The official history of the M.V. Khrunichev GKNPTs is usually counted from April 30, 1916 (more than 100 years), when the construction of a large plant of the Russo-Balt automobile company began in Moscow Fili
The State Space Research and Production Center named after M.V. Khrunichev was established in 1993 by merging two of the oldest Moscow enterprises in the space industry - the M.V. M. V. Khrunichev and the Salyut Design Bureau, located on a common territory in the bend of the Moscow River. At the same time, the fate of the enterprise, which received a new sign after the collapse of the USSR, turned out to be much more successful than that of many scientific and industrial centers in this turbulent time.
Khrunichev successfully survived the dashing 90s and, unlike many other enterprises in the aerospace industry, managed not only to survive, but to fit into the new conditions of market relations. There were too many who wanted to and the Soviet space heritage turned out to be too valuable for our new “friends” to let it sink into oblivion. At the first stage, the enterprise survived due to orders for the space program of friendly India (cryogenic upper stage 12KRB). Then contracts for the construction of modules for the ISS (International Space Station) arrived. And most importantly, the center was allowed to enter the international market of commercial services with its products, namely, to launch spacecraft for foreign customers using the most reliable domestic carrier Proton-K
Rocket Proton in the assembly building 92A-50
alexgp
As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the volume of orders received and the profits received were enough not only to maintain a unique team and capacities (from 8 to 12 launches were carried out per year), but also for some development of the most necessary infrastructure. In particular, the complexes for the preparation of products at the Baikonur Cosmodrome (the so-called 81st site and MIK 92A-50) were restored and re-equipped. A conversion ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) was upgraded for commercial launches ("Rokot"). A new upper stage Briz-M was designed and manufactured. The old “workhorse” of the Proton-K launch vehicle was upgraded to the Proton-M version with a new digital control system.
In addition, the center began to gradually enter the previously uncharacteristic markets for the manufacture of small spacecraft for communication and remote sensing of the earth for the needs of domestic business and corporations. At the same time, slowly and difficultly (due to meager and episodic state funding), the launch vehicle project was developed to replace the aging Proton. It was the development of a new promising Angara launch vehicle of a modular type, started back in 1995.
Conversion launch vehicle Rokot at the Plesetsk cosmodrome
mil.ru
If about the general vector, then the policy of the old leadership of the center was aimed at maximum preservation and loading of existing capacities. At the same time, this was often done by pulling resources and orders from other enterprises in the industry (the Breeze-M upper stage competed with a similar product from NPO Energia - a series of DM blocks). Many may call this state of the enterprise quite successful, but from the point of view of the industry, it was rather a slow stagnation. All the characteristic problems of the domestic industry of the post-Soviet period, of course, were present. This is the gradual aging and outflow of personnel, the degradation of the production infrastructure (as mentioned above - with rare exceptions), the disappearance of suppliers of critical materials and components.
In this mode, the research and production center gradually turned into a "space cab", the entire scientific and engineering potential of which was used exclusively to solve current problems and "plug holes". At the same time, competitors, namely European and Asian launch service providers, were already breathing in the back. The United States retained a separate market share, but the direction of commercial private astronautics developed by them was then still in its infancy.
However, the potential of the enterprise remaining from the times of the USSR as a whole was preserved, and, with sufficiently clever use, it made it possible, if necessary, to resume truly breakthrough projects in the space industry. These could be new (including reusable) carriers, space stations, interorbital tugs, heavy geostationary platforms. These and many similar projects were periodically worked out by the specialists of the center, but everything died at the level of draft designs and mock-ups (the Baikal reusable stage). Such things did not cause interest from the side of the new leadership of the country. Until the second half of the 2000s.
Reusable stage Baikal
Quote "Morning of Russia" 2001. russia.tv
The appearance at that time of additional income from increased oil prices (the peak was in 2008) led to the fact that science-intensive industries and, in particular, space were again remembered. And this, unfortunately, played a cruel joke on the GKNPTs. Under the upcoming epic tasks of domestic cosmonautics, strikingly coinciding with the populist statements of American presidents, other enterprises of space and related industries that have been lying “on their side” for many years began to join the center (as branches). This process started in 2007 and continued until 2011. A total of 10 branches were added. It is clear that as a result, all their debts were paid by the State Scientific and Practical Center with the expectation of future state investments. Until some time, the financial viability of such a conglomerate was not in doubt. However, problems started almost immediately. In addition to financial recovery, all new branches had to be loaded with work. Attempts were made to transfer to them from the Moscow site the manufacture of part of the components and assemblies. As a result, the accident rate has sharply increased (since 2007, on average, every tenth launch has been unsuccessful).
Experts believe that the cause of more frequent accidents is not only general degradation and a drop in discipline in the process of reorganization, but also the low quality of components produced "outside". Branches, not accustomed to the strict requirements of the space industry, often drove frank substandard, which sometimes overcame the input control already accustomed to a certain level of quality. At the same time, in the resulting confusion and in the process of the flow of funds, the possibility of financial irregularities appeared. Currently, several branch managers and former heads of the center, as well as their deputies, are under investigation.
However, the problems didn't end there. By 2014, it became clear that there would be no more money, as oil prices finally collapsed. And here, in the conditions of a budget deficit, the center was asked to deal with the accumulated problems on its own. By this time, the operating debt of the enterprise amounted to more than 11.9 billion rubles, and debts to suppliers - 14.7 billion. For minimal financial stabilization, the center already needed about 56.4 billion. As a result, this amount was only insignificant (15.9 billion rubles). ) was repaid by the state, the rest was allocated as a commercial loan by Vnesheconombank, Sberbank and Roscosmos. And not at all on the previously promised preferential terms.
