Alexander Vasilevsky
Hermann Got
Operation Uranus- code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - November 30, 1942). Counter-offensive of troops of three fronts: Southwestern (general), Stalingrad (general A.I. Eremenko) and Don (general K.K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying an enemy group of troops in the area of the city of Stalingrad.
Military situation before the operation
By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barricades plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 62nd Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general offensive of the Nazi troops was stopped. On November 10, they went on the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of areas in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the Nazi troops became more complicated. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched over 2,300 km, the flanks of the strike groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not able to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the fascist German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until spring, and then go on the offensive again.
Balance of forces on the fronts
Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aircraft and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the “History of the Second World War,” was as follows:
Operation plan
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff began developing a counteroffensive plan in September. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed “Uranus,” was approved by Headquarters under the chairmanship of J.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N.F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of delivering deep strikes from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas (offensive depth of about 120 km); The strike group of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. Strike groups of both fronts were supposed to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces at Stalingrad. At the same time, with part of the forces, these same fronts ensured the creation of an external front of encirclement. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th Air Armies, carried out two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya area to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky area along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided: to direct the main attacks against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy’s defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups use terrain favorable to the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough sectors, by weakening the secondary sectors, create a 2.8 - 3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy in the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy achieved in the concentration of forces, strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.
Progress of the operation
October 1942, fighting in the area of the Red October plant
Start of the offensive
The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front began on the morning of November 19 after powerful artillery bombardment. Troops of the 5th Tank Army broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army. German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps brought into the battle, the advanced units of which reached the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike group of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Tank Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy group between the Volga and Don rivers. The 6th and the main forces of the 4th Tank Army were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total number of 330 thousand people. By this time, most of the external front of the encirclement had been created, the distance of which from the internal one was 40-100 km.
The Soviet command estimated the size of the group that was to be encircled in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80 - 90 thousand. The original version had a more modest scale. The underestimation did not have a significant impact on the rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but it greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a major underestimation with a brilliant final result is not the only example in military history. A similar example is the Battle of Novi. The continued presence of a huge cauldron, which attracted all the forces and attention of the enemy and sharply limited the possible options for his actions on the entire southern wing, allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly develop the success of the encirclement and inflict new huge losses on the enemy.
10 seven-year cycles have passed since Operation Uranus, and at this time it is possible to look at events objectively. Of course, Stalingrad fought heroically. If it had not been for this operation, sooner or later it would have been surrendered to the Germans, as other cities were surrendered. After Operation Uranus, the Germans never recovered, like an attacking boxer suddenly caught in a deep knockdown, they were unable to regain the initiative.
The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad was not only a milestone event in the war, but also in the entire strategic approach of the Red Army. In his memoirs “The March on Stalingrad,” General Doerr said that for Germany the battle of Stalingrad was the most severe defeat in its history, and for Russia its greatest victory.
Until now, the origins of this event are surrounded by mystery. Let's try to reveal this secret with the help of astrology. Stalin did not trust his generals at the beginning of the war, especially since the summer of 1942 after the tragic defeats on the Kerch Peninsula and near Kharkov. 
Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko
On July 23, 1942, Timoshenko was removed from his post as commander of the newly renamed Stalingrad Front. The reasons are more than compelling: for the failure of the offensive near Kharkov in May 1942, subsequent retreats and finally, encirclement near Millerovo. This is a significant event. Timoshenko was People's Commissar of Defense before the war. It was he who corrected the situation in the Finnish War, and it ended relatively successfully for us, but that’s where his merits end. Tymoshenko bears full responsibility for the defeats at the beginning of the war.
And here it is 1942. Stalin did not touch him for a very long time, because there was no one to replace him. In the army, you cannot put an ordinary general in command of a front; only in exceptional cases they take an army commander if he has distinguished himself in previous battles. At the beginning of the war, few were different, so there was little choice. But, despite everything that has been said, July 23 became a milestone date. From that time on, there were no longer any large boilers in the Red Army.
