Japanese-Finnish war. Forgotten War

A New Look

triumphant defeat.

Why hide the victory of the Red Army
in the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov's version.

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of the Soviet military history. The huge Red Army failed to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias for three and a half months, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Finland Marshal Mannerheim - the winner of the "winter war"?

Defeat Soviet Union in the "winter war" is the most striking evidence of the weakness of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It serves as one of the main arguments for those historians and publicists who argue that the USSR was not preparing for war with Germany and that Stalin tried by all means to delay the entry of the Soviet Union into the world conflict.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Stalin could have planned an attack on a strong and well-armed Germany at a time when the Red Army suffered such a shameful defeat in battles with such a small and weak enemy. However, is the "shameful defeat" of the Red Army in the "winter war" an obvious axiom that does not require proof? In order to understand this issue, we first consider the facts.

Preparing for War: Stalin's Plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began at the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula, hand over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko as a naval base on a long-term lease. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland a territory twice as large in size, but not suitable for economic activity and strategically useless.

A Finnish government delegation arrived in Moscow to discuss territorial disputes...

The Finnish government has not rejected the "great neighbor" claims. Even Marshal Mannerheim, who was considered a supporter of the pro-German orientation, spoke in favor of a compromise with Moscow. In mid-October, Soviet-Finnish negotiations began, which lasted less than a month. On November 9, negotiations broke down, but the Finns were ready for a new bargain. By mid-November, it seemed that the tension in the Soviet-Finnish relations was somewhat discharged. The Finnish government has even called on residents of the border areas who moved inland during the conflict to return to their homes. However, at the end of the same month, on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops attacked the Finnish border.
Naming the reasons that prompted Stalin to start a war against Finland, Soviet (now Russian!) researchers and a significant part of Western scientists indicate that the main goal of Soviet aggression was the desire to secure Leningrad. Like, when the Finns refused to exchange lands, Stalin wanted to seize part of the Finnish territory near Leningrad in order to better protect the city from attack.
This is an obvious lie! true purpose attack on Finland is obvious - the Soviet leadership intended to capture this country and include it in the "Unbreakable Union ..." Back in August 1939, during secret Soviet-German negotiations on the division of spheres of influence, Stalin and Molotov insisted on the inclusion of Finland (along with with the three Baltic states) into the "Soviet sphere of influence". Finland was to become the first country in a series of states that Stalin planned to annex to his power.
The aggression was planned long before the attack. The Soviet and Finnish delegations were still discussing possible conditions territorial exchange, and in Moscow the future communist government of Finland, the so-called "People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic", was already being formed. It was headed by one of the founders of the Communist Party of Finland, Otto Kuusinen, who permanently lived in Moscow and worked in the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Otto Kuusinen is Stalin's candidate for the Finnish leaders.

A group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left - O. Kuusinen

Later, O. Kuusinen became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957-1964 he was secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. To match Kuusinen there were other "ministers" of the "people's government", which was in the train Soviet troops were supposed to arrive in Helsinki and announce the "voluntary accession" of Finland to the USSR. At the same time, under the leadership of NKVD officers, units of the so-called "Red Army of Finland" were created, which was assigned the role of "extras" in the planned performance.

Chronicle of the "winter war"

However, the performance did not work. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, the Soviet troops ran into stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish rangers are the backbone of Mannerheim's army.

Having advanced 25-60 km deep into the territory of Finland, the Red Army was stopped on the narrow Karelian Isthmus. Finnish defensive troops dug into the ground on the "Mannerheim Line" and repelled all Soviet attacks. The 7th Army, commanded by General Meretskov, suffered heavy losses. Additional troops sent by the Soviet command to Finland were surrounded by mobile Finnish detachments of skiing warriors, who made sudden raids from the forests, exhausting and bleeding the aggressors.
For a month and a half, a huge Soviet army trampled on the Karelian Isthmus. At the end of December, the Finns even tried to launch a counteroffensive, but they clearly lacked the strength.
The failures of the Soviet troops forced Stalin to take emergency measures. On his orders, several high-ranking commanders were publicly shot in the army; General Semyon Timoshenko (future People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), close to the leader, became the new commander of the main North-Western Front. To break through the Mannerheim Line, additional reinforcements were sent to Finland, as well as detachments of the NKVD.