Thus, the enterprise had to get out of the current situation at the expense of its own resources, including through the so-called "optimization of production activities".
As a result of the ill-considered actions of the reformers and in connection with a sharp reduction in state funding, by the end of 2014, a catastrophic situation had developed in the Khrunichev State Scientific and Practical Center.
As described at the end of the previous part of our article, the Khrunichev center had to get out of the financial and organizational crisis at the end of 2014 on its own. Instead of making up for the resulting deficit of funds from Roskosmos, a new acting general director Andrei Kalinovsky was appointed, who had previously been involved in the production of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft in Novosibirsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
Within a short time, they were presented with a corresponding financial recovery program.
Kalinovsky's plan provided for the sale of more than 60% of the enterprise's territory (more than 100 hectares) in Moscow and the transfer of most of the technological operations to the Omsk production association Polet as the main source of the missing funds. First of all, this concerned the production of the promising Angara launch vehicle. In addition, it was planned to get rid of most of the "non-core" tasks (for example, small satellites and space station modules). Again, it was supposed to make the most of the resources of existing branches and "outsourcing", having already purposefully given away most of the technological chains there. In words, all this was done solely to reduce costs and increase labor productivity, as well as optimize the use of production space and traffic flows. But the main thing is that in the end, again, expensive Moscow land was freed, which was needed to repay the accumulated loans.
A. Kalinovsky. Change is needed
Mustache Timofey © IA Krasnaya Vesna
It is clear that the "financial recovery" put at the forefront by a specialist who had not previously been related to astronautics, very soon bore its sad fruits. "Effective management" was expressed in the final collapse of the Moscow site and the massive outflow of personnel from the center. At the same time, the transfer of the production of the Agara launch vehicle to Omsk actually failed. The Angara-5, which flew away at the end of 2014, was manufactured mainly by Moscow specialists, attempts to manufacture the Angara on the basis of the Polet plant led to failure. Due to the inability to provide the same quality. As a result, at the end of 2016, the prosecutor's office sent materials to the court on bringing the head of the Polet enterprise, Mikhail Ostroushenko, to administrative responsibility for disrupting the state defense order.
The reduction of space, the "optimization" of subcontractors and suppliers of components for the Proton-M rocket led to an almost complete halt in its production. So in 2016, only 3 launches were carried out, in 2017 only 4. As a result, in 2016, for the first time since 1999, Russia carried out fewer launches than the United States, and for the first time in history, fewer than China! Recall that earlier, from 8 to 12 Protons were launched annually. At the same time, Kalinovsky's "aviation" approaches to the production of missiles caused only bewilderment among specialists. The requirements for mass design perfection, for tightness and reliability for astronautics have always differed from those accepted in aviation. Not to mention a different serialization and the inevitable uneven loading of production. In addition, there was no understanding that very often a specialist in a given field (worker or engineer) is a piece "product". Over the years, workers have been developing a peculiar attitude towards the quality of the operations performed, constantly interacting with the engineering staff and controllers, and it is simply impossible to replace them with the first local "guest worker" that comes across. And the transfer of knowledge from the older generation of engineers to young people in the context of reorganization and massive layoffs is also fraught with unexpected “failures”.
Removal of "Angara-A5" to the launch complex
mil.ru
The result of this attitude is not only the inability to produce high-quality components and products in the conditions of newly-minted branches, but also the continuing sad story with the next module for the ISS Nauka (the former backup of the Zarya module launched in 1998). The terms of its preparation are annually disrupted due to contamination introduced in the process of finalization. Why did the chips get into the fuel system, despite the fact that the technology of such operations has been worked out for years? Why weren't the relevant specialists involved in the work by the new management? This can only be explained by the destruction of technological continuity and ties already within the enterprise itself. And although this happened even before the appointment of Andrei Kalinovsky as the head, the “lesson” received was not learned!
The second part of the GKNPTs - KB "Salyut" was also defeated. The production part of the design bureau (pilot plant) was closed even before the start of the "recovery" program. But under Andrey Kalinovsky, the laboratory and testing base in Moscow was finally liquidated, and the former territory of the design bureau was already completely freed for construction. At the same time, unique equipment was abandoned or written off in empty rooms. Buildings with special foundations (for vibration testing) are waiting for their sad fate, and the few employees who remained after layoffs have been relocated to the territory of a serial plant. A plan was announced to create a so-called "Competence Center" from the remaining engineers. Questions on the development and implementation of new technologies, the conduct of development work, the control and testing of products from this “competence” have now definitely fallen out. The question of how long its remnants (competence) will last, at least for carrying out designer supervision of already manufactured products in the face of mass reductions, remains open.
Science Module (MLM)
nasa.gov
However, some of Andrey Kalinovsky's innovations can be called conditionally reasonable. This is the introduction of electronic accounting and planning of work performed and piecework pay for engineering and technical personnel. However, such automation often does not lead to an increase in labor productivity, but only complicates bureaucratic procedures. But piece work, on the one hand, made it possible to increase the salaries of some of the in-demand specialists, but on the other hand, it increased the conflict between employees and departments. Part of the old specialists and departments performing routine work were put on starvation rations. In addition, constant reorganizations and relocations have significantly increased the outflow of experienced personnel. Additionally, most of the top and middle managers were fired, mainly due to disagreement with the ongoing "reforms", and Kalinovsky's former associates at their former jobs were appointed instead.
In connection with the new management policy, the number of contracts for launches of Protons began to decline rapidly. The bet was made on the promising Angara successfully tested in 2014.