Stalin's search for new commanders was reflected even in Koreychuk's play "Front"
, which Stalin edited in the summer of 42 on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. The plot of the play was that the front commander, Lieutenant General Gorlov, a brave participant in the Civil War, and today an ignorant military leader who is behind the times, faces a young, well-educated Major General Ognev. Ognev started the war as a colonel, commanded a division, then an army. At Gorlov's headquarters there are flatterers, sycophants, self-righteous boors, and drunkenness. Ognev openly opposes not only Gorlov, but the entire trend. According to the first version of the play, he independently develops his plan of operation, and without informing anyone, he carries it out successfully.
Stalin edited this version: Ognev transmits his plan to a member of the front’s military council, and he transfers it to Moscow. The plan is being implemented brilliantly. Gorlov was removed from his post, and Ognev was appointed in his place. Stalin wrote the following monologue into the mouth of a member of the military council: “ Stalin says that we need to boldly promote young, talented commanders to leadership positions. We need to beat these narcissistic ignoramuses, replace them with others: new, young, talented, otherwise we can ruin the whole great work».
After the play was published in Pravda on August 24 and 27, 1942, an unexpected reaction appeared. On August 28, Tymoshenko sent a telegram: “ Comrade Stalin, the published play by Comrade Korneychuk Front, deserves special attention. This play has been harming us for centuries, it needs to be removed, the author should be brought to justice, and those responsible for this should be dealt with. Tymoshenko»
As you can see, this play touched a nerve not only with Tymoshenko, who was expelled from Stalingrad in disgrace. The commanders were given a signal: since it is impossible to fight before. It is interesting that Timoshenko was replaced as commander of the Stalingrad Front by Lieutenant General Gordov. Almost the namesake of the hero of the play. A month later it was also removed with a bang. The final version of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation was approved July 30, 1942
. It is this date that appears on the maps of this plan along with the signatures of the then Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky and the real author of the idea of the operation plan, Colonel Potapov, i.e. Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff.
Apparently, the idea originated during one of Potapov’s reports to Stalin. Joseph Vissarionovich had the habit of working directly with General Staff officers who personally supervised this or that area.
Zhukov, in his memoirs, who took credit for developing the plan, was in fact, with the permission of Headquarters, only privy to the plan for the Stalingrad operation on September 27, 1942. He writes that on September 12 a meeting took place in the Kremlin, at which Vasilevsky was present. However, in the entry in Stalin's visit log for September 12 and 13, there is no note about any visit with the participation of Zhukov and Vasilevsky. The first such entry for September dates only to September 27.
Potapov
It is clear that an operation of such a scale could not be prepared in a month and a half, as Zhukov writes about it. It follows from this that the Stalingrad operation or counter-offensive plan “Uranus” was prepared for 3.5 months in the strictest secrecy. Only 3 people were privy to all the details - Stalin, Vasilevsky and Colonel Potapov. Part of the operation was revealed to Zhukov at a meeting at the end of September. And even then only part of it, because until recently Zhukov was confident that the main offensive of the Soviet army would take place near Rzhev (Operation “Mars”), and at Stalingrad there would only be a diversionary strike.
The fact that Zhukov did not know the scale of the offensive at Stalingrad is evidenced by this fact. At that meeting on September 27, Zhukov and Konev refused to transfer the reserves of the Western and Kalinin fronts to the Volga. Meanwhile, Operation Mars is a deliberate disinformation of the Germans in order to convince them that the main blow will be against the German army group “Center”. At the end of July, Stalin appointed Zhukov to command the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation and hid that it was a diversion from the southern direction. Stalin hid even more carefully the diversionary nature of this operation in November-December 1942.
On Stalin’s instructions, NKVD intelligence “helped” the Germans two weeks before Zhukov arrived here, i.e. informed them that from November 15 the main attack would be near Rzhev. This is described in the memoirs of the Germans. Stalin so stubbornly played up the decisive importance of Operation Mars to the end that he genuinely misled everyone for decades to come. This operation, as a diversionary one, played one of the decisive roles in the Battle of Stalingrad. But Zhukov had no idea about this.