Semyon Timoshenko - leader of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line"

On January 15, 1940, Soviet artillery began a massive shelling of Finnish defense positions, which lasted 16 days. In early February, 140 thousand soldiers and more than a thousand tanks were thrown into the offensive in the Karelian sector. For two weeks there were fierce battles on the narrow isthmus. Only on February 17, Soviet troops managed to break through the Finnish defenses, and on February 22, Marshal Mannerheim ordered the army to be withdrawn to a new defensive line.
Although the Red Army managed to break through the "Mannerheim Line" and capture the city of Vyborg, the Finnish troops were not defeated. The Finns managed to reinforce themselves on new frontiers. In the rear of the occupying army, mobile detachments of Finnish partisans operated, which made daring attacks on enemy units. The Soviet troops were exhausted and battered; their losses were enormous. One of Stalin's generals bitterly admitted:
- We have conquered exactly as much Finnish territory as is necessary to bury our dead.
Under these conditions, Stalin preferred to again propose to the Finnish government to settle the territorial issue through negotiations. The general secretary preferred not to mention plans for Finland's annexation to the Soviet Union. By that time, Kuusinen's puppet "people's government" and his "Red Army" had already been quietly disbanded. As compensation, the failed "leader of Soviet Finland" received the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the newly created Karelian-Finnish SSR. And some of his colleagues in the "cabinet of ministers" were simply shot - apparently, so as not to get in the way ...
The Finnish government immediately agreed to negotiations. Although the Red Army suffered heavy losses, it was clear that the small Finnish defense would not be able to stop the Soviet offensive for a long time.
Negotiations began at the end of February. On the night of March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded between the USSR and Finland.

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Finnish delegation accepted all Soviet demands: Helsinki ceded to Moscow the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri, the northeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, the port of Hanko and the Rybachy Peninsula - a total of about 34 thousand square kilometers of the country's territory.

The results of the war: victory or defeat.

So those are the basic facts. Having remembered them, now we can try to analyze the results of the "winter war".
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland was in a worse position: in March 1940, the Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.

However, the Finns managed to defend their independence. The Soviet Union, which unleashed the war, did not achieve the main goal - the accession of Finland to the USSR. Moreover, the failures of the offensive of the Red Army in December 1939 - the first half of January 1940 caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union and, above all, its armed forces. The whole world made fun of the huge army, which for a month and a half trampled on the narrow isthmus, unable to break the resistance of the tiny Finnish army.
Politicians and the military were quick to conclude that the Red Army was weak. Especially closely followed the development of events on the Soviet-Finnish front in Berlin. German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary back in November 1939:
"The Russian army is worth little. Poorly led and even worse armed ..."
Hitler repeated the same thought a few days later:
"The Führer once again defines the catastrophic state of the Russian army. It is barely capable of fighting ... It is possible that average level Russian intelligence does not allow them to produce modern weapons."
It seemed that the course of the Soviet-Finnish war fully confirmed the opinion of the Nazi leaders. On January 5, 1940, Goebbels wrote in his diary:
"In Finland, the Russians are not advancing at all. It seems that the Red Army is not really worth much."
The theme of the weakness of the Red Army was constantly exaggerated at the Fuhrer's headquarters. Hitler himself said on January 13:
"You can't squeeze more out of the Russians anyway... It's very good for us. It's better to have a weak partner in the neighbors than an arbitrarily good comrade in the union."
On January 22, Hitler and his associates again discussed the course of hostilities in Finland and came to the conclusion:
"Moscow is very weak militarily..."

Adolf Hitler was sure that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.

And in March, the representative of the Nazi press at the headquarters of the Fuhrer, Heinz Lorenz, was already openly mocking the Soviet army:
"... Russian soldiers are just fun. Not a trace of discipline ..."
Not only Nazi leaders, but also serious military analysts considered the failures of the Red Army as proof of its weakness. Analyzing the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, the German General Staff in a report to Hitler made the following conclusion:
"The Soviet masses cannot resist a professional army with skillful command."
Thus, the "winter war" inflicted swipe by the authority of the Red Army. And although the Soviet Union achieved very significant territorial concessions in this conflict, in strategic plan he suffered a humiliating defeat. In any case, almost all historians who have studied the Soviet-Finnish war believe so.
But Viktor Suvorov, not trusting the opinion of the most authoritative researchers, decided to check for himself: did the Red Army really show weakness and inability to fight during the "winter war"?
The results of his analysis were astonishing.

The historian is at war with... the computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate on a powerful analytical computer the conditions in which the Red Army fought. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
snow cover depth - one and a half meters;
relief - rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
and so on.
And each time the smart computer answered:

IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such relief
and so on...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army offensive in the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the simulation of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" without taking into account climate and relief.
Here it is necessary to explain what the Finnish "Mannerheim Line" was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally oversaw the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.

The "Mannerheim Line" was a system of defensive fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border, 135 kilometers long and up to 90 kilometers deep. The first strip of the line included: extensive minefields, anti-tank ditches and granite boulders, reinforced concrete tetrahedrons, barbed wire in 10-30 rows. Behind the first line was the second: reinforced concrete fortifications 3-5 floors underground - real underground fortresses made of fortified concrete, covered with armor plates and multi-ton granite boulders. In each fortress there is a warehouse of ammunition and fuel, a water supply system, a power station, rest rooms, and operating rooms. And then again - forest blockages, new minefields, scarps, barriers ...
Having received detailed information about the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", the computer clearly answered:

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before coming - fire training
first explosion: air, epicenter - Kanneljärvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: air, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent ...
third explosion...