However, already in 2016, it became clear to everyone that we would not see a new launch of this rocket (in the heavy modification of Angara-5) in the near future. Immediately, the leadership of the center began to voice ideas about the uselessness, hopelessness and high cost of the ill-fated Angara and the creation of incomprehensible stubs from the old Proton named Proton Light. And this is almost immediately after the previous statements about the speedy curtailment of the production of the "old" missile and the emasculation of the missile design bureau.
On June 27, 2017, Andrey Kalinovsky unexpectedly leaves his post and goes to Roscosmos as Executive Director for Quality and Reliability. Officially, there are reports of the high results achieved by the former director of the center in his previous post. They talk about raising wages, reducing debt and the previously promised increase in productivity. Aleksey Varochko, former director and chief designer of KB Motor (Motor specializes in ground-based equipment for missile and space systems), is appointed to the vacant position. Which almost immediately canceled all the innovations of the previous leadership in terms of reorganizing production at the Moscow site.
The arrival in June 2017 of the new General Director of the GKNPTs only led to a change in the leadership style, but did not change the general vector aimed at the gradual liquidation of the oldest enterprise in the space industry.
The new head of the Khrunichev Center, Aleksey Varochko, as a whole, continues the policy of the former leadership.
In November 2017, the corporatization of the former federal state unitary enterprise into a joint-stock company was completed. And already in January 2018, Varochko announced that the center urgently needed additional financial support from the government in the amount of at least 30 billion rubles. Including servicing the previous loan in the amount of 4.5 billion annually! Here is such a "financial stabilization". At the same time, all plans for the sale of Khrunichev's land in Moscow and the complete transfer of production to Omsk remain in force. In addition, the company introduces austerity measures on employee bonuses and salaries. About the former "piecework" ordered to forget. New cuts and reorganizations are planned with very vague prospects. It is still too early to talk about them in detail, since the plans of the new leadership are constantly changing. However, it has already been announced that some of the branches (Voronezh Mechanical Plant and the Design Bureau of Chemical Engineering named after A. M. Isaev) in May-June 2018 will be separated from the center and transferred to NPO Energomash. As for the ill-fated Angara, the date of the second launch of its heavy modification was named. Not before 2022! After the first successful launch (in 2014), 8 years will have passed by that time. This is the price of transferring production from the Moscow site.
The first test launch of the Angara-A5
mil.ru
It should be noted that almost immediately after the departure of Kalinovsky (July 2017), the leadership of Roscosmos also announced a sharp change in plans for the Angara. The stake is now being placed on the supposedly cheaper and more promising Phoenix project (Soyuz-5 carrier). It is under him that all flight plans for the new manned spacecraft "Federation" are now made up. There is really one "but"! "Soyuz-5" is in fact a deep modification of the good old Russian-Ukrainian "Zenith", and all the savings come down to the use of the already existing "Zenith" ground infrastructure at the Baikonur and Plesetsk cosmodromes. Under it, the recently purchased by the Russian company S7 "Sea Launch" is also designed. At the same time, there is still no new manned missile, and despite the existing backlog, it still has to go through a full cycle from design to flight tests. Moreover, the use of the Zenit successor for manned launches will require not only a revision of many rocket parameters, but also the retrofitting of existing SCs for the corresponding purposes. So the declared cheapness (compared to the Angara) in the final version can be very different from the previously announced one. In addition, familiarity with modern realities raises doubts that until 2022 (the expected date for the start of the Federation tests) the new missile will be fully ready. At the same time, as was said, not only its high cost, but also its “futility” is blamed on Angara. Because the main assembly unit of the URM rocket (universal rocket module) was originally designed for small payloads (about two tons for the Angara-1.1). Accordingly, even with a promising hydrogen booster, the maximum combination of such blocks in the Angara-5V configuration is limited by a payload of 30-35 tons. Another thing is the not yet created Phoenix, which is very similar in size to the Falcon 9 and pulls up to 17 tons in a single-block version according to the project. It is stated that from its blocks it is possible to assemble a super-heavy carrier by analogy with the recently flown Falcon Heavy and even more. True, it is modestly silent that the "Zenith" launch was not originally designed for such a modification. And savings on ground infrastructure for the future heavy carrier in this case will obviously not work. At the same time, under the upcoming foggy prospects for Phoenix, they have already abandoned both the manned version of the Angara and the construction of a second launch complex for it at the Vostochny cosmodrome.
"Angara-A5" in the assembly and testing complex
Andrey Morgunov. mil.ru
A natural question arises related to such sharp turns in the policy of Roscosmos. What is the true reason for the sudden need to save on one launch complex and embark on less expensive (only at the first stage!) Development of a new space project "from scratch"? Is it due to the temporary financial difficulties of the state or the understanding that in the near future we will not see a new flying Angara in any case? In our opinion, it was solely due to the irresponsible actions of the former management, which first brought a self-sufficient and quite successful enterprise to a financial hole, and then carried out rash "reforms" in order to compensate for their own mistakes and miscalculations. How else to explain why, for the sake of a hypothetical "Phoenix" in the sky, it was urgently necessary to strangle a titmouse already in the hands named "Angara"?
Or is it just an attempt to cover up their own failures behind a smoke screen of new high-profile statements?
So what do we end up with.
At the beginning of the reforms, it was a stable and moderately developing enterprise with a very good position in the international start-up services market.
At the end - the destroyed industrial and scientific base, the almost lost ability to produce the old Proton and the disrupted production of the promising Angara. In addition to this, huge debts and hopelessly lost positions in the global commercial launch market.
