essence of which Plano Carpini reveals a little higher (“... they (the Mongols. - A. K.) must subjugate the whole earth ... until the time of their slaughter comes: namely, they fought for forty-two years and must first reign eighteen years After that, they are said to be defeated by another people, which, however, they do not know how they were foretold"), based on calculations of the supposed time of the reign of the Antichrist and those apocalyptic peoples whose invasion should herald his appearance; these calculations were extracted by Christian writers from the works of the Fathers of the Church - both authentic and apocryphal, written on their behalf later. It is clear that the mythical predictions of the death of the Mongol kingdom based on such calculations could not have arisen among the Mongols themselves. And in general, this whole scene, written out in the traditions of the knightly saga, with fiery speeches (the domestic reader probably remembered the famous: “The dead have no shame ...” of the Russian prince Svyatoslav), does not at all fit with the customs of the Mongols, for whom retreat is a military technique, deserving of praise, and by no means of censure. A complete misunderstanding of the enemy, the logic of his actions forced European chroniclers to often describe what did not actually exist. So it is here: Batu's actions received an interpretation that did not correspond to reality at all. But something still stood behind his "speeches" addressed to the soldiers? And in fact, at some point, the outcome of the battle might seem unclear and the Mongols had the idea of retreating or even fleeing?
The picture is partly clarified by Persian authors who were in the service of the Mongols, in particular Juvaini and Rashid ad-Din. They report the following. Intending to exterminate the "Kelars and Bashgirds", that is, the Christian Hungarians, Batu gathered a significant army. But the enemy army was also extremely large (Juvaini, and after him other authors give absolutely fantastic figures of 400 or even 450 thousand horsemen). At the forefront of his army, "for reconnaissance and patrol", Batu sent his younger brother Shiban (according to Juvaini, with a 10,000-strong detachment). A week later, Shiban returned and informed his brother that there were twice as many enemies as the Mongols, "and all the people are brave and warlike." It was then, probably, that the scene occurred, described, but not understood by European chroniclers. After “the troops came close to each other,” continues Juvaini, Batu “climbed the hill and for a whole day did not speak a word to anyone, but prayed fervently and cried loudly. To the Muslims (let me remind you that this is written by a Muslim author. - A.K.), he also ordered everyone to gather and pray. The next day they prepared for battle. There was a large river between them ... "Rashid ad-Din, who repeated the story of Juvaini, adds that Batu did so "according to the custom of Genghis Khan." A younger contemporary, Rashid al-Din Wassaf, somewhat colors the picture, but he does not report anything new in essence; moreover, in his presentation, the pagan Batu looks almost like an orthodox Muslim: “having ascended to the top of the hill”, he “humbly and weakly prayed to the Almighty, the only giver of blessings, stayed awake all night with a heart that burned like a lamp, and with a soul that blew like the coolness of the morning, he passed the night until the day came.
So, it was not a matter of developing a plan for the upcoming battle, and not even of banal cheering on their warriors on the eve or during the fight. Batu's actions had a distinctly ritual character. But the Muslim authors did not quite correctly interpret them. Evidently, while performing rites on the top of the hill, Batu sought to achieve the favor of the heavenly powers - that very "Eternal Sky", by whose power and blessing the Mongols explained all their victories. At the same time, it should be taken into account that Batu offered up his prayers on one of the especially dark nights, almost on the new moon (that month it fell on the next night, April 12), and this time was especially noted by the Mongols. Important things “they begin at the beginning of the moon or at the full moon,” wrote Plano Carpini, and therefore they “call [the moon] the great emperor, kneel before her and pray.”
As you know, Genghis Khan and his descendants in the male line descended directly from Heaven itself (for one of the ancestors of Genghis Khan, Bodonchar, was born to a mother, Alan-Goa, when she was unmarried, - in her own words, from some heavenly light, penetrated into her bosom; this story was canonized by the Mongols and included in their sacred chronicle - "The Secret Tale") (2). Like the rulers of other nomadic communities, the Genghisids perceived themselves as intermediaries between the divine Heaven and their own subjects, believed in their ability to provide heavenly protection and prosperity to the people (modern researchers translate the medieval Mongolian term "suu jali", which denoted such a supernatural ability, with the word "charisma" ). Batu obviously demonstrated these qualities on the night before the battle, inspiring the soldiers to win. At the same time, he followed the custom of his grandfather Genghis Khan, who often did the same on the eve of important battles - the testimony of Rashid ad-Din on this score seems to be key to understanding the essence of what is happening. It is appropriate to note that the episode at Chaillot seems to be the only description of such a ritual in history. Mongol conquests. And the fact that he is connected specifically with Batu is probably not accidental. The leader of the Western campaign managed to prove himself not just as a commander, but as a bearer of sacred properties, the very charisma of power that was able to ensure victory for his army. And this quality, in the eyes of the Mongols themselves, was much more significant than the simple ability to correctly lead the troops, especially since Batu did not lack talented and energetic commanders. Modern researchers even believe that the possession of such sacred qualities, such charisma initially contributed to the promotion of Batu from among other princes, and in particular to his superiority among the Jochids.
It is curious that another contemporary, the West European writer of the mid-13th century, the Dominican monk Vincent of Bove, the author of the Historical Mirror, also reported on some prayer actions of Batu during his invasion of Hungary, but naturally interpreted them in a completely different way. , eschatological key. Batu, according to him, “sacrificed to the demons, asking them if he had the courage to walk on this earth. And the demon living inside the idol gave the following answer: “Go carelessly, for I am sending three spirits ahead of your deeds, thanks to the actions of which your opponents will not be able to resist you,” which happened. These spirits are: the spirit of discord, the spirit of distrust and the spirit of fear - these are three unclean spirits, like frogs, about which it is said in the Apocalypse. (Compare in the description of the “end times” in the Revelation of John the Theologian: “And I saw three unclean spirits, like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon and out of the mouth of the beast and out of the mouth of the false prophet: these are demonic spirits that work signs; they go out to the kings of the earth the whole world, to gather them for battle on that great day of God Almighty”; Rev. 16:13-14.)
But this is only one side of the matter. The role of Batu cannot be reduced only to ritual actions on the eve of the battle. Judging by the evidence of sources, he directly led (or at least tried to lead) his troops - and this, I repeat once again, is the only case of this kind in his entire biography, as it is presented in the written sources that have come down to us. But the actions of Batu as a commander received a far from unambiguous assessment in the sources. As it turns out, it is in them that the reasons for those failures that almost led to the defeat of the Mongols in the battle of Shio lie.
According to Foma Splitsky, a certain defector from the Russians warned the Hungarians about the plans of the Tatars. Upon learning of the impending attack, the brother of King Bela Koloman and Bishop Hugrin of Kaloch with their detachments approached the bridge over the Shio. It turned out that part of the Tatars had already begun crossing the river; a fight ensued. The Hungarians overturned the enemy with a swift blow, "put down a lot of them, and others, breaking through back to the bridge, were thrown into the river." An important detail is reported by the Franciscan monk Benedict Pole: Koloman "in the very first fight, he personally threw the main leader of the Tartars from the bridge over this river, along with a horse and weapons, into the abyss of death." This fact is confirmed by eastern sources, from which we learn the name of the deceased Mongol leader - he was the governor Batu Bahatu, who led one of the columns of the Mongol army during the invasion of Hungary (more on the circumstances of his death will be discussed later). Coloman "withstood their second and third onslaught," continues Benedict, "and fought until the Tartars fled."