But the Red Army did not have nuclear weapons in 1939!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the "Mannerheim Line" without the use of nuclear weapons.
And again the computer peremptorily answered:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer recognized the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons as IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times ...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Even after long battles, even at the cost of huge human casualties - but still in February 1940, the "Russian soldiers", who were mockingly gossip at the Fuhrer's headquarters, did the impossible - they broke through the "Mannerheim Line".
Another thing is that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was an ill-considered adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet "eagles".
But militarily, the "winter war" demonstrated not the weakness, but the power of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even the IMPOSSIBLE order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was not understood by Hitler and the company, many military experts did not understand, and modern historians did not understand after them.

Who lost the "winter war"?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler's assessment of the results of the "winter war". So, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the "Russian soldiers" and did not repeat about the "weakness" of the Soviet troops. When Stalin suggested that they end the war, they very quickly agreed. And not only did they agree, but without long disputes they ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke with great respect about the Red Army. He considered the Soviet troops modern and efficient and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
“Russian soldiers learn quickly, grasp everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation,” the marshal believed.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to see the courage of the soldiers of the Red Army. Marshal at the forefront.

And the neighbors of the Finns - the Swedes - also commented with respect and admiration on the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" by the Red Army. And in the Baltic countries, too, they did not make fun of the Soviet troops: in Tallinn, Kaunas and Riga, they watched in horror the actions of the Red Army in Finland.
Victor Suvorov noted:
"The fighting in Finland ended on March 13, 1940, and already in the summer the three Baltic states: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered to Stalin without a fight and turned into the "republics" of the Soviet Union."
Indeed, the Baltic countries drew a very clear conclusion from the results of the "winter war": the USSR has a powerful and modern army, ready to carry out any order without stopping at any sacrifice. And in June 1940, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered without resistance, and in early August "the family of Soviet republics was replenished with three new members."

Shortly after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.

At the same time, Stalin demanded from the government of Romania the "return" of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were part of the Russian Empire before the revolution. Taking into account the experience of the "winter war", the Romanian government did not even begin to bargain: on June 26, 1940, a Stalinist ultimatum was sent, and on June 28, units of the Red Army "in accordance with the agreement" crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia. On June 30, a new Soviet-Romanian border was established.
Consequently, we can assume that as a result of the "winter war" the Soviet Union not only annexed the Finnish border lands, but also got the opportunity to capture three countries entirely and a large part of a fourth country without a fight. So, in strategic terms, Stalin still won this massacre.
So, Finland did not lose the war - the Finns managed to defend the independence of their state.
The Soviet Union did not lose the war either - as a result, the Baltic States and Romania submitted to the dictates of Moscow.
Who then lost the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov answered this question, as always, paradoxically:
"Hitler lost the war in Finland."
Yes, the Nazi leader, who closely followed the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, made the biggest mistake that a statesman can make: he underestimated the enemy. “Hitler did not understand this war, did not appreciate its difficulties, and made catastrophically wrong conclusions. For some reason he suddenly decided that the Red Army was not ready for war, that the Red Army was not capable of anything.”
Hitler miscalculated. And in April 1945 he paid with his life for this miscalculation ...

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated the Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, the armament of the Soviet army. We had no idea even approximately what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. That's why it was misjudged...
- Perhaps it is very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps, we would have been horrified by the urgent question of the East and the proposed offensive against the Bolsheviks ...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"... We misjudged the Bolshevik strength of resistance, we had the wrong numbers and based our entire policy on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer has already realized his miscalculation.