Reusable Falcon Heavy landing stages
SpaceX
The nearest time when it will be possible to try to return to the world market in the field of heavy carriers (with the Angara or the already new Phoenix) is smoothly leaving for 2022. It is clear that all this time our competitors will frolic in the resulting niche, primarily the enterprising and impudent Elon Musk with his Falcon of various modifications. And again, there will be few people willing to let us into this market. It is possible not to remember the lost technologies, experienced specialists, scientific and industrial school yet, these concepts are difficult to measure in monetary terms. Also modestly silent is the question of who will now manufacture modules for the new Russian orbital station, plans for which are built after 2024 (completion of the ISS). Khrunichev made most of the modules for her, but this is clearly in the past. There were no plans to continue the operation of the Moscow site even in the form of the remaining stump after 2025. According to the latest information from employees, mass layoffs are again being prepared for the summer of 2018
On the plus side, we have a hundred hectares of expensive Moscow land released for commercial development, around the upcoming sale of which strange games have already begun, including with the participation of the Moscow prosecutor's office.
If you do not know the background, then the result is very similar to the usual raider capture. This is how some media interpret the events around Khrunichev. We are dealing with the elementary stupidity and incompetence of modern Russian officials, in whose hands the fate of the domestic cosmonautics turned out to be, or political intrigues and subtle and selfish calculation are behind this - time will tell. But in any case, the actual destruction of one of the leading enterprises in the industry can greatly affect not only the prestige and development of astronautics, but also the defense capability of our country in difficult modern conditions.
Copy of someone else's materials
When the state is both the owner and the main client of its rocket and space enterprises, mechanisms begin to operate that are contrary to both efficiency and common sense
Manufacturer of launch vehicles "Proton-M" and "Angara", Center. Khrunichev (Federal State Unitary Enterprise GKNPTs named after M.V. Khrunichev), which is part of the state corporation Roscosmos, is in financial distress. The enterprise, in addition to the 65.1 billion rubles already allocated by the state in 2014-2017. A few months earlier, 71 engines for the second and third stages of the Proton-M rocket were recalled for re-checking due to a possible marriage. At the same time, heavy-class launch vehicles in Russia are built only by Khrunichev, and the start of operation of the Angara rocket, which has been created since 1995, has long been a political issue. The easiest way is to write off all the problems as “sabotage”, “incompetence” or the sacramental “plundered”. However, with all the temptations of the easy way (“strengthen control”, “fire”, “imprison”) this is a false direction. So what's going on with the Center? Khrunichev?
cost inflation
Khrunichev's problems are typical for the entire Russian rocket and space industry. Chief among them is cost-push inflation. If we open the reports of any company in the industry in recent years, we will see that their revenue has grown many times, in proportion to the growing state spending on space (the Federal Space Program, the GLONASS program, etc.), and the credit burden has also grown. However, profits over 16 years have grown by only modest percentages, if at all. Against this background, defective engines or penny salaries of engineers in production are already sad consequences.
There are fundamental reasons for this state of affairs. First, it is the conversion of military production that failed back in 1992-1993. Its essence is not to start producing shut-off valves or household pumps instead of intercontinental ballistic missiles (many enterprises in the industry produced a large number of civilian products even in Soviet times). The essence of any conversion is to adapt the enterprise to work in peaceful and market conditions in order to make its activities cost-effective. Roughly speaking, if the Ust-Katav Carriage Works (part of the Khrunichev Center) has not learned how to make reliable modern trams, then it is difficult to expect that it will succeed in the production of engines for space technology. I emphasize that the problem is not in a particular plant or company, but in the lack of opportunities for the development of the entire industry, in that very notorious aggressive institutional environment.
Secondly, it is "bureaucratic fever". When the state is both the owner and the main client of its rocket and space enterprises, the mechanisms of the “administrative market” operate, often contradicting both the task of increasing efficiency and common sense.
It would seem that the same Proton-M is in demand in the world, which means that there is efficiency. However, it is worth noting that the cost of its commercial launch today is estimated at about $65 million, while one rocket costs the Russian state (the Federal Space Agency, the Ministry of Defense) a little over 1 billion rubles. It looks like you can make money. Nevertheless, in practice, today simply no one will buy this missile more expensive - American and European missiles act as competitors. Moreover, with all the subsidies and virtually non-performing loans in state banks, one Proton costs the Russian government (that is, in fact, all of us) several billion rubles. Therefore, it is good if commercial launches make it possible to compensate for the cost of production of a launch vehicle.
In addition, the sale of Proton services on the world market is not carried out by the Center. Khrunichev, and the American company International Launch Services controlled by him. It turns out that the manufacturing plants that are part of the GKNPTs are separated from the results of their activities by several layers of corporate and state bureaucracy and are not motivated to do quality work. By the way, the colossal income inequality between engineers and business leaders is not a consequence of some specific greed, but the result of a built-up bureaucratic hierarchy.
Two families
At the same time, the position of the Khrunichev center is aggravated by the narrow range of its products. In general, narrow specialization is another characteristic feature of the Russian rocket and space industry, while all over the world, large and successful space companies have long followed the path of diversification. In Russia, diversification was achieved only through the formation of the United Rocket and Space Corporation above all companies, and already above it - the state corporation Roscosmos, which is trying to coordinate all this variety of legal entities and interest groups.
The only Khrunichev product that now flies regularly is the same Proton-M launch vehicle. Throughout its commercial operation, including the previous modification of the Proton-K, along with government contracts and emergency launches in the 1990-2010s, seven to nine launches of this rocket per year were usually performed. There were three peaks in this story: 2000 - 14 launches (no accidents), 2010 - 12 launches (one accident) and 2012 - 11 launches (two accidents).