Success at the first stage of the battle remained with the Hungarians - this is confirmed by all sources. But what happened next? Foma Splitsky gives such a version of events. After the detachment of Koloman and Hugrin moved away from the bridge, the Tatars pulled up seven siege weapons here and, throwing huge stones and shooting arrows, drove away the guards left by the Hungarians. So they managed to cross the river without hindrance, after which they rushed to the camp of the Hungarians, who did not expect an attack and for the most part behaved very carelessly (this, I recall, is a favorite topic of the Split chronicler). The Pole Benedict states the matter differently: according to his information, the outcome of the battle was decided by a roundabout maneuver that Batu undertook. The leader of the Mongols “sent an army across the river in its upper reaches at a distance of one or two days of travel, so that they unexpectedly attacked the opponents fighting on the bridge from the rear ... As a result, the outcome of the case took an unexpected turn. And after the Hungarians ignored the warning of King Koloman, the Tartars crossed the bridge. Sources also report on the bypass maneuver of the Mongolian troops. oriental origin; however, it is not entirely clear whether it took place downstream or upstream of the river.
In the future, the battle unfolded at the very camp of the Hungarians. This had fatal consequences for them. “A large Tatar horde, as if in a round dance, surrounded the entire camp of the Hungarians,” says Foma Splitsky. - Some, pulling their bows, began to shoot arrows from all sides, others hurried to set fire to the camp in a circle. And the Hungarians, seeing that they were surrounded by enemy detachments from everywhere, lost their mind and prudence and no longer understood at all how to deploy their orders, or how to raise everyone to battle, but, stunned by such a great misfortune, rushed around in a circle like sheep in a pen, seeking salvation from wolf teeth." Terrified, they rushed to escape - but then they came across “another evil, arranged by them and well known to them. Since the approaches to the camp, due to tangled ropes and piled up tents, turned out to be very risky blocked, during a hasty flight, some pressed on others, and the losses from the stampede, arranged by their own hands, seemed to be no less than those that were committed by the enemies with their arrows " . In this situation, the Tatars resorted to another trick that they often used: they “as if they opened a certain passage for them and allowed them to leave. But they did not attack them, but followed them from both sides, not allowing them to turn either there or there. And when the Tatars saw that the Hungarians retreating in disarray “are already exhausted by the difficult road, their hands cannot hold weapons, and their weakened legs are not able to run further, then they began to hit them with spears from all sides, cut them with swords, sparing no one, but brutally destroying everyone ... ”The miserable remnants of the Hungarian army were pressed against some kind of swamp, and those who escaped the sword of the Tatars drowned in the quagmire. Bishops Khugrin Kalochsky, Matvey Esztergomsky, Gregory Dyorsky, many other magnates and without the number of ordinary soldiers perished in this terrible battle. The brave brother of the king Koloman, seriously wounded at the beginning of the battle, fled to Pest, and then went across the Drava River to Croatia (after a short time he died from his wounds). As for King Bela IV, he, having barely escaped death or captivity, found refuge in the possessions of the Austrian Duke Frederick II Babenberg, but he simply robbed him, luring the amount of 10 thousand marks, and then, as a pledge of this amount, taking from his area in the west of Hungary. From the Austrian possessions, the king moved to Zagreb, where he remained throughout the summer and autumn, and by winter, fearing the Tatars, he fled with his family to the coast of Dalmatia and took refuge on one of the islands of the Adriatic Sea.
A look at what is happening from the other side is presented by Juvaini and Rashid ad-Din. According to their version, the decisive role in the victory of the Mongols was played, firstly, by the perseverance and determination of the detachments of Shiban and Buraldai operating in the vanguard, and secondly, by the same roundabout maneuver of Batu, which we have already talked about.
That same night, Batu “sent one part of the army around,” says Juvaini, “and the army of Batu himself crossed the river from this side. Shibakan, Batu's brother, personally moved into the middle of the battle and made several attacks in a row. The enemy troops, being strong, did not budge, but that army (sent around) went around them from behind. Then Shibakan with all his army hit them at once, rushed to the fences of the royal tents, and they cut the ropes of the tents with swords (a detail known to us from the story of Thomas of Split. - A.K.) (3). When they overturned the fences of the royal tents, the army of the Kelars (Hungarians. - A.K.) was confused and fled; no one escaped from this army ... It was one of the many great deeds and terrible battles. Rashid ad-Din adds that Batu, together with Emir Buraldai (whose name Juvaini does not mention), crossed the river himself at night; Buraldai, on the other hand, undertook an "attack with all the troops at once." The Mongols “rushed to the tent of the kelar (king. - A.K.), who was their king, and cut the ropes with swords. As a result of the fall of the tent, their army (Hungarians. - A.K.) lost heart and turned to flight. Like a brave lion that rushes at its prey, the Mongols chased them, attacked and killed them, so that they destroyed most of that army. (Subsequently, the richly decorated tent of the Hungarian king served Batu himself.) Another detail, though hardly reliable, is contained in the Book of Victories by the 15th-century Persian writer Sheref ad-Din Ali Yazdi. The latter reports that Batu "personally entered the battle itself and made several attacks in a row." However, it is unlikely that Yazdi had any unique sources on the history of the Hungarian war, from where he could extract this information. He used the writings of authors known to us (primarily the "Collection of Chronicles" by Rashid al-Din), and the news of Batu's personal participation in the battle was most likely contrived by him.
Well, the picture is impressive and, at first glance, quite objective. We could limit ourselves to it - if we did not have at our disposal another source that sheds light on the hidden from prying eyes circumstances of the defeat of the Hungarians. It turns out that there was some dispute between the main commanders of the Mongols, even a conflict, and Batu's actions almost led to disaster. Fortunately for the Mongols and unfortunately for their opponents, along with Batu, a commander who had an exceptional understanding of the situation and a genuine military genius participated in the battle.