True, Hitler and Goebbels did not admit that the cause of the disaster was their self-confidence and incompetence. They tried to shift all the blame on the "cunning of Moscow." Speaking to colleagues at the Wolfschanze headquarters on April 12, 1942, the Fuhrer stated:
- The Russians ... carefully concealed everything that is somehow connected with their military power. The whole war with Finland in 1940... is nothing but a huge disinformation campaign, because Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.
But, one way or another, Hitler and Goebbels admitted that, analyzing the results of the "winter war", they were mistaken in assessing the potential and strength of the Red Army.
However, until now, 57 years after this recognition, most historians and publicists continue to harp on about the "shameful defeat" of the Red Army.
Why do communist and other "progressive" historians so insistently repeat the theses of Nazi propaganda about the "weakness" of the Soviet armed forces, about their "unpreparedness for war", why, following Hitler and Goebbels, they describe the "inferiority" and "untrainedness" of Russian soldiers and officers?
Viktor Suvorov believes that behind all these rantings lies the desire of semi-official Soviet (now Russian!) historiography to hide the truth about the pre-war state of the Red Army. Soviet falsifiers and their Western "progressive" allies, in spite of all the facts, are trying to convince the public that on the eve of the German attack on the USSR, Stalin did not even think about aggression (as if there was no capture of the Baltic countries and part of Romania), but was only concerned with "ensuring the security of the borders" .
In fact (and the "winter war" confirms this!) The Soviet Union already at the end of the 30s had one of the most strong armies, armed with modern military equipment and manned by well-trained and disciplined soldiers. This powerful war machine was created by Stalin for the Great Victories of Communism in Europe, and perhaps throughout the world.
On June 22, 1941, the preparations for the World Revolution were interrupted by a sudden attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany.

References.

• Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English. Smolensk, 1994
• Mary W. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. from the Swedish M., 1997
• Picker G. Hitler's Table Talk. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
• Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait against the backdrop of a diary. M., 1994
• Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why did the Soviet Union program the Second world war. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC PICKING
on the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, the course and results of the war are still considered very ambiguous. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France England and the United States tried to adhere to the position of non-intervention in local conflicts, so as not to give Hitler a pretext for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of the Western allies.

Reason and causes of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole range of reasons related, first of all, to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.

• During 1918-1922. The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts in 1922, an agreement was signed on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border, according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a non-aggression pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense, the leaderships of both countries were afraid of mutual territorial claims.
• Stalin regularly received information that Finland had signed secret pacts of support and assistance with the Baltic states and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
• In the late 1930s, Stalin and his associates were also worried about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to start preparing for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would be in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to change part of the Karelian Isthmus to other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, on the site that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
• Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the lease by the Soviet Union of several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The leadership of the USSR planned to place its military bases in these territories.
• Soon, activities were banned in Finland communist party;
• Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression pact and secret protocols to it, according to which the Finnish territory was supposed to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement untied the hands of the Soviet leadership regarding the regulation of the situation with Finland

The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was fired from Finland. The Soviet border guards, who were in the village at that time, suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied its involvement in this act and did not want further development conflict. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the situation and announced the start of the war.

Until now, there is no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both sides cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of someone's guilt. Back in late November, Finland advocated the creation of a common commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected this proposal.

On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.

In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out, in the Soviet Union, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were put on full combat readiness. An extensive propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.

From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions (the total number of military reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.

The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft were available.

Course of events

The Winter War can be divided into two phases:

• November 1939 - January 1940: the Soviet offensive in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
• February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, capitulation of Finland and peace negotiations.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and already on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).

On the occupied territory, the Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Communist Party of Finland and an active member of the Comintern. With the support of Stalin, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began to negotiate with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.

The 7th Soviet Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken in the first decade of 1939. The Soviet soldiers could not advance further. All attempts to break through the following lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance inland.

Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result, half of the army was destroyed. The success of Finland was due, first of all, to the fact that the Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile detachments, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated, having lost people, but did not leave this region until the very end of the war.

The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland in two, demoralize and disorganize the army in the northern regions of the country. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to surround the division. The Red Army switched to all-round defense, repulsing the attacks of Finnish skiers. The Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, moreover, the main striking force of the Finns was the almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer huge human losses, equipment also broke down. The 44th rifle division was sent to help the encircled division, which also fell into the Finnish encirclement. Due to the fact that two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division began to gradually fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and returned under their control state border in Central Karelia. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.

In the area of ​​the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. During short term soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.

In January 1940, the Finns encircled the 54th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi region, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Rifle Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. Also, a Soviet tank division fell into the Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to get out of the encirclement, losing all the equipment and more than half of the soldiers.

The Karelian Isthmus has become a zone of the most active hostilities. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting stopped here. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of strikes along the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to use the lull in the war to the maximum advantage and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge human casualties.

By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in a difficult situation. She fought in an unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory, it was dangerous to move forward due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather complicated the planning of operations. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the population of the country had tremendous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.

Second period of the Winter War

Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the troops of Finland, to exhaust the soldiers, to morally break their spirit. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army launched an offensive inland.

Very fierce battles began on the Karelian Isthmus. At first, the Red Army planned to strike the main blow at the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the army of the USSR began to get stuck on foreign territory, incurring losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhda. In the area of ​​​​this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw troops.

By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed the second line of defense of Mannerheim, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat, because they were in a difficult position. The reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. A different situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was the huge stocks of equipment, materiel, replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.

On March 13, hostilities were stopped, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

• Vyborg was one of the largest cities in the country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
• After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.

Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. As a result of the discussion, the parties decided to stop hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that he was given the Hanko peninsula for a long lease.