However, the growth of competition in the world market and the inflation of costs mentioned above were exacerbated by Russia's confrontation with the West. This led to the fact that in 2016 only three Protons were launched, and two in eight months of 2017 (the next launch should take place in September). The clear result was additional financial difficulties for the company and endless requests for help, because the lion's share of the proceeds to the Center. It is the Proton that brings Khrunichev. And although there are still commercial orders for this rocket, it is clear that its time is running out.
In this situation, the main focus is on the Angara family of launch vehicles, which in their heavy version should replace the Proton-M, and due to lighter modifications are designed to expand the demand for Khrunichev rockets. It’s just that the Angara has been created since 1995, and it is planned to bring it into mass production only by the beginning of the 2020s. The root of the problem is that the Proton is based on the UR-500 intercontinental ballistic missile. And neither the Center for them. Khrunichev, nor in Russia as a whole. The same, incidentally, applies to all other attempts to develop new space technology. As examples, one can cite the long-term epics with the creation of a new manned spacecraft in the bowels of RSC Energia or new modules for the ISS there.
Thus, when we are once again forced to pay attention to the plight of the GKNPTs them. M.V. Khrunichev, it is necessary to take into account the complex nature of the problem. The Russian rocket and space industry is in need of a deep recovery. Moreover, it needs to create an enabling environment, including for private initiative. Otherwise, neither the bossy saber-wielding, nor the scattering of money from a helicopter over industry flagships will produce the desired effect.
Pavel Luzin, expert on foreign and defense policy and military-industrial complex, director of Under Mad TrendsMOSCOW, January 17 - RIA Novosti. The Khrunichev Space Center has requested additional funding in the amount of more than 30 billion rubles for rehabilitation, confirmed the head of the enterprise Alexei Varochko.
"It's no secret that the company has a large loan portfolio. Only 4.5 billion rubles a year is spent on servicing the loan. At one time, the Khrunichev Center, in order to support the Proton-PM enterprise, which produces engines for the first stage of the rocket "Proton-M" took a loan. Otherwise, the plant was threatened with closure and dismissal of personnel, "Varochko said in an interview with Izvestia, answering the question of why the enterprise needs a tranche of 30 billion.
The publication indicates that several years ago Roskosmos already provided the Center with about twice the amount.
According to the head of the center, the capacities of Proton-PM are designed to produce engines for at least 5-6 rockets a year, but when the order dropped, the enterprise had to maintain "idle" work. Only on this loan banks are paid 650 million rubles a year.
"Another expense item is increased production costs. In 2017, the Salavatinsky Chemical Plant raised the price of rocket fuel by 2.5 times. The price of fuel has increased - the cost of testing engines has increased, and the price of missiles for the Ministry of Defense and Roscosmos is fixed. we have to reduce our own profits," Varochko said.
He also noted that in the conditions of reduced government orders and "subsidence" of the commercial market, the enterprise has to maintain and maintain the existing surplus infrastructure.
"It is designed to produce ten Proton rockets a year, while we produce half as many. The production of Angara is designed for five heavy rockets a year. We have to maintain space, people," the head of the Center complained.
The current economic condition of the enterprise was aggravated by a series of accidents.
“From the second half of 2016 to the first half of 2017, we did not produce a single new rocket. Then there was a question about the marriage of engines, now this problem has been fixed, the engines were sorted out, the marriage was eliminated, but this situation aggravated the financial situation of the organization. downtime took 30 billion rubles," Varochko concluded.
GKNPTs named after M.V. Khrunichev is one of the leading enterprises in the Russian rocket and space industry. The main products at present are launch vehicles of the Proton family and upper stages for them. The enterprise is also developing a promising family of Angara missiles. In the summer of 2014, it was recognized that the Khrunichev Center was in a very difficult financial situation, to get out of which an enterprise recovery program was adopted.