Operation Mars, with modest results, was marked by huge losses. After this, Stalin promoted Zhukov to field marshal of the Soviet Union. Everyone, including Zhukov himself, was perplexed - why? The Germans, based on these data, in October-November 1942, deployed an additional 11th Field Army, led by Field Marshal Manstein, to the western Moscow direction, which was intended to storm Leningrad. They also transferred 5 more divisions and 2 brigades from Western Europe here with the beginning of the offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts. Then another 10 divisions. In this direction, until November 24, 1942, in the Vitebsk region, Hitler kept Manstein and only when he finally understood where the main events were taking place, he sent him to Stalingrad.
As the former head of the Vostok department, Reikhand Gelem, noted in his memoirs, on November 4, 1942, an important report was received through the Amber line. It said: “According to information received from a trusted person, a meeting of the military council was held under the chairmanship of Stalin, which was attended by 12 marshals and generals. It was decided to carry out all offensive operations on November 15, as far as weather conditions allow. The main attacks are from Grozny (direction of Mazdoka), in the Upper and Lower Mamon area of the Don region, near Voronezh, Rzhev, near Lake Ilmen and near Stalingrad.” Hitler was informed about him on November 7.
In fact, the southwestern front delivered the main blow not on its right wing at the villages of Upper and Lower Mamon against the Italians, but on its left wing against the Romanians. Apparently, this is also part of the disinformation - until the very beginning, only 3 people were privy to all its details. So even Amber's high-ranking informant (most likely one of the 12 generals listed) did not provide convincing information about the Stalingrad counterattack. Hitler aimed the 1942 company at conquering the oil-bearing regions of the USSR. He was not free in his choice; his decision was influenced by the Rockefellers, who sponsored him and Hitler was forced to listen to them.
By the end of 1942, a positive picture was emerging for the German troops. The creation of a powerful group in the center and the presence of superior forces in the south did not give Hitler any reason to worry about the eastern front. The Fuhrer even decided to use it for personal purposes. On November 7, he, together with the top generals, went on vacation to the Alps. The day of November 19 passed calmly for him. Goebbels’ speech, delivered the day before, was printed: “The goal in the east is clear and unshakable, Soviet military power must be completely destroyed.” Only short reports reported weak Soviet counterattacks at Stalingrad.
Operation Uranus began on November 19 for the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, and for the Stalingrad Front - on November 21. Operation Mars began on November 25, the day after Pauls's army was encircled at Stalingrad. What was the success of the Stalingrad operation? The fact is that reserves were created for the planned encirclement in the form of another front and several armies. This entire colossus of tanks, guns, ammunition (there were about 8 million of them on three fronts!), food and fuel had to be prepared and transported on trains to the Stalingrad area in absolute secrecy.
For this purpose, the Volzhskaya rakada (rakada from French - front-line road) was built from the Vilovlya station (84 km from Stalingrad) to the Sviyazhsk station (on the right bank of the Volga opposite Kazan). The entire line was adopted on November 1, 1942. This meant that a railway line of about 1000 km was built in a fantastic time of 6 months! No one has ever installed such railway tracks in such a time frame. The result was a turning point in the war. Operation Uranus was prepared in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy - correspondence and telephone conversations were prohibited, all orders were transmitted orally only to the direct executors. All regiment movements, entering positions only at night.
Military history has always considered the classic defeat of the Carthaginian Hannibal in 216 BC. Roman legionnaires near the town of Cannae in southeastern Italy. 2158 years after Cannes, Stalingrad will become synonymous with a classic operation to encircle and destroy the enemy. But if such a grandiose operation as Stalingrad ended successfully, then planetary constellations should indicate this.
Rice. 2 eclipses
And two solar eclipses could become such constellations. August 12, 1942 in the “anti-Russian field” and February 4, 1943 in the “Russian field”. These eclipses represent the Battle of Stalingrad. The encirclement itself began and ended at the midpoint between these eclipses - November 15 and 23. This ensured the surprise and surprise of this operation. “We had absolutely no idea about the strength of Russian troops in this area. Previously, there was nothing here and suddenly a blow of great force was struck, which was of decisive importance", wrote one of the German generals.