• The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people who died from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people dead, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
• The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - it ensured the security of Leningrad;
• The USSR strengthened its positions on the Baltic coast, which was achieved by acquiring Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
• The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, having learned to break through fortified lines;
• In 1941, Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and let German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
• The destruction of the Mannerheim Line became fatal for the USSR, as Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and pass into the territory of the Soviet Union;
• The war showed Germany that the Red Army in difficult weather conditions is unfit for combat. The same opinion was formed by the leaders of other countries;
• Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, was to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect the Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road had to go through locality Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never carried out;
• On October 11, 1940, another treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to place a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
• The international organization League of Nations, created following the results of the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that the international community reacted negatively to the Soviet intervention in Finland. The reasons for the exclusion were also constant aerial bombardments of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during the raids;

Thus, the Winter War became an occasion for Germany and Finland to gradually draw closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return the lost territories.

Of all the wars that Russia has waged throughout history, the Karelian-Finnish war of 1939-1940. for a long time remained the least advertised. This is due both to the unsatisfactory outcome of the war and to significant losses.

It is still not known for certain how many combatants on both sides died in the Finnish war.

Soviet-Finnish war, campaign of soldiers to the front

When the Soviet-Finnish war took place, started by the country's leadership, the whole world took up arms against the USSR, which in fact turned into colossal foreign policy problems for the country. Next, we will try to explain why the war could not end quickly and turned out to be a failure on the whole.

Finland has almost never been an independent state. In the period of 12-19 centuries, it was under the rule of Sweden, and in 1809 it became part of the Russian Empire.

However, after the February Revolution, unrest began in Finland, the population first demanded broad autonomy, and then completely came to the idea of ​​​​independence. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

However, the further path of the country's development was not unambiguous; a civil war broke out in the country between whites and reds. Even after the victory of the White Finns, there were still many communists and social democrats in the country's parliament, half of whom were eventually arrested, and half were forced to hide in Soviet Russia.

Finland supported a number of White Guard forces during the civil war in Russia. Between 1918 and 1921 there were several military conflicts between countries - two Soviet-Finnish wars, after which the final border between the states was formed.

political map Europe in the interwar period and the border of Finland before 1939

In general, the conflict with Soviet Russia was settled and until 1939 the countries lived in peace. However, on detailed map the territory that belonged to Finland after the Second Soviet-Finnish War is highlighted in yellow. The USSR also claimed this territory.

Finnish border until 1939 on the map

The main causes of the Finnish war in 1939:

• the border of the USSR with Finland until 1939 was located only 30 km. from Leningrad. In case of war, the city could be located under shelling from the territory of another state;
• the historically considered lands were not always part of Finland. These territories were part of the Novgorod principality, then were captured by Sweden, recaptured by Russia during the Northern War. Only in the 19th century, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, these territories were transferred to them under control. What, in principle, was not of fundamental importance within the framework of a single state;
• The USSR needed to strengthen its position in the Baltic Sea.

In addition, despite the absence of war, the countries had a number of claims against each other. Many communists were killed and arrested in Finland in 1918, and a number of Finnish communists took refuge in the USSR. On the other hand, many Finns suffered during the political terror in the Soviet Union.

this year was killed and arrested a large number of communists in Finland

In addition, local border conflicts between countries regularly took place. Just as the Soviet Union was not satisfied with such a border near the second largest city in the RSFSR, not all Finns were satisfied with the territory of Finland.

In some circles, the idea of ​​creating a "Greater Finland" was considered, which would unite the majority of the Finno-Ugric peoples.

Thus, there were enough reasons for the Finnish war to start, when there were a lot of territorial disputes and mutual discontent. And after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed, Finland went into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Therefore, in October 1939, negotiations begin between the two sides - the USSR demands to cede the territory bordering Leningrad - to push the border back at least 70 km.

negotiations between the two countries begin in October of this year

In addition, we are talking about the transfer of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the lease of the Hanko Peninsula, the transfer of Fort Ino. In exchange for Finland, twice the territory in Karelia is offered.

But despite the idea of ​​a “Greater Finland”, the deal looks extremely disadvantageous for the Finnish side:

• firstly, the territories offered to the country are sparsely populated and practically devoid of infrastructure;
• secondly, the torn off territories are already inhabited by the Finnish population;
• finally, such concessions would both deprive the country of a line of defense on land and seriously weaken its positions at sea.

Therefore, despite the length of the negotiations, the parties did not come to a mutually beneficial agreement and the USSR began preparations for an offensive operation. The Soviet-Finnish war, the start date of which was secretly discussed in the highest circles of the political leadership of the USSR, increasingly appeared in the headlines of Western news.

The reasons for the Soviet-Finnish war are summarized in archival publications of that era.