And you say renovation! We read and think I have already blogged about the difficult situation at the Center. M. V. Khrunichev, in continuation of the story, I cite a letter from the employees of the space enterprise, in which the main problems that threaten the future of the Tsikh are voiced "GKNPTs im. M. V. Khrunichev, who celebrated his centenary last year, is in the worst crisis in its history. Neither the hard times of the revolution, nor the Great Patriotic War, nor even the 90s, could bring the enterprise to the deplorable state in which it is now. For almost a year (since June 9, 2016) the Proton-M launch vehicle has not been flying, the number of orders for launching satellites has sharply decreased. Three years have passed since the first launch of the new Angara rocket, and its flight tests have not yet been resumed. Employees leave the enterprise en masse, both as part of measures to “optimize the headcount” and of their own free will, as they no longer want to work under the guidance of “optimizers”. We have almost lost the ability to launch heavy satellites on the GSO, which poses a direct threat to Russia's defense capability. What is the reason? In the implementation of the financial recovery program developed and adopted for implementation by the team of "effective managers" A. V. Kalinovsky, who headed the enterprise in the summer of 2014. Production facilities in Moscow and Omsk are being completely rebuilt. The main purpose of this restructuring is to reduce the area occupied by the enterprise, with their subsequent sale for development, both in Moscow and in Omsk. All this under the slogan of "lean production", "Lean-technologies" (from the English Lean - unprofitable, unprofitable, thin (from the word bad), meager, unproductive). As a result of the implementation of these plans, the full-fledged production of the Angara in Omsk has not been established, but in Moscow it is no longer assembled, so that as a result, the launch of the rocket into series and the replacement of the Proton with it are postponed further, and the funds for this continue to be spent. General Director of GKNPTs im. M. V. Khrunichev Andrey Vladimirovich Kalinovsky in Omsk (photos provided by the staff of the TsIKh) With Proton, the situation is simply deplorable - its old production has collapsed, some of the parts and blanks are now being made in branches thousands of kilometers from Moscow. Quite often, branches cannot complete the processing of the product completely on their own equipment, and for some operations it has to be transported from Omsk or Ust-Katav to Moscow, and then back. This results in wasted time and money for transportation. Some of the workers from the factory in Moscow were laid off, some were transferred to idle time by 2/3 of their salary. In KB Salyut, which is engaged in design support for existing projects and the development of new ones, the situation is no better than at the plant. Firstly, as a result of the “development of a motivational model”, a new wage system was introduced. Part of the bonuses were canceled - for academic degrees and knowledge of a foreign language, and the bonus was tied to the volume of work performed. When planning, it was taken into account through standard hours, and in terms of work it has long been separated from the actual time costs, both up and down. But the standards for labor intensity were never revised, because some of the units ended up in chocolate, and some were on starvation rations with a bare salary. Of course, this led to the departure of some specialists of their own free will, and by no means pensioners. It also sharply aggravated relations between departments - no one wants to work for free. As a result, what was previously decided on the job is now done only through high authorities. Secondly, in order to provide additional incentives for employees, it was decided to establish the so-called “individuals” in some departments. “visualization boards” are the product of the gloomy genius of Lean technologists. Only now the Japanese came up with them for conveyor production, and not for the production of such piece products as rockets, and even more so not for design work. But how can they understand this, they are not engineers! Currently, all this mess is also being converted into electronic form, stuffed into the CAD system used at the enterprise - NX from Siemens, absolutely not caring about finalizing the interface for ease of use. It takes a full-time person to run the business in this system. It is also difficult to understand how the use of a foreign program fits in with the policy of import substitution, especially in the presence of domestic analogues and for reasons of secrecy. But despite the lack of knowledge and experience in the development of rocket and space technology, A. V. Kalinovsky and his team do not forget to generate new ideas in the field of rocket science, which is exemplified by the long-suffering Proton-Light project presented to the public last year . Having optimized the Angara and practically stopped the production of the usual Proton, they decided to mutilate it, giving rise to new versions, as if the rocket was a children's designer, and not a complex technical system. The chimerical nature of this plan was initially obvious to any competent specialist, but in order for the management to understand that the initial version was bad, and the deadlines were unrealistic, it took a year of study by the entire design bureau team, which further increased the company's debts. But Kalinovsky could not completely refuse it - and therefore, after playing a little more "cubes", they presented a new version, more realistic. Why even produce chimeras based on a rocket that will only fly until 2025 and which the owners of the Baikonur Cosmodrome do not want to see further poisoning their territory of their country. But on the other hand, new contracts are already being concluded for it, although there is no rocket itself yet. Separately, it is worth mentioning the managerial achievements of the new management. To begin with, they renamed the management structure of the Center into the "Head Office", and then spawned new departments, directorates and departments in it. Listen to how beautiful it sounds - "Director of the Directorate"! It is immediately obvious that a person is not in vain taken to work in a luxurious company car and he does not receive a large salary in vain. A. V. Kalinovsky brought some of the new managers with him from Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and recruited some in the branches of the enterprise in Omsk and Ust-Katav. And of course they are provided with solid salaries. The structure of financial and legal services was replaced, work with suppliers and clients was reorganized. The result was that they simply do not want to have any more business with us - the work done was not paid on time, and the products ordered from us were not delivered on time. According to the balance sheet for 2016, the amount of claims against the enterprise is already 9.5 billion rubles. In addition, the restructuring of production and the development of new projects is carried out at the expense of borrowed funds. The amount of credits and loans hanging at the enterprise, during the work of A. V. Kalinovsky, managed to double and increased from 28 billion rubles to 52 billion rubles. And the territory of the Moscow site of the enterprise is used as collateral for the loan. There are also debts to suppliers, and they are comparable in size to the debt to banks. The total damage caused by the reformers to the state is already comparable, if not exceeding the amount of theft at the long-suffering Vostochny cosmodrome. It is urgent to change the management of the enterprise and hold a new competition for the position of general director. It is also necessary to revise the financial recovery program and stop the corporatization process until the production is completely destroyed and the area for building is sold off. The workshops are still standing, and the team has not completely scattered, so there is still a reliable way to restore the normal operation of the enterprise.” Stages of reduction of the territory of Qikha
In fact, we are now at the point of no return. There is currently no other enterprise in Russia capable of producing heavy-class missiles in the next 10 years. And these are satellites on the GSO, and large interplanetary vehicles.
Unfortunately, unlike the scientific community, employees of space enterprises, especially those with a defense bias, do not have the opportunity to openly fight for the salvation of their enterprises. And in general it sounds very strange. This indicates a lack of functional feedback from the country's leadership, which can lead to very disastrous consequences in the near future.
Reposting and sharing this email could make a difference (or at least there's a small chance):
They proudly refer to these measures as "reconfiguration of production and reduction of overhead costs."
In 2017, the Khrunichev State Space Research and Production Center (GKNPTs) was supposed to launch the Angara-A5 heavy rocket, but this will only happen in 2018. About the reasons for the postponement of the launch of the Angara and the resumption of the operation of the Protons, about why it is necessary to expand the product line and what needs to be done in order not to be afraid of Elon Musk, - in an interview with Kommersant correspondents Ivan Safronov and Alexander Dzhordzhevich, the general director of the GKNPTs named after Khrunichev Andrey Kalinovsky.