What remained outside the knowledge of Latin chroniclers and Persian historians is described in the "Biography of Subedei", which is read in the Chinese chronicle "Yuan-shih". According to this source, Subedey was at the forefront of the army that fought in Hungary, “together with the Chuvans (here: members of the Golden Family. - A.K.) Batu, Hulagu (whose name is not mentioned in other sources in connection with the Western campaign - A. K.), Shiban and Kadan. All these commanders advanced "on separate five roads." The clash with the main forces of King Bela really caused confusion among the leaders of the Mongols. "The army of the king is full of strength, we will not be able to move easily," they said. Then Subedei “put forward an excellent plan”, the essence of which was to lure the Hungarian army to the river (its name is given in a Chinese source as Ho-nin, but in terms of meaning, we are undoubtedly talking about the Shaio River). It was Subedei, and not Batu, who owned the idea of a detour; he commanded the troops that were moved behind enemy lines. “The troops of all the princes were in the upper reaches, where shallow water and horses could wade, in addition, there was a bridge in the middle,” the author of his biography in “Yuan-shih” explains Subedei's intention. - In the lower reaches, the water is deep. Subedei wanted to tie rafts for a secretive, underwater (? - A.K.) crossing, leading to the enemy's grasp from behind. An indispensable condition for success, as always with the Mongols, was to be the synchronism of the actions of individual Mongolian detachments - both the one that attacked the Hungarian units defending the bridge in the forehead, and the one that came in from behind and had to cross the river downstream, where it least expected by the Hungarians. However, this time there was no concerted action. Batu hastened - perhaps overestimating his own strength, or perhaps not wanting to share the laurels of the winner with his elderly, but still undefeated mentor. The Chinese source directly blames the “zhuvan” Batu for hasty and ill-considered actions that led to excessive losses among the attackers, and not only among the “subjugated peoples”, but also among the Mongols themselves: “Without waiting for the crossing, the zhuvan was the first to ford the river for battle. Batu's army began to fight for the bridge, but instead of using it, every thirtieth of the soldiers drowned; along with them, his subordinate commander Bahatu died. Immediately after the crossing, the Zhuwang, in view of the increasing army of the enemy, wanted to demand the return of Subedei, belatedly counting on him. Subedei said this: “Van wants to return - let him return. Until I reach the city of Pest on the Danube (both names are given in transcription corresponding to the Hungarian original. - A.K.) - I will not return!” and ran towards the city. (Here, the Chinese source is somewhat ahead of the events: the city of Pest was taken by the Mongols after the defeat of the Hungarian forces at Shaio. - A.K.) All the princes also went to the city, as a result of which they attacked together, captured it and returned back. When the victory was finally won and the detachments united, Batu made a claim to Subedei:
During the battle near the Ho-nin River, Subedei was late to help, my Bahatu was killed.
But Subedey dismissed the accusations against him, essentially convicting Batu of not understanding the elementary truths of the military tactics of the Mongols:
Although Zhuwang knew that the upper reaches were shallow, he still took possession of the bridge to cross and fight, not knowing that I had not yet completed tying the rafts in the lower reaches. And today, you know, he says to himself - I was late, and he thinks that this is the reason.
We must pay tribute to Batu: he managed to admit his own wrong. (“Then Batu also figured out how it was,” the source says.) Later, at the traditional gathering of princes and emirs, when everyone “drank mare’s milk and grape wine,” Batu confirmed this: “Speaking about the events during the campaign against the king , Batu said this: “Everything that was captured at that time is the merit of Subedei!”
It is worth noting that subsequently Batu always paid tribute to both Subedei himself and his son Uryankhatai, and, in turn, could count on their support, including in delicate matters that were very important for him and related to his relationship with relatives. If he was distinguished by vindictiveness, then to the same extent he possessed the ability to appreciate people for true merits. This character trait - inherent only to truly outstanding politicians - invariably brought him dividends.
Notes
1. The article is an abridged fragment from the book: Karpov A. Yu. Baty. M., 2011 (ZhZL series). References and references can also be found there.
2. This story, from the words of the Tatars themselves, was known in other countries; see the stories of Rashid ad-Din and the Armenian historian, contemporary of the events of Kirakos Gandzaketsi.
3. In all likelihood, it was this battle that was preserved in the Khiva legends, recorded in the 17th century by the Khiva khan and historian Abu-l-Gazi, a descendant of Shiban. These legends also told about how brother Batu chopped iron chains and wooden carts that surrounded the enemy camp; True, the capital of Russia, Moscow, is named as the place of the battle (an obvious anachronism). The Persian author of the early 14th century, Vassaf, following mainly Juvaini, names instead of Shiban - obviously by mistake - the son of Batu Sartak: the latter “with one fog rushed towards the enemy; this party went down the side of the mountain just like a mountain stream. Like a predetermined disaster falling on people, which no one is able to repel, they rushed to the enemy’s camp and cut the ropes of the tent fences with swords ... ".
First to the North
The first western campaign of the Mongols was carried out during the lifetime of Genghis Khan. It is crowned with a victory over the united Russian-Polovtsian army in the Battle of Kalka in 1223. But the subsequent defeat of the weakened Mongol army from the Volga Bulgaria for some time postpones the expansion of the empire to the West. In 1227 the Great Khan dies, but his cause continues to live. The Persian historian Rashid-ad-Din has the following words: "in pursuance of the decree given by Genghis Khan in the name of Jochi (eldest son), he entrusted the conquest of the Northern countries to members of his house." Since 1234, the third son of Genghis Khan, Ogedei, carefully plans a new campaign, and in 1236, a huge army, according to some estimates, reaches 150 thousand people, advances to the West. It is headed by Batu (Batu), but the real command is entrusted to one of the best Mongol commanders - Subedei. As soon as the rivers are ice-bound, the Mongol cavalry begins its movement towards the Russian cities. Ryazan, Suzdal, Rostov, Moscow, Yaroslavl capitulate one after another. Kozelsk holds out longer than others, but it is also destined to fall under the onslaught of countless Asian hordes.
To Europe via Kyiv
Genghis Khan planned to take one of the richest and most beautiful cities of Russia back in 1223. What the Great Khan did not succeed in, his sons did. Kyiv was besieged in September 1240, but only in December the defenders of the city faltered. After the conquest of the Kievan principality, nothing held back the Mongol army from invading Europe. The formal goal of the campaign in Europe was Hungary, and the task was the destruction of the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, who was hiding there with his horde. According to the chronicler, Batu "for the thirtieth time" offered the Hungarian king Bela IV to expel the Polovtsians defeated by the Mongols from their lands, but every time the desperate monarch ignored this proposal. According to some modern historians, the pursuit of the Polovtsian Khan prompted Batu and Subedei to decide to conquer Europe, or at least some of its part. However, the medieval chronicler Yvon of Narbonne attributed to the Mongols much more extensive plans: “They invent that they are leaving their homeland in order to transfer to themselves the kings-sorcerers, whose relics Cologne is famous for; then, to put an end to the greed and pride of the Romans, who in ancient times oppressed them; then, to conquer only the barbarian and Hyperborean peoples; sometimes out of fear of the Teutons, in order to humble them; then, to learn military science from the Gauls; something to seize fertile lands that can feed their multitude; sometimes because of the pilgrimage to St. James, whose final destination is Galicia.