Briefly about the balance of forces and means in the winter war

As of the end of November 1939, the balance of forces on the Soviet-Finnish border is presented in the table.

As you can see, the advantage of the Soviet side was colossal: 1.4 to 1 in terms of the number of troops, 2 to 1 in guns, 58 to 1 in tanks, 10 to 1 in aircraft, 13 to 1 in ships. Despite careful preparation, the start of the Finnish war (the date of the invasion had already been agreed with the political leadership of the country) happened spontaneously, the command did not even create a front.

They wanted to carry out the war with the forces of the Leningrad Military District.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

First of all, the USSR creates a pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war - arranges a border conflict at Mainil on 11/26/1939 (the first date of the Finnish war). There are many versions describing the reasons for the start of the Finnish war in 1939, but the official version of the Soviet side:

The Finns attacked the border outpost, 3 people were killed.

The documents disclosed in our time, which describe the war between the USSR and Finland in 1939-1940, are contradictory, but do not contain clear evidence of an attack by the Finnish side.

Then the Soviet Union forms the so-called. Kuusinen's government, which leads the newly formed Democratic Republic of Finland.

It is this government that recognizes the USSR (no other country in the world recognized it) and responds to the request to send troops into the country and support the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois government.

From that time until the peace negotiations, the USSR does not recognize the democratic government of Finland and does not negotiate with it. Officially, even the war has not been declared - the USSR sent troops in order to assist a friendly government in an internal civil war.

Otto V. Kuusinen, head of the government of Finland in 1939

Kuusinen himself was an old Bolshevik - he was one of the leaders of the Red Finns in civil war. He fled the country in time, headed the international for some time, even escaped repression during the great terror, although they primarily fell on the old guard of the Bolsheviks.

Kuusinen's coming to power in Finland would be comparable to the coming to power in the USSR in 1939 of one of the leaders of the white movement. It is doubtful that major arrests and executions would have been avoided.

However, the fighting is not going as well as planned by the Soviet side.

Heavy war in 1939

The original plan (developed by Shaposhnikov) included a kind of "blitzkrieg" - the capture of Finland was to be carried out within a short time. According to the plans of the General Staff:

The war in 1939 was supposed to last 3 weeks.

It was supposed to break through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and make a breakthrough to Helsinki with tank forces.

Despite the significant superiority of the forces of the Soviet side, this main offensive plan failed. The most significant advantage (in terms of tanks) was leveled by natural conditions - tanks simply could not perform free maneuvers in forest and swampy conditions.

In addition, the Finns quickly learned how to destroy still insufficiently armored Soviet tanks (mainly T-28s were used).

It was when there was a Finnish war with Russia that an incendiary mixture in a bottle and with a wick got its name on it - a Molotov cocktail. The original name is "Cocktail FOR Molotov". Soviet tanks simply burned out on contact with a combustible mixture.

The reason for this was not only low-level armor, but also gasoline engines. This incendiary mixture was no less terrible for ordinary soldiers.

The Soviet army also turned out to be, surprisingly, not ready for war in winter conditions. Ordinary soldiers were equipped with ordinary budyonovkas and overcoats, which did not save from the cold. On the other hand, if it was necessary to fight in the summer, the Red Army would have faced more big problems, for example, impenetrable swamps.

The offensive that had begun on the Karelian Isthmus was not prepared for heavy fighting on the Mannerheim Line. In general, the military leadership did not have clear ideas about this line of fortifications.

Therefore, shelling at the first stage of the war was ineffective - the Finns simply waited it out in fortified bunkers. In addition, ammunition for the guns was brought up for a long time - the weak infrastructure affected.

Let us dwell in more detail on the Mannerheim line.

1939 - war with Finland on the Mannerheim Line

Since the 1920s, the Finns have been actively building a series of defensive fortifications, which received the name of a prominent military leader in 1918-1921. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Realizing that a possible military threat to the country does not come from the north and west, it was decided to build a powerful defensive line in the southeast, i.e. on the Karelian Isthmus.

Karl Mannerheim, military leader after whom the front line is named

We should pay tribute to the designers - the relief of the territory made it possible to actively use natural conditions- Numerous dense forests, lakes, swamps. Enckel's bunker, a typical concrete structure armed with machine guns, became the key structure.

At the same time, despite the long construction time, the line was not at all as impregnable as it would later be called in numerous textbooks. Most of the pillboxes were designed by Enkel, i.e. early 1920s These were outdated at the time of the Second World Dota for several people, with 1-3 machine guns, without underground barracks.

In the early 1930s, million-plus pillboxes were designed and from 1937 began to be built. Their fortification was stronger, the number of embrasures reached six, there were underground barracks.

However, only 7 such pillboxes were built. The entire Mannerheim line (135 km) could not be built up with pillboxes, therefore, before the war separate sections were mined and surrounded by barbed wire.