The eclipse on August 12 is extremely interesting. Firstly, it occurred on the star Merak, one of the stars of the Big Dipper associated with our territory. Secondly, the eclipse was on Chiron, which indirectly points to the anti-hero of the Battle of Stalingrad - Paulus (Libra according to the Sun). Another rare constellation took place at this time - Priapus and Razi connected at the same degree with the White Moon - a new light cycle for 4 years was activated, which indicates a light past program, which after the conjunction of these planets could be revived. The Sun was in this degree of the Zodiac on the day of the battle on the Kulikovo Field and Borodino, which symbolizes the protection of the Russian egregor.
When superimposed on the chart of the Third Reich, this conjunction falls on Jupiter and Mars of the Reich, which means that from this moment the military authority of Nazi Germany will steadily decline until the victory of the Soviet army.
Rice tauquadrate to Uranus
And finally, in July, a tauquadrate formed in the sky from the Lunar Nodes to Uranus. Throughout the Battle of Stalingrad he will hold on and at key moments build up to the cross. It will disintegrate only in January 1943. In what follows we will follow these constellations.
Uranus is the ruler of the territory of Aquarius and at the same time the name of this operation, which led to a turn in the war. Interestingly, Uranus at the midpoint of the Lunar Nodes indicates freedom. Despite the incredible compression from eclipses on its territory, Uranus gains freedom.
In the horoscope of the USSR, the eclipse on August 12 fell on Neptune, which indicates the mystery and secrecy of the upcoming operation. It was after this eclipse that Operation Uranus was classified. And in Stalin’s horoscope, this eclipse arose in the 5th house of the horoscope on the White Moon, which speaks of a fatal period, at best bright and creative.
Finally, about Paulus, commander of the 6th German Army. If we compare him with Vasilevsky, we will find they have a lot in common. Both were born under the sign of Libra, both staff officers. Paulus was appointed commander of the 6th Army in early January 1942. Before that, he had not commanded a corps, a division, or even a regiment. He held his last combat position in 1934, commanding a separate tank battalion. Vasilevsky also commanded a regiment in 1930 and was on staff duty until 1942. But despite all this, one becomes the chief of the army, and the second is the chief of the general staff and coordinates 3 front lines.
Rice Paulus Horoscope
Friedrich Paulus was born on September 23, 1890 at 20:07 near the midpoint. Tall, fit, neat, Paulus always wore gloves because he hated dirt. He took a bath and changed clothes twice a day, for which he was sarcastically called “the noble lord.” Maybe this was the influence of the Sun in the “black vulture” degree, but this degree also gives a catastrophe after elevation. In his horoscope we see several alarming circumstances.
First. The exact opposition between the White Moon and Vakshya with Uranus on the cusps of houses 6-12 is causing concern. There is also a tauquadrate to the Moon in the 9th house. There is no doubt that this is one of the main changes in his horoscope, which affected his fate. Uranus, the ruler of the 10th house in the 6th shows a staff worker who may be noticed and will have his finest hour. But Vakshya here shows that everything will end in absurdity, even imprisonment, prison (White Moon in the 12th house) abroad (Moon in the 9th house).
Second. White Moon in the 23rd destructive degree of Aries in the “Germanic field”. On the one hand, he marked the beginning of the destruction of the German state. But on the other hand, this is the destruction of a villainous country built on satanic ideology.
Third. Another fatal configuration, located on the previous opposition, is the stretcher (with the opposition Chiron - Moon and Jupiter). The karmic aspects between them give constraint and oppression, imprisonment, and the star Giedi on his Jupiter says that under his leadership hundreds of thousands of people will freeze and die.
Fourth. The Sun is at destructive 1 degree Libra. This is the collective degree of humanity, associated with judgment and condemnation. Indeed, Paulus was imprisoned as a prisoner for 10 years until 1953.
And finally, fourth. The Black Moon is located in the 4th house of the horoscope, which indicates the negative karma of the family or that it will be betrayed in its homeland. Indeed, Hitler forbade him to capitulate, and awarded him the rank of field marshal in the hope that Tom would commit suicide. In addition, if we take into account that he was born at the midpoint and the Lunar Nodes are on the horizontal axis of the horoscope, then the eclipse will become for him a manifestation and retribution for past sins.