When you headed the Khrunichev Center in 2014, you said that the enterprise was in a deplorable state. What has been fixed?
The situation was indeed difficult. The financial recovery program, which we adopted in agreement with the state corporation Roscosmos and the government, implied economic transformation within ten years - it was supposed to end by 2025. At first we were engaged in stabilization, because we did not have enough working capital even for production activities. It was the stage of 2014-2016: at that time, the state actively helped us, giving money for the production of rocket and space technology. Now there is a stage of modernization, which implies major transformations in production. I think that the final look of the production structure will be built in late 2018 - mid-2019. After that, sustainable development will begin. This year will be three years since we are implementing this program: the situation is not easy, but the process is proceeding in strict accordance with the previously adopted plans.
Why did you need a new financial recovery program then?
A number of initial conditions have changed. A new state budget for the next three years was approved, as part of this, there was a reduction in costs for a number of projects, which we had to take into account. The program has become somewhat tougher for us, but still doable.
How are relations with VEB developing, which was supposed to issue you borrowed funds in several stages? The first tranche in the amount of 12.5 billion rubles. you have received completely, and then?
After that, we received, under the guarantee of Roskosmos, two more loans from other banks for 20 billion rubles. The amount of funds originally included in the rehabilitation program, we received in full. But from other sources.
- How is the corporatization of the enterprise going?
We are at the finish line and in July this year we plan to become a joint-stock company.
- Is it true that part of the territory of the GKNPTs in Fili will be given for residential development?
We recalled 71 engines to the Voronezh Mechanical Plant. It's a lot, but it had to be done
I cannot say what plans the Moscow government has regarding this territory. But we are actively discussing the possibility of opening a technopark on the vacated lands, in which modern space technologies could be developed.
When do you expect to resume launches of launch vehicles that were suspended after the recall of the second and third stage engines due to the use of the wrong solder in them?
The first launch is planned for May 29. Initially, the commercial launch of the Echostar-21 was supposed to take place at the end of 2016 - at the beginning of 2017, but, unfortunately, the engines on this rocket were at risk. Therefore, we offered the customer to replace the Proton with one with fully serviceable engines. Just last week, we had a final meeting, at which the customer confirmed his agreement to replace the rocket.
- How many engines were recalled to the Voronezh Mechanical Plant (VMZ)?
71 engines. This is a lot. But it was necessary. In the current situation, regarding the engines, there was a purely theoretical probability of the presence of a defect. We all had the courage to say, "Let's stop and check everything."
- And how long will it take to fix?
Already in early May, the first serviceable batch will arrive from Voronezh.
- The launch program has suffered a lot?
How many launches were planned, so many remained. Everything will depend on the readiness of spacecraft: in our country, launches are often postponed not only because of problems with rockets, but also because of the unavailability of the payload that we are going to launch.
- Two "Proton-M" were not supplied by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation also because of the engines?
Yes. The missiles themselves were almost ready at the end of 2016, but as a result, we will ship them in the third quarter of 2017.
- Are you parting with VMZ with a light soul?
Well, you can’t say that as if it was a burden for us and we suffered with them ... In accordance with the plans of the state corporation, VSW is transferred to the perimeter of responsibility of NPO Energomash, on the basis of which an engine-building holding will be formed.
And will you get rid of something else, or do you need all the existing assets? Interested in the fate of the Ust-Katav Carriage Works.
The future structure implies the optimization of part of the area, but at the same time, all branches will be preserved in the production of rocket and space technology. As for Ust-Katav, in the structure of the holding it will become a center of competence for the manufacture of castings, stampings, hardware, rubber products. In the next few years, the plant will be reconstructed at the expense of the Federal Target Program for the creation of new capacities there.
Recently, Roscosmos filed another lawsuit against the Khrunichev Center for 600 million rubles, and earlier another - for 1 billion, in January - in general for more than 2 billion rubles.
We had contractual obligations for the supply of rocket and space technology and the implementation of R & D. Our obligations were not fulfilled in full, and as a result, we received claims.
- And what are the prospects for resolving this conflict?
We will try to reduce the amount of claims, we will present our arguments.
- The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not really listen to your arguments in court related to the Proton accident in 2013.
Surely we will find some compromise solutions.
- What is the current status of the Rokot conversion program?
While in operation. We are now making the last machines, the last launch will be commercial - we will launch the Sentinel-3B apparatus in the interests of the European Space Agency. Tentatively, this will take place at the end of 2017 or in the first quarter of 2018. After that, the program will end.
- Will there be a control system of the Ukrainian “Khartron” there?
Yes. Recently received from Ukraine the latest equipment for commercial launches.
- The Rokot should be replaced. What is the status of this project?
Bench tests of individual components and assemblies are now underway, after which we will assemble the first flight rocket in order to carry out its first launch in 2019. The car turned out well. One firm contract has been signed with the Korean Aerospace Institute for launch in 2020. He is still alone, but the general interest in this rocket on the commercial market is quite large.
- Is it being promoted by International Launch Services?
Yes, they have an exclusive right in general to the entire family of Angara launch vehicles.
- Will the project be implemented?
No, they rejected it. Our colleagues from Roskosmos have a new project, Phoenix, which will occupy this niche in the future.
- And what happens to the heavy one? The launch was supposed to take place this year, but it is not in the plans.