Instead of pillboxes, there were simple trenches on the front lines.

This line should not be neglected either, its depth ranged from 24 to 85 kilometers. It was not possible to break through it with a swoop - for some time the line saved the country. As a result, on December 27, the Red Army stops offensive operations and prepares for a new assault, pulling up artillery and retraining soldiers.

The further course of the war will show that with proper preparation, the outdated line of defense could not hold out for the proper time and save Finland from defeat.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

During the first stage of the war, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations (12/14/1939) also falls. Yes, at that time this organization has lost its meaning. The exclusion itself was rather the result of increased antipathy towards the USSR throughout the world.

England and France (at that time not yet occupied by Germany) provide Finland various help- they do not enter into an open conflict, however, active arms supplies are going to the northern country.

England and France are developing two plans to help Finland.

The first includes the transfer of military corps to Finland, and the second - the bombing of Soviet deposits in Baku. However, the war with Germany forces to abandon these plans.

Moreover, the expeditionary force would have to pass through Norway and Sweden, to which both countries responded with a categorical refusal, wanting to maintain their neutrality in World War II.

Second phase of the war

Since the end of December 1939, a regrouping of Soviet troops has been taking place. A separate Northwestern Front is being formed. The armed forces are being built up in all sectors of the front.

By the beginning of February 1940, the number of armed forces reaches 1.3 million people, guns - 3.5 thousand. Aircraft - 1.5 thousand. Finland by that time was also able to strengthen the army, including through the help of other countries and foreign volunteers, but the balance of power becomes even more catastrophic for the defending side.

On February 1, a massive artillery bombardment of the Mannerheim Line begins. It turns out that the majority of Finnish pillboxes cannot withstand accurate and prolonged shelling. They bomb just in case for 10 days. As a result, when the Red Army attacked on February 10, instead of pillboxes, only a lot of "Karelian monuments" were found.

In the winter of February 11, the Mannerheim Line was broken through, the Finnish counter-offensives lead nowhere. And on February 13, the second line of defense, hastily fortified by the Finns, breaks through. And already on February 15, taking advantage of the weather conditions, Mannerheim gives the order for a general retreat.

Help Finland from other countries

It should be noted that the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line meant the end of the war and even defeat in it. There was practically no hope for major military assistance from the West.

Yes, during the war years, not only England and France provided various technical assistance to Finland. The Scandinavian countries, the USA, Hungary and a number of others sent many volunteers to the country.

soldiers were sent to the front from Sweden

At the same time, it was the threat of direct war with England and France, in the event of the complete capture of Finland, that forced I. Stalin to negotiate with the current Finnish government and conclude peace.

The request was transmitted through the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden to the Finnish Ambassador.

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

Let us dwell separately on the well-known military myth about Finnish snipers - the so-called. cuckoos. During the years of the Winter War (as it is called in Finland), many Soviet officers and soldiers fell victim to Finnish snipers. The army began to talk about the fact that Finnish snipers were hiding in trees and firing from there.

However, sniper fire from trees is extremely ineffective, since the sniper on the tree himself is an excellent target, does not have a proper foothold and the ability to quickly retreat.

The answer to such accuracy of snipers is quite simple. At the beginning of the war, the officers were outfitted with dark-colored insulated sheepskin coats, which were perfectly visible on the snow-covered desert and stood out against the background of soldiers' overcoats.

The fire was fired from insulated and camouflaged positions on the ground. Snipers could sit in makeshift shelters for hours, waiting for a suitable target.

The most famous Finnish sniper of the Winter War is Simo Häyhä, who shot about 500 Red Army officers and soldiers. At the end of the war, he was seriously injured in the jaw (it had to be inserted from the femur), but the soldier lived to be 96 years old.

The Soviet-Finnish border was moved 120 kilometers from Leningrad - Vyborg, the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were annexed.

A lease of the Hanko Peninsula was agreed for a period of 30 years. In return, Finland received only the Petsamo region, which provided access to the Barents Sea and was rich in nickel ores.

The end of the Soviet-Finnish war brought bonuses to the winner in the form of:

1. Acquisition of new territories by the USSR. The border from Leningrad was pushed back.
2. Gaining Combat Experience awareness of the need to improve military equipment.
3. Colossal combat losses. The data vary, but the average loss of the dead amounted to over 150 thousand people (125 from the USSR and 25 thousand from Finland). Sanitary losses were even greater - 265 thousand in the USSR and over 40 thousand in Finland. These figures had a discrediting effect on the Red Army.
4. Failure of the plan on the establishment of the Finnish Democratic Republic .
5. The fall of international prestige. This applies to the countries of the future allies, and the Axis. It is believed that it was after the Winter War that A. Hitler finally established himself in the opinion that the USSR is a colossus with feet of clay.
6. Finland lost areas that are important to you. The area of ​​given land was 10% of the entire territory of the country. The spirit of revanchism began to grow in her. From a neutral position, the country is increasingly inclined to support the Axis countries and, as a result, participates in the Great patriotic war on the side of Germany (in the period 1941-1944).