Now let's turn to eclipses. The solar eclipse on August 12 occurred on the Black Moon of Paulus in the 4th house at 19 deg. Leo, and the next thing happened in opposition at 16 degrees Aquarius in the 10th house, thereby marking the encirclement and liquidation of the German group. An eclipse on the Black Moon is considered very difficult - betrayal in the homeland. Hitler - Taurus, is in turn the 8th sign, the destroyer of Libra.
And now Vasilevsky. Stalin sent him to coordinate 3 fronts near Stalingrad. Only he, alone of everyone, knew about the true goals of the operation. With this mission, as a representative of Headquarters, he will remain there until the final encirclement. Unfortunately, we only know Vasilevsky’s cosmogram – September 30, 1895. It can be assumed that his Moon is in the Russian field. Then the Ascendant falls into the sign of Virgo. In this case, the Sun is in exact conjunction with Vakshya. Such a person must occupy the golden mean. If he strives upward, to the pinnacle of power, then a fiasco awaits him. He can get high positions if he doesn't want them. On June 26, 1942, he was appointed chief of the general staff. Before this, Stalin showed him a compromising letter, which listed his shortcomings and said that he could not be in such a position. When Stalin asked what he thought about this, Vasilevsky replied that it was true. He strongly opposed this appointment. However, he was appointed to this position and within a year went from lieutenant general to marshal.
Vasilevsky, not a combat general by nature, was the only one who was fully dedicated to this operation. Rokosovsky, when he arrived to coordinate the actions of the fronts at the command post of the southwestern front, was outraged that the chief of the general staff was actually commanding the front. But he had no idea about the scale of the operation. Front commander Latutin himself did not know this.
It is interesting to look at the transit situation at the beginning of the counterattack on November 19-21 for Vasilevsky’s horoscope. These days, the Black Moon stands in exact opposition to the White Moon. And the transit White Moon passes across the Sun with Vakshya, closing the tauquadrat. All this persists for a month, when Paulus's army was surrounded.
The names of the fronts also contain an element of secrecy. Stalin confused everyone so much with names that it’s not easy to figure it out even now. In July 1942, the vast space from the Don bend to Tsimlyansk was entrusted to one front. In August the front was divided in two, although the two fronts were led by one man, Eremenko. Only in September, with the appearance of Rokossovsky, the division of fronts received real embodiment. But from October 31, a third front appears, which indicates the formation of Operation Uranus.
Vasilevsky writes that in order to maintain secrecy, the creation of the third front was postponed to the end of October. So the whole front was formed 2 weeks before the offensive. This indicates a gradual, secretive increase in strength. And so, on November 19-21, a terrible blow was struck from three sides. The main role in this operation was played by the southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, which occupied positions against the flanks of the German group.
Overall, the plan for Operation Uranus was simple. From the breakthrough sites on the Don River north of Stalingrad and from the chain of lakes south of the city, the armies fanned out, forming external and internal fronts of encirclement. The middle of the fan was formed by tank and mechanized corps, which had the most penetrating power. They had to be the first to break through to meet each other. Hope for a quick completion of the operation was given by the fact that on the flanks of Paulus’s army there were Romanian troops who were not distinguished by their stamina. The Don Front carried out the task of pinning down the encircled enemy and advancing with its right wing with limited objectives.
“Send the receiver to receive fur gloves” - such a telephone message was sent to the 5th Tank Army. This meant an infantry attack on November 19 at 8.50. It was at this time that the fronts went on the offensive. This day became the day of the artillery holiday.
This war is special; it must be considered as a battle of light and dark beginnings. Therefore, when considering an astrological chart, we pay attention first of all to the indications of good and evil. 8.50 – it was the 3rd sunny day. For an electoral horoscope, it is a sunny day that is important. The 3rd day is the day of Asha Vahishta, the day of the element of Fire, which was created first and was not desecrated by Angromanya. Also, this sunny day is dedicated to Airyemon - the leader of the Aryan peoples, i.e. directly related to the Russian egregor.