We have moved it to 2018. The reason is simple: in parallel with the development work, we were in the process of transferring production to Omsk, and we, by mutual agreement with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, decided to conduct additional tests. This is necessary to confirm the readiness of the production of the Omsk enterprise in terms of the quality of products, the stability of technological processes and the qualifications of personnel. Therefore, now we are preparing bench products. In 2017, we will complete all tests at the Central Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering and after that we will start production in Omsk.
- By the way, you carried out the modernization of production there, purchasing machines for this. Russian?
Not always.
- Did sanctions interfere with the purchase of foreign products?
- What payload will be displayed first on the Angara-A5?
Taking into account the delivery time of the launch vehicle, several payload options are being discussed with the customer. To date, no final decision has been made.
- Is it true that Angola was interested in launching its AngoSAT at Angara?
Just last week, one of SpaceX's clients approached us, asking us to consider the possibility of transferring the launch of his device from the Falcon rocket to the Proton-M
Yes, we considered this possibility with our colleagues from RSC Energia, but it was one of the options. But in the end, another type of media was chosen.
You promised that the enterprise would produce two heavy Angara-A5 rockets and one light rocket a year. Will the forecasts come true or will the dates be shifted again?
The plans have been saved. We are developing the Amur, we are entering the manned program ... Therefore, taking into account the consolidated order - the Ministry of Defense and Roscosmos - these parameters have been preserved: from 2021, two large vehicles and one small one will be produced.
- How is the work on the KVTK upper stage (oxygen-hydrogen heavy class. - Kommersant) going?
Now we are closing the previous contract. The process of submitting primary documents is underway. In the first half of this year - the beginning of the second, we must conclude a new contract for KVTK with a state corporation to continue work.
- In what year should we expect the launch?
In 2024 It was originally planned to be held in 2021, but here budget adjustments really affected the timing.
- Are the launch dates for the manned Angara-A5P the same?
Yes - in 2021, 2022 and 2023.
- Why are you preparing several new modifications of the Proton then?
When we entered the commercial launch market 15–20 years ago, the Khrunichev Center was virtually a monopolist. We had one rocket that we offered to the market, and the market adjusted to it, and not vice versa. Were we comfortable? Of course. Over time, many new players have appeared. And as soon as the market had the opportunity to use various options, they began to choose those carriers whose power is sufficient to carry their payload. There is a serious trend - spacecraft are becoming lighter. And those who used to stand in line with us with their companions weighing more than five tons, began to make devices weighing four tons. And they no longer want to pay for excess rocket power. And we have "Proton-M" as it put six tons into orbit, and six tons remained. We realized that we also need to change: it is impossible to compete with only one product in the line. More precisely, it is possible, but only if the price is artificially reduced - but you understand that it is infinitely impossible to do this. It should be taken into account that Baikonur is located much to the north of the cosmodromes of our competitors. With the same Falcon and Ariane, we are significantly losing in terms of energy only due to geography. If the "Proton" flew from the equator, then we would not have to invent anything at all, but this is from the category of "if only, if only." Therefore, a few years ago we took the first step - we changed the sales policy, differentiating customers into permanent and one-time. And now we are creating a whole family based on the Proton for various orders that may come.
- Are we talking purely about commercial orders or will you also invite government customers?
- Proton-M was also created as a commercial project, and today we also carry out federal orders on it. I think it's the right thing to have a line of machines that meet different requirements. We passed the first NTS (scientific and technical council. - “Kommersant”) at the end of 2016, and now we are preparing for the second. Since the changes from the original in the Proton Medium version are not very big, I expect that the first car will appear at the end of 2018.
- What about the Light version?
We presented it to the international market, but were forced to postpone its creation. Initially, I thought that this version would be the most popular. However, after analyzing the interest of potential customers, it turned out that the greatest attention was focused on the Medium option. That is, for most customers, the payload corresponds to this particular modification. Demand dictates everything.
- Until what year will you operate Proton? Is it possible to extend their service life after 2025?
The real challenge now is the stable growth of wages. Regardless of the situation in which the company is
By the time the Angara takes off, and by 2025 it should definitely happen, then we will say goodbye to the Proton.
Are you afraid of Elon Musk?
Last week, a SpaceX client approached us asking us to consider rescheduling his spacecraft's launch from a Falcon rocket to a Proton-M. You have to work, not be afraid (laughs).
Some employees of the Khrunichev Center were worried about your arrival at the enterprise: they were afraid of layoffs, cuts in wages ...
The real challenge now is the stable growth of wages. Regardless of the situation in which the company is located. Yes, there are huge debts. Not the most highly efficient production yet, but in the first two years we managed to achieve a rapid increase in average wages: by 19.3% in 2015, by 11.4% in 2016. Last year, growth slowed down somewhat, primarily due to a decrease in production load. Plans for 2017 have not changed: we are obliged to ensure further wage growth corresponding to the level of high-tech production.
- Will the Khrunichev Center somehow participate in the implementation of the lunar program?
Undoubtedly. So far, the two-launch scheme with the help of heavy Angara-A5V missiles has not been abandoned - this is still one of the options for implementing the program that exists.
- And how do you feel about a super-heavy rocket?
Recently, with foreign colleagues, we discussed the trends in the development of the industry for the coming decades. And they honestly answer that they are going in the direction of minimizing the weight of the payload: fewer microcircuits, more efficient antennas, more compact engines. But they immediately stipulate that there is economic feasibility in combining the efforts of several large companies in creating a large spacecraft and launching it with a single super-heavy rocket. And this fork will determine the shape of future launch vehicles.
The talk about the load is really very serious - 35, 50 or even 70 tons. Today, the technical potential of the country's rocket-building industry makes it possible to implement tasks of any complexity. But I think that in this project it is very important to accurately determine the goal setting.