"Devils from Hell"
The main blows of the Horde troops in Europe fell on Poland and Hungary. On the days of Palm Week in 1241, the "devils from the underworld" (as the Europeans called the Mongols) almost simultaneously find themselves at the walls of Krakow and Budapest. Interestingly, the tactics successfully tried in the battle of Kalka helped the Mongols defeat the strong European armies. The retreating Mongol troops gradually lured the attacking side deep into the rear, stretching it and dividing it into parts. As soon as the right moment came, the main Mongol forces destroyed scattered detachments. An important role in the victories of the Horde was played by the "despicable bow", so underestimated by European armies. Thus, the 100,000-strong Hungarian-Croatian army was almost completely destroyed, and the color of the Polish-German chivalry was partially exterminated. Now it seemed that nothing would save Europe from the Mongol conquest.
fading strength
The Kyiv thousand-man Dmitra, who was captured by Batu, warned the khan about crossing the Galicia-Volyn lands: “Do not linger in this land for a long time, it’s time for you to go to the Ugrians. But if you delay, O strong land, they will gather against you and will not let you into their land.” Batu's troops managed to pass the Carpathians almost painlessly, but the captive governor was right in another way. The Mongols, gradually losing their strength, had to act extremely quickly in such distant and alien lands. According to the Russian historian S. Smirnov, Russia during the western campaign of Batu could put up to 600 thousand militias and professional soldiers. But each of the principalities opposing the invasion, which decided to fight alone, fell. The same applied to the European armies, which, many times outnumbering the troops of Batu, were unable to consolidate at the right time. But by the summer of 1241, Europe began to wake up. King Frederick II of Germany and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, in his encyclical, appealed to "open the eyes of spiritual and bodily" and "become a bulwark of Christianity against a ferocious enemy." However, the Germans themselves were in no hurry to resist the Mongols, since at that time Frederick II, who was in conflict with the papacy, led his army to Rome. Nevertheless, the appeal of the German king was heard. By autumn, the Mongols repeatedly tried to overcome the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Danube and transfer military operations to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, but all failed. 8 miles from Vienna, having met with the combined Czech-Austrian army, they were forced to retreat back.
harsh lands
According to most Russian historians, the Mongol army fundamentally weakened its resources during the seizure of Russian lands: its ranks thinned by about a third, and therefore it was not ready to conquer Western Europe. But there were other factors as well. Back in the beginning of 1238, when trying to capture Veliky Novgorod, Batu's troops were stopped on the outskirts of the city by no means by a strong enemy, but by a spring thaw - the Mongol cavalry thoroughly got stuck in the swampy area. But nature saved not only the merchant capital of Russia, but also many cities of Eastern Europe. Impenetrable forests, wide rivers and mountain ranges often put the Mongols in a difficult position, forcing them to make tedious many kilometers detours. Where did the unprecedented speed of movement on the steppe impassability go! People and horses were seriously tired, and moreover, they were starving, not getting enough food for a long time.
death after death
Despite serious problems, with the onset of December frosts, the Mongol army was seriously going to move deep into Europe. But the unexpected happened: on December 11, 1241, Khan Ogedei died, which opened a direct path to the Horde throne of Guyuk, Batu's implacable enemy. The commander turned the main forces home. A struggle for power begins between Batu and Guyuk, ending in the death (or death) of the latter in 1248. Batu ruled for a short time, having died in 1255, Sartak and Ulagchi also quickly passed away (probably poisoned). The new khan Berke in the troubled times is more concerned about the stability of power and peace within the empire. On the eve of Europe, the Black Death swept over Europe - a plague that reached the Golden Horde along the caravan routes. The Mongols will not be up to Europe for a long time. Their later western campaigns will no longer have the scope that they acquired under Batu.
The military campaign of Genghis Khan's grandson Batu to the West began in 1235. Then there was a kurultai, a military council, which gave rise to an attack on Eastern Europe. Quite quickly, the Mongols were able to conquer the fragmented Russia. Europe could expect the same fate.
Walking through Russia, devastating major centers, the Mongols did not idly rejoice for a long time. They scrupulously collected information about Western Europe. The Mongols knew everything that could be physically known: economic, political, social status Europe of that time. Europeans, however, only heard rumors about the Mongols, told by refugees.
The alignment of forces before the invasion
The famous Mongol commander Subudai, who commanded the army of the Mongols, left only 30,000 soldiers to control Russia, while a 120,000-strong army was preparing to invade Central Europe. He realized that together Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Silesia could put up an army that far outnumbered the Mongol army.
Moreover, the invasion of Central Europe could well lead to conflict with the Holy Roman Empire. But the information obtained by the Mongol spies encouraged Subudai and Batu - in Europe at that time there were too strong contradictions between the centers of power: the Pope and the emperor, England and France. And the Balkans with the eastern border of Central Europe were not a conflict-free space. The Mongols expected to deal with everyone in turn.
Before the invasion of the Mongols, the east of Central Europe and the north of the Balkans were constantly at war. Serbia barely restrained the aggression of Hungary, Bulgaria and what was called Byzantium before the Fourth Crusade. The expansion of Bulgaria was stopped only because of the invasion of the Mongols.
Defeat at Legnica
Reading detailed reports of hostilities one is amazed at the swiftness of the Mongols. In a matter of weeks from January to March 1241, dozens of Polish cities fell. Sowing horror and panic, the Mongol tumens (detachments of 10 thousand soldiers) reached Silesia. The Europeans considered that the Mongol army had more than 200 thousand people.
In northeastern Europe, they believed in the terrible stories about the Mongols, but still they were ready to fight to the last. Silesian prince Henry the Pious gathered 40 thousand Germans, Poles and Teutonic knights. They took up positions at Legnica. The Bohemian king Wenceslas I was in a hurry to connect with Henry and also sent 50 thousand soldiers to Legnica.
Wenceslas I did not have time for the decisive attack of the Mongols. Only two days were missing. The king of Poland was killed, Henry's army was defeated, and his remnants fled to the west, the Mongols did not pursue them. The northern detachments of the Mongols, operating on the Baltic coast, won a victory there and turned south to join the main army in Hungary. Along the way, they devastated Moravia.
Defeat of the Hungarians
Wenceslas' army moved to the northwest to join up with the hastily recruiting detachments of German knights. At the same time, the Mongols acted no less effectively in the south. After three decisive battles, by mid-April 1241, all European resistance in Transylvania was broken.
Battle on the river Chaillot. Miniature 13th century
Hungary at that time was one of the main military-political forces in Eastern Europe. On March 12, the main troops of the Mongols broke through the Hungarian barriers in the Carpathians. Upon learning of this, King Bela IV convened a military council in the city of Buda on March 15 to develop a plan to repel the raid. While the council was in session, the Mongol vanguard had already arrived on the opposite bank of the river. Not succumbing to panic and given that the advance of the Mongols was held back by the wide Danube and the fortifications of the city of Pest, the king, at the cost of incredible efforts, gathered almost 100 thousand soldiers.
Hungarian king Bela IV flees from the Mongol army
In early April, Bela IV went east of Pest with an army, confident that he would be able to drive the invaders away. The Mongols feigned retreat. After several days of careful pursuit, Béla ran into them near the Chaio River, nearly 100 miles northeast of present-day Budapest. The Hungarian army unexpectedly quickly recaptured the bridge over the Shio from a small and weak Mongol detachment. Having built fortifications, the Hungarians took refuge on the western bank. From loyal people, Bela IV received accurate information about the forces of the enemy and knew that his army was much larger than the Mongol one. Shortly before dawn, the Hungarians found themselves under a hail of stones and arrows. After a deafening "artillery preparation" the Mongols rushed forward. They managed to surround the defenders. And after a short time, it seemed to the Hungarians that a gap appeared in the west, where they began to retreat under the onslaught of the attack. But this gap was a trap. On all sides, the Mongols rushed on fresh horses, slaughtering the exhausted soldiers, driving them into the swamps and attacking the villages where they tried to hide. Literally a few hours later, the Hungarian army was almost completely destroyed.