Summing up all of the above, we can conclude that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 was a strategic failure of the Soviet leadership.

Finland was assigned to the sphere of influence of the USSR by secret protocols to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. But, unlike other Baltic countries, she refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, as it passed 32 km from the "northern capital". In exchange, the USSR offered more extensive and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland in the conditions of World War II, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, headed by Prime Minister A. Cajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the "Mannerheim Line"), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. On October 12 - November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with the Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached an impasse.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Soviet border checkpoint Mainila, the Soviet side carried out a provocative shelling of Soviet positions, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha region, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Further south, the 9th Army advanced on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would cut Finland in two. To the north of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim Line. And finally, on the main line 7, the army was to break through the Mannerheim line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, the troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim line, but could not take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. So several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the fighting in December - January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe was the defeat of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow filled up the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with arms and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that in a few days Helsinki might fall. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became tougher. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nishtad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not remove the demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. SPb., 2000.

On the eve of the World War, both Europe and Asia were already blazing with many local conflicts. International tension was due highly likely new big war, and all the most powerful political players on the world map, before it began, tried to secure favorable starting positions for themselves, while not neglecting any means. The USSR was no exception. In 1939-1940. the Soviet-Finnish war began. The reasons for the inevitable military conflict lay in the same impending threat of a major European war. The USSR, more and more aware of its inevitability, was forced to look for an opportunity to move the state border as far as possible from one of the most strategically important cities - Leningrad. With this in mind, the Soviet leadership entered into negotiations with the Finns, offering their neighbors an exchange of territories. At the same time, the Finns were offered a territory almost twice as large as the USSR planned to receive in return. One of the demands that the Finns did not want to accept in any case was the request of the USSR to deploy military bases in Finland. Even the admonitions of Germany (Helsinki's ally), including Hermann Goering, who hinted to the Finns that Berlin's help could not be counted on, did not force Finland to move away from its positions. Thus, the parties that did not come to a compromise came to the beginning of the conflict.

The course of hostilities

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939. Obviously, the Soviet command counted on a quick and victorious war with minimal losses. However, the Finns themselves were also not going to surrender to the mercy of their big neighbor. The President of the country, the military Mannerheim, who, by the way, was educated in the Russian Empire, planned to delay the Soviet troops with a massive defense for as long as possible, until the start of assistance from Europe. The complete quantitative advantage of the country of the Soviets was obvious both in human resources and in equipment. The war for the USSR began with heavy fighting. Its first stage in historiography is usually dated from 11/30/1939 to 02/10/1940 - the time that became the most bloody for the advancing Soviet troops. The line of defense, called the Mannerheim Line, became an insurmountable obstacle for the soldiers of the Red Army. Fortified pillboxes and bunkers, Molotov cocktails, later called "Molotov cocktails", severe frosts, reaching up to 40 degrees - all this is considered to be the main reasons for the failures of the USSR in the Finnish campaign.

Turning point in the war and its end

The second stage of the war begins on February 11, the moment of the general offensive of the Red Army. At that time, a significant amount of manpower and equipment was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. For several days before the attack, the Soviet army carried out artillery preparation, subjecting the entire surrounding area to heavy bombardment.

As a result of the successful preparation of the operation and the further assault, the first line of defense was broken through within three days, and by February 17, the Finns completely switched to the second line. During February 21-28, the second line was also broken. On March 13, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. On this day, the USSR stormed Vyborg. The leaders of Suomi realized that there was no longer any chance to defend themselves after breaking through the defense, and the Soviet-Finnish war itself was doomed to remain a local conflict, without outside support, which Mannerheim counted on so much. Given this, the request for negotiations was the logical end.

The results of the war

As a result of protracted bloody battles, the USSR achieved the satisfaction of all its claims. In particular, the country has become the sole owner of the waters of Lake Ladoga. In total, the Soviet-Finnish war guaranteed the USSR an increase in territory by 40 thousand square meters. km. As for losses, this war cost the country of the Soviets dearly. According to some estimates, about 150 thousand people left their lives in the snows of Finland. Was this company necessary? Given the fact that Leningrad was the target of the German troops almost from the very beginning of the attack, it is worth recognizing that yes. However, heavy losses seriously called into question the combat capability of the Soviet army. By the way, the end of hostilities was not the end of the conflict. Soviet-Finnish war 1941-1944 became a continuation of the epic, during which the Finns, trying to return the lost, again failed.