Crossing the Alps
The defeat of the Hungarians allowed the Mongols to gain a foothold throughout Eastern Europe from the Dnieper to the Oder and from the Baltic Sea to the Danube. In just 4 months, they defeated the Christian armies, which were 5 times larger than their own. Having suffered a crushing defeat from the Mongols, King Bela IV was forced to hide, finding refuge on the coastal islands of Dalmatia. Later, he managed to restore the central government and even increase the power of the country. True, not for long - he was soon defeated by the Austrian Margrave Friedrich Babenberg the Grumpy and never achieved success in a long war with the Bohemian king Ottokart II. Then the Mongols invaded the lands of Bukovina, Moldavia and Romania. Slovakia, which was then under the rule of Hungary, suffered seriously. In addition, Batu also advanced westward to the Adriatic Sea, invaded Silesia, where he defeated the army of the Duke of Silesia. It seemed that the way to Germany and Western Europe open…
In the summer of 1241, Subudai consolidated his hold on Hungary and developed plans to invade Italy, Austria, and Germany. The Europeans' desperate resistance efforts were poorly coordinated and their defenses proved highly ineffective.
At the end of December, the Mongols marched across the frozen Danube to the west. Their forward detachments crossed the Julian Alps and headed for northern Italy, while their scouts approached Vienna along the Danube plain. Everything was ready for the final assault. And then the unexpected happened... From the capital of the Great Mongol Empire, Karakorum, news came that the son and successor of Genghis Khan Ogedei had died. The law of Genghis Khan unambiguously stated that after the death of the ruler, all the descendants of the clan, wherever they were, even if they were 6 thousand miles away, should return to Mongolia and take part in the election of a new khan. So, in the vicinity of Venice and Vienna, frightened to death, the Mongolian tumens were forced to turn around and move back to Karakorum. On the way to Mongolia, their wave swept through Dalmatia and Serbia, then east through northern Bulgaria. The death of Ögedei saved Europe.
Mongol army at the walls of Legnica
Europe at the beginning of the thirteenth century was in many ways simply ignorant of the new threat coming towards it from the East. Information slowly coming with caravans and travelers spread slowly. Europe itself, mired in chronic cruel feudal strife, was little interested in what was happening somewhere in distant lands - to put things in order in their own. The first data, very vague, about events in the distant steppes of Asia began to reach the courts of the monarchs in the 20s. XIII century, when the armies of Jebe and Subedei invaded the Polovtsian steppes. Having reached the limits of Russia, suffering from princely strife, the troops of the Mongol Empire in 1223 defeated the Russian troops near the Kalka River and, taking a lot of booty, migrated back to Central Asia.
The first of the European powers that be worried was the Hungarian king Bela IV. He dispatched a Dominican friar, Julian, with several representatives of other monastic orders, on a reconnaissance mission in the Volga region to deal with the situation on the ground. For three years from 1235 to 1238, Julian collected information, with which he successfully returned. The stories of the scout monk about the hordes of the steppe cavalry were so impressive and eloquent that they preferred not to believe them. While Julian's warning speeches were lazily brushed aside in Europe, in the East it became again, to put it mildly, anxious. The huge army of Batu invaded Russia, and outlandish embassies began to appear at the courts of sovereign persons. Delegates dressed in strange clothes with slanting eyes and faces weathered by the steppe winds handed letters to the local authorities. From these messages it followed that a certain person who calls himself the Great Khan demands obedience and submission from kings and other rulers. Somewhere they were surprised at such impudence, somewhere they laughed - in other places the ambassadors were even treated impolitely, violating diplomatic etiquette, because the Mongols accused Bela IV of the same fact that several embassies from Hungary did not return.
But after the ambassadors from the east, refugees followed - and they became less surprised, and stopped laughing altogether. In 1239, the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan turned to the Hungarian king with a request set out in a letter. Its essence was to ensure that Bela accepted on its territory the Polovtsians fleeing the invasion, in exchange for their adoption of Catholicism. Prior to this, the Polovtsy professed a mixture of Orthodoxy and worship of the Turkic deity Tengri. In the autumn of 1239, Bela IV met Kotyan with almost 40 thousand tribesmen on the border of his state and gave them permission to settle in Hungary. However, the local feudal nobility was afraid of too much strengthening of royal power (before the absolutist “state is me” there were more than four centuries) and plotted. On the eve of the Mongol invasion of Europe in 1241, Kotyan, who converted to Catholicism, and members of his family were treacherously killed in Pest. The Polovtsy renounced Catholicism and migrated to the Balkans.
The union with the Hungarian kingdom of the Russian principalities did not take place either. This union was persistently sought by the Galicia-Volyn prince Daniil Romanovich and Chernigov - Mikhail Vsevolodovich. King Bela IV, under various pretexts, evaded any agreements. Other states of Europe did not show any interest in the joint preventive curbing of the aggressor. The German Emperor Frederick II Staufen, an exquisite expert in languages and strategic intrigues, publicly laughed off the Mongol messages with a demand for obedience - he modestly asked the Great Khan to appoint him as a court falconer. In fact, according to some reports, he entered into a secret correspondence with the Khan, intending to use this power in an increasingly growing conflict with the Pope. Pontiff Gregory IX himself was obviously well aware of the threat from the East, for Catholic Church had at that time, perhaps, the best agents in Europe. The Pope had his own views on the Mongol military machine, hoping to use it in an anti-Arab direction as an instrument of indirect actions in the Middle East policy. In the north, the Livonian Order, which had an impressive military force, was preparing for an armed version of the preaching of Catholicism in the Baltic states and in the north-east of Russia and, concentrating on the realization of its ambitions, did not show any interest in confronting some Mongols. Ignoring the impending danger, which in its significance could not outweigh the traditional small-town feudal showdowns, cost the Europeans dearly.
East vs. West
Heavily armed Mongol warrior and his equipment
The military power of the Mongols was to some extent weakened by the stubborn resistance of the Russian principalities, but it was a significant force. Under the Mongol khans, there were a sufficient number of scientists and geographers, so that the command of the nomads was aware of the lands to the west of Russia, to a much greater extent than the Europeans knew about the newcomers from the east. Since the main blow was delivered to Hungary, we can assume that Batu planned to use the Hungarian valley as an operational and forage base in the center of Europe. Presumably general concept and the plan for the raid on Eastern Europe was developed by Subedei, one of the best commanders of the Mongol Empire. He envisaged an invasion of Hungary from several directions in order to force the enemy to split their forces, thereby reducing the level of resistance.
Three tumens (the main Mongol tactical unit numbering 10 thousand soldiers) remained as an occupying contingent on the territory of Russia. Two tumens under the command of the grandsons of Genghis Khan Baydar and Kadan were to make a reconnaissance and sabotage raid in a northwestern direction towards Poland. It was only supposed to try the Poles for strength, to explore how capable the local troops were of defense, and then turn south to the main forces. The younger brother of Batu Shiban with one tumen had to sneak along the northern outskirts of the Carpathian Mountains and enter Hungary from the north. Batu himself, with an army consisting of at least four tumens, struck through Transylvania, diverting attention to himself, and the author of the plan, Subedei, moving along the banks of the Danube, was preparing to invade the kingdom from the south with the main forces. Some researchers believe that the onslaught on Europe was concentrated on Hungary, since Batu allegedly was going to limit himself to it only. Another version is that the defeat of Bela IV was only a stage on the path of further expansion. If the Christian army tried to advance towards Batu or Subedei, in any case it exposed its rear to the blow. The operation was well thought out.
The problem for the Europeans was also that practically no one knew anything about the methods and methods of warfare used by the Mongols. Of course, the term "Mongols" is clearly collective in nature, since the army that appeared at the beginning of 1241 at the walls of Europe was a real international cocktail, which included representatives of the most different peoples and nationalities. An avalanche that erupted from endless steppes Mongolia, like a sponge, has absorbed entire layers different cultures. Together with them, knowledge and skills were acquired. Those that proved useful were reworked and put into practice by the conquerors. European chivalry will have to face a completely unknown opponent, experienced, skillful, skillful and courageous. It was not a formless, hooting crowd of savages fleeing at a serious obstacle. A perfectly organized, trained and, most importantly, experienced army was advancing on Eastern Europe. She was bound by iron discipline, shed blood in abundance and the ruthless will of the khans. Countless victories with rare defeats contributed to the proper level of morale.
The main part of the Mongolian army consisted of cavalry - light and heavy. There were also elite units from the commander's immediate guard, keshikten, a kind of guard. The main Mongol warrior was a composite bow made of yak horns and wood 130–150 cm long. The weapon had big power and long-range: arrows 90-95 cm long could hit targets at a distance of about 300 meters, and at a closer distance they were able to pierce armor. Each warrior carried with him several bows and quivers for them - the entire shooting kit was called saadak. Heavy cavalry with armored warriors, armed with swords, maces and shields, entered the battle at a decisive moment, when the light cavalry had already exhausted the enemy as it should, bringing him to the appropriate condition. The personnel of the army was divided according to the decimal system: ten, one hundred, one thousand, and the largest tactical unit - tumen, consisting of ten thousand. The army was completed at the rate of one warrior out of ten people. This rule first extended to the original Mongol lands, and then, as they advanced, to part of the conquered. The recruit came to the service with his weapons and several horses. The Mongols were famous for their skill in conducting sieges and had a sufficient amount of equipment used in the storming of fortresses and cities.
Onslaught
At the very beginning of 1241, the Mongol army invaded Poland according to the original plan. In January, they broke through to the Vistula, where Lublin and Zavikhost were captured and plundered. An attempt by a hastily put together local militia and chivalry to resist ended in defeat on February 13 near Tursk. It was here that the Europeans first experienced the unprecedented tactics of the Mongols. The initial onslaught of the Poles was strong, and the light cavalry of the allegedly disorganized and wild enemy began to retreat in complete disorder. Carried away by the chase, the pursuers, without noticing it themselves, turned into game surrounded on all sides and were killed. On March 10, Baidar crossed the Vistula at Sandomierz, after which, having separated from his forces a detachment led by Kadan, sent him to ruin the region, and he himself went to Krakow. The natural desire of the Poles to cover the Krakow direction led to a new, larger battle on March 18 near Khmilnik. Baydar this time was opposed by the Krakow governor Vladimezh Klemens and the Sandomierz contingent under the command of Pakoslav. The Polish troops were demoralized even before the start of the battle by the actual desertion of the Krakow prince Bolesław the Shy, together with his mother, the Russian princess Gremislava Ingvarovna, and family. Far away from sin, the prudent prince left for Hungary.
And again the Mongols showed themselves as the most skillful warriors. Since the Polish troops were concentrated in Krakow, it was decided to lure them out of there. A mobile group of light cavalry broke into the suburbs, looting and ruining there. The enraged Poles, seeing that there were few enemies, could not resist the temptation to give chase. The Mongolian detachment allowed them to chase after themselves for several tens of kilometers, skillfully without breaking the distance. After that, the pursuers were surrounded by mounted archers and exterminated. Many Lesser Poland (Lesser Poland - a historical region in southwestern Poland) chivalry and both governors perished. The remnants of the troops dispersed, some of them ran to the city, bringing disorganizing confusion. Panic began to spread around the area. Krakow, left without defenders and almost without inhabitants, was captured on March 22 and was already subject to a thorough ruin.
Having finished with Krakow, Baidar moved on - the Oder was waiting for him ahead, which still had to be crossed - bridges and crossings were destroyed in advance. The construction and search for boats, rafts and other watercraft somewhat delayed the Mongol army. By the time the vanguard of the Mongols appeared at Wroclaw, its inhabitants had already prepared for defense. The city itself was abandoned and partially burned, and the inhabitants, together with the garrison, took refuge in a well-fortified fortress. Provisions were also concentrated there in case of a siege. An attempt to capture Wroclaw on the move failed - the defenders repulsed the enemy's onslaught with heavy losses for him. Having failed in a swift attack, the Mongols withdrew to the main forces of Baydar to regroup. By this time, the sabotage campaign of this northern group had already attracted too much attention. Local authorities, who quite recently listened with obvious skepticism to stories about hordes of nomads sweeping everything in their path and perceived them as stories about the mythical kingdom of John the Presbyter, are now faced with this disaster face to face. The enemy was no longer somewhere far away - he was ruining the country. And the reaction, albeit belated, followed.
Battle of Legnica
Jan Matejko. Henry the Pious
Prince Henry the Pious, recognizing the threat as very significant, began to gather an already large army. Troops were moving towards him from different places. From the southern part of Poland, the brother of the deceased Krakow governor Sulislav arrived with a detachment. The contingent from Upper Silesia was commanded by Mieszko. Henry himself stood at the head of the Lower Silesian troops. Foreign formations in the united army were under the command of Boleslav, son of the Moravian Margrave Diepold. By the way, there were members of the Order of the Knights Templar. In any case, the Grand Master Ponce d'Aubon, in a letter to the French King Louis IX, said that in the battle of Legnica the order lost about 500 people, including 6 knights. There was also a small detachment of knights of the Teutonic Order. The fact is that the father of Henry the Pious, Henry I the Bearded, transferred a certain piece of land under the control of this order in exchange for help. Prince Heinrich turned to his neighbor, the Czech king Wenceslas I, for help, and he promised to send an army. Heinrich decided to still try his luck in a field battle - his army, for the most part infantry, included a large number of experienced warriors. A big stake was traditionally placed on the strike of heavy knightly cavalry - in European customs of warfare, this was one of the main axioms of victory. The difficulty of the situation was that non-Europeans fought against Henry. He led his army to Legnica, a city in Silesia, where Wenceslas I was moving, who decided to personally lead the army.
Baidar was only one day's march from the city. Having learned about the approach of Henry and having received information from well-placed intelligence about the threat of his unification with the Czechs, the Mongol commander set out to meet the enemy in order to impose a battle on him and prevent the merger of the two armies. He notified Batu and Kadan, who continued to repair ruin in Mazovia, by letters of his decision.
Knight of the Teutonic Order
The forces of the opposing sides are generally comparable in number, but differ in composition. According to some reports, Baydar had 1,000 skirmishers to harass and lure the enemy, 11,000 mounted archers, and 8,000 heavy cavalry. In total, his army is estimated at almost 20 thousand people. Henry and his allies could counter this with 8 thousand heavy cavalry, 3 thousand light cavalry, 14 thousand infantry. Apparently, the Europeans planned to beat off enemy attacks with their light cavalry, bleed him, and then deliver a crushing blow with heavy knightly cavalry.
Opponents met on April 9, 1241 near Legnica. Baidar positioned his skirmishers from the "lure group" in the center, with mounted archers on the flanks. The heavy cavalry was stationed at some distance in the rear. Heinrich placed his light cavalry in front, behind which the heavily armed horsemen stood in the second echelon. The infantry formed the third line. The battle began with an exchange of ridicule and insults, which was soon supplemented by mutual archery. The allies began to get more, so their light cavalry rushed to the already annoying skirmishers. However, successful at first, the attack began to be smeared - the enemy on his undersized horses drove off for a certain distance and again continued to fire, all the while keeping a distance from the allies. Then Henry ordered the heavy cavalry to join the battle, which was promptly executed.
The emboldened vanguard, having regrouped, resumed the onslaught, and the Mongols, seeing the change in the situation, began to rapidly retreat, spreading in flank directions. The allies began the pursuit of the seemingly fleeing enemy at full speed. And then the Mongols applied one of their many tricks that were not standard for Europeans: they arranged a smoke screen from bundles of wood, grass and brushwood prepared in advance. Clouds of smoke began to cover the retreating skirmishers, and the entire Allied cavalry armada rushed right through the clouds of smoke, not seeing anything around.
Schematic of the Battle of Legnica
At this time, the horse archers on the flanks began to surround the enemy cavalry, generously showering them with arrows. When the inertia of the attacking knights was extinguished, they, exhausted by shelling and poorly oriented in the situation, were hit by the completely fresh Mongolian heavy cavalry, which had been in reserve until then. Unable to withstand the onslaught, one of the Polish detachments tried to flee, but only weakened the formation.
The blow of the Mongols turned the recently still furiously advancing Europeans to flight. The infantry, seeing nothing because of the clouds of smoke and actually performing the role of extras, was not even aware of the ever-growing defeat. Finally, the fleeing knights appeared from behind the smoke, and the Mongols tirelessly chasing them. This turned out to be a complete surprise - the fleeing horsemen crashed into the dense ranks of their infantry, a scuffle began, which quickly gave rise to panic. The formation crumbled, and the Allied army fled, no longer representing an organized force. A real massacre began - the Mongols did not really need prisoners. The destruction was complete. The initiator of the campaign, Henry the Pious, died in battle. Late literally for a day to the battlefield, Vaclav, having learned about the defeat of an ally, preferred to urgently retreat. Baidar's warriors cut off the ears of the dead and put them in large bags, of which there were nine pieces. The body of Prince Heinrich was beheaded, and his head was impaled on a pike. With all these attributes of intimidation, the Mongols approached Legnica, demanding to surrender the city, but the inhabitants, rightly deciding that it was better not to count on the mercy of such visitors, put up serious resistance and fought off several attacks. Having devastated the surroundings, the steppes left.
Hungary. Battle of Chaillot
The information obtained by the monk Julian, of course, caused some skepticism, but the Hungarian king took certain measures to increase the country's defense capability. Some fortresses were reconstructed, stockpiles of weapons were accumulated. When the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, along with his fellow tribesmen, came to emigration - and not because of a passion for travel, but because he was driven from his native nomad camps by the Mongols - Hungary was alarmed in earnest. The situation was complicated by the numerous and ambitious feudal nobility, who constantly intrigued against the royal power and stubbornly did not want to strengthen the center, which resulted in the treacherous murder of Kotyan.
The first information about the appearance of the Mongols in the eastern suburbs at the court was received in January. King Bela IV, who was then in Pest, instructed the palatine (the highest official after the king in Hungary until 1853) Dionysius to set up outposts in the Carpathians. On March 10, 1241, news came of a large-scale invasion by a large Mongol army through the so-called "Russian Gates" (Veretsky Pass). It was Batu with a whole staff of experienced military leaders - his army numbered tens of thousands of people. The conflict with the nobility, who dreamed that the royal army would not exceed the number of palace guards, did not allow timely advance of reinforcements to the border. On March 12, the limited forces of Dionysius were dispersed, and the highly mobile enemy began to flood over the country. Already on March 15, the vanguard of Batu, under the command of his younger brother Shiban, reached the Pest region, where the king frantically gathered an army.
Batu approached and camped about 20 km from the main forces of the Hungarians. The nomads constantly kept the enemy in suspense with their presence, and in the meantime, flying detachments ravaged the surroundings, collecting rich booty, provisions and fodder. On March 15, they captured the city of Vats, a little later, Eger. Bela's forces, meanwhile, increased - significant reinforcements approached him in the person of the army of the Croatian Duke Koloman, and now they total strength reached, according to various estimates, at least 60 thousand people. Opinions about next steps caused controversy. Part of the leadership, headed by Archbishop Ugolin of Koloch, demanded the most active action. The zeal of the modest minister of the church was so great that he personally, without the approval of the king, made a diversionary sortie to the camp of the Mongols with a couple of thousand soldiers. There, of course, the bishop was ambushed and returned with only a few men. This initiative got away with him, because not everything went smoothly at the headquarters of the Christian army: Bela's vassal, the Austrian Duke Friedrich Babenberg, quarreled with his overlord and departed for his homeland. Realizing that further inaction only loosens the army, and being confident in his superiority - now the king had 60 thousand against Batu's 30 thousand - in early April, Bela ordered the united army to leave Pest. Not wanting to accept the battle on unfavorable terms, the Mongols retreated. Overloaded convoy and big share infantry, the Hungarian-Croatian army slowly dragged along. A few days later, the main forces under the command of Subedei approached Batu - communication among the Mongols through the system of messengers was excellently established, which made it possible to assemble a shock fist in the shortest possible time. right time in the right place.
After a week of pursuit, Bela camped near the Chaillot River. The camp was surrounded by a palisade and wagons. There was a bridge on the left flank of the position. For some reason, the king decided that the enemy would not be able to cross the river, and left him to cover him with only one thousand soldiers. Batu decided to surround the enemy and destroy him. He separated Subedei's corps, which was ordered to covertly force the river to the south at night and bypass the enemy camp. The khan himself spent the whole day on April 9 in disturbing allied activities. On the one hand, he did not let them rest and kept them in suspense, on the other hand, the enemy saw that the Mongols had become much smaller, and cheered up, lowering their vigilance. April 10 passed in preparation for the operation.
Scheme of the battle on the river Chaillot
On the night of April 10-11, Subedei secretly crossed Shio according to plan and actually entered the flank and rear of the allied army. In the morning, widely using stone-throwing tools, Batu successfully knocked down the barrier from the bridge and captured it. Soon, the Mongol cavalry poured through it to the other side. The news of the appearance of the enemy took the Hungarians and Croats by surprise. While the alarm was sounding, the steppes took up comfortable positions on the heights, showering arrows in the camp with a shower. Soon, stone-throwers were also brought there. By two o'clock in the afternoon, according to a contemporary of the events, the historian Archdeacon Thomas of Split, the camp was tightly blocked by the Mongols, who massively used lit arrows. Resistance began to weaken, and the army began to panic. The flight of individual feudal lords with detachments began, which soon grew into complete chaos. Batu prudently did not completely surround the enemy, leaving him a small loophole - otherwise the allies could start fighting to the death, and then his army would have suffered completely unnecessary losses.
The Mongols were masters not only of tactical retreat, but also knew how to competently and stubbornly pursue the enemy. The crowd, which had been an army a few hours ago, having lost everything - from fighting spirit to banners and baggage - was now being driven towards Pest, from where it had recently set out. On the shoulders of the fleeing Mongols broke into Pest. The city was sacked and burned. The destruction was complete. The losses of the Hungarians and Croats are estimated at more than 50 thousand people. The kingdom lost not only the army, but also the king. Bela IV did not find another way out, how to run to his vassal, the Austrian Duke Friedrich Babenberg. The demoralized king gave him almost the entire treasury (10,000 marks) and three counties for help in the fight against the invasion and, probably, for providing asylum. The seriously wounded Duke Koloman with the remnants of his detachment retreated to Croatia.
Unfinished hike
Mongolian detachments, almost without resistance, continued the unhindered devastation of the country. The greatest advance of the Mongols to the west was recorded in the spring of 1242, when the tumen of Kadan, capturing cities and fortresses along the way, went to the Adriatic. Batu himself, with Baydar approaching him from Poland, began to ruin the Czech Republic. And then the steppes took and plundered many cities. Bela IV, who found himself in forced exile, tried to raise a resonance because of the extremely plight of his state, and indeed of all of Eastern Europe. He sent letters asking for help to two of the most powerful figures of the time: the German Emperor Friedrich Staufen and Pope Gregory IX. Naturally, absorbed in clarifying the relationship between themselves, these politicians did not care about the lamentations of the Hungarian king. The emperor sympathetically replied that, they say, the Mongols are very bad, and the Pope referred to worries, limiting himself to words of support and consolation. The hospitality of the Austrians soon also dried up, and Bela was forced to flee to Dalmatia. It is not known how events would have taken place further if at the end of 1241 Batu had not received an emergency message about the death of the Great Khan Ogedei. Now the highest Mongol nobility had to gather for kurultai in order to elect a new ruler of the colossal empire. The activity of the Mongols in Europe is gradually decreasing. Despite the activities of individual, even large, detachments, a gradual retreat to the East begins. There are several versions of the cessation of the campaign to the West, and one of them is that the death of Ogedei was only an excuse for the retreat of the army, exhausted by battles and heavy losses suffered in the fight against the Russian principalities and in Eastern Europe. Perhaps there were plans to repeat such a campaign in the future, but in the light of the civil strife that was increasingly embracing the Mongol Empire, this plan was not carried out.
King Bela IV, soon after the departure of the aggressors, safely returned to the performance of his state duties and did a lot to strengthen royal power. Already in 1242, he set out with an army against the Duke of Austria, forcing him to give up the counties actually taken from the Hungarians. Batu, or Batu Khan, settled in the capital of his ulus, Sarai-Batu, actively participating in political life Mongolian state. He no longer made any military campaigns in the West and died in 1255 or 1256. Europe, frozen in a fit of horror before the hordes of impetuous steppe nomads, after their departure took a breath and took up the usual routine feudal squabbles. The vast lands of Russia, stretched to the east, were waiting for hard, tragic times, the blood-covered grass of the Kulikovo field and the frozen banks of the Ugra River.
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The head of the Mongol Empire was the son of the "heavenly warrior" Ogedei. For several years the Mongols were busy with wars in Korea and North China. In 1234, the North Chinese "Golden Empire" fell. Then it was time to deploy all the military power of the steppes to the West...
In 1235, the great Khan Ogedei convened a kurultai (congress) of the Mongolian nobility, at which it was decided to start a new campaign. This enterprise was given special significance: it was about the fulfillment of the precepts of Genghis Khan. First, it was necessary to move from the steppes beyond the Ural River to the Lower Volga region and the Polovtsian steppe, then to the Volga Bulgaria and Russia. In the distant future, it was supposed to conquer the "land of the Franks" - Western Europe.
Khan Batu
The command of the troops of the western campaign was entrusted to the grandson of Genghis Khan - Batu.
Mongolian name Batu (in Russian pronunciation - Batu) meant "strong", "solid", "indestructible". Batu was a capable, successful commander. No wonder he was subsequently called Sain Khan, i.e. Happy. Ruthlessly and consistently he went to the goal.
Mongolian army
The march to the West required the joining of the forces of all Mongolian clans. Seven grandsons of Genghis Khan gathered at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, and each brought with him large military forces. In total, Batu had at his disposal 100-150 thousand horsemen. In addition, during the assault on cities, the Mongols drove forward countless crowds of prisoners who carried earth, logs and stones to overcome the ditches and build an embankment in front of the walls. Most of these prisoners died from the arrows of the fortress defenders. But their bodies created a hill, along which the Mongol warriors then climbed the city walls.
Conquest of Volga Bulgaria
In the autumn of 1236 the Mongols attacked Volga Bulgaria. The Bulgars three times (in 1223, 1229 and 1232) repulsed the raids of the conquerors. However, the numerical superiority of the conquerors was too great. After a fierce battle, the capital of the country, the city of Bulgar, was captured and destroyed. In the spring and summer of 1237, the hordes of Batu completed the devastation of Bulgaria, they also marched across the steppes from the Caspian to the Don, destroying the Polovtsians and other nomadic peoples there. Now they stood on the very threshold of Russia...
The Russian princes, of course, knew about what was happening in the East. Vladimir Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich settled thousands of refugees from the Volga Bulgaria in his border fortresses. Fearing an alliance between the eastern and western enemies of Russia, he intercepted the ambassadors sent by the Khan to the Hungarian king, detained the Catholic monks sent by the Pope to Russia for the purpose of intelligence.
Batu's invasion
Batu's campaign in Europe
Having passed with fire and sword through the Galicia-Volyn principality, Batu moved on to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. On April 11, 1241, in the battle of Shaio, the Mongols defeated the 60,000-strong army of the Hungarian king Bela IV. And two days earlier, another Mongol detachment operating in southwestern Poland destroyed the combined Polish forces at the Battle of Legnica. material from the site
The way to Western Europe was opened. However, in the spring of 1242, Batu suddenly turned his troops back to the East. What made the grandson of Genghis Khan stop the campaign that threatened the existence of the entire European civilization? The answer is obvious. With all the many big and small reasons, the main obstacle that slowed down and stopped the advance of the Mongol army was the heroic resistance of the peoples of Eastern Europe, and in particular the Russian people. Having lost the best warriors, Batu simply did not have the strength to move on, to conquer populous and strong countries.
This is exactly what was pointed out A. S. Pushkin: “Russia definitely had a high purpose ... Its boundless