At the start of Operation Uranus, a fatal cross was formed in the sky with the participation of Uranus, the Lunar Nodes, Chiron, the Sun and Venus. In general, this cross was held throughout the entire operation. At this time, Uranus was closest to the Sun and could be seen through binoculars. At 12 o'clock at night, Uranus hung like an 8th magnitude star over the heads of the soldiers.
The Sun was at the end of Scorpio in the Burnt Path, and by the end of the operation it moved to the beginning of Sagittarius - the Diamond Path or the Road of Life. At best, this sign provides protection and support for the light egregor. This is indicated by the septile aspect from the White Moon to the Sun. Moreover, transit Venus and the Sun were exactly on the descendant of the horoscope of the Third Reich. This operation symbolized the activation of his enemies. In the horoscope of the USSR, the Sun and Venus touch the White Moon. The White Moon at this time had aspects to three distant planets - a conjunction with Neptune, a sextile with Pluto and a trine to Uranus, and also made a septile to the Sun and Venus. All this speaks of a rare successful constellation for the forces of light.
At the same time, the Black Moon was in yellow (undicile) aspects to Neptune, Chiron, and Jupiter. She was also in opposition to Aza, which weakened both of them.
On the Ascending Node, a symbol of evolutionary tasks, there was the star of the Big Dipper (connection with the Aryan egregor) Fekda. And finally, Jupiter makes trigonal aspects to the Sun and Venus, which speaks of great honors and rewards in the near future for those who have taken the bright path.
The operation was completed in 4 days. As a result, on November 23 at 16.00, the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts firmly united in the area of Kloch and Sovetsky, closing the encirclement ring. In the first days, Paulus persistently sought permission to break out of the ring and leave Stalingrad, but Hitler ordered to hold out to the end, hoping to unblock the encircled group. It turned out that the Soviet army surrounded 330,000 people. This is much more than our military leaders expected. It was supposed to surround 90-120 thousand Germans. That is why the liquidation of the group took so long. The mere encirclement of such a large group did not mean their instant destruction. Moreover, by the fall of 1942, there were precedents for the encirclement of the Nazis by units of the Red Army, demonstrating the enemy’s high resistance to falling into the cauldron.
But this time everything was different. The Germans could not transfer tanks from the central front because they were involved in Operation Mars. The relief operation was called “Winter Storm” and Field Marshal Manstein was already preparing it. But a group of German troops went to relieve the blockade. But this only happened on December 12. On December 14, there was no one on its way except scattered units and the 4th mechanized corps. This was one of those cases when, according to Churchel’s catchphrase, “ the fate of many depended on the few».
The commander of the 4th Corps, Zolsky, had no room for error. He must fight, delaying the Germans as long as possible until the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army concentrate. The battle lasted 5 days and time was won.
If you look at the electoral horoscope of this battle on December 12, 1942, you can see that Mars from Ophiuchus closes the main cross of the planets in the period December 12-18. For us, the greatest danger was December 12-15, when Mars passed the Burnt Path.
Here, of course, people of the highest zodiac fight. If you superimpose the map of Major General Zolsky (March 22, 1897, 20.00 Moscow) on the map of the battle, you will see a strong Ophiuchus (Moon, Uranus, Saturn). The entire transit cross was activated through this sign. General Ehard House was born on January 8, 1889 in Austria - commander of the 6th German division. He fought with Zolsky's army and had to release Paulus. He also had the highest zodiac in the cosmogram - Pegasus (Mars 30gr Aquarius and Venus 2gr Pisces). He also closed the entire cross to this connection. Ophiuchus defeated Pegasus and the release of the blockade failed. After this, the days of Paulus's army were numbered.
Content:
The November steppe was covered with snow. The weather turned bad, the snowstorm hid the outlines of hills, gullies - and hundreds of tanks and guns, frozen in anticipation of a command. Soon a steel avalanche fell on the enemy's heads. On November 19, 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive near Stalingrad began - Operation Uranus.
In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht launched a series of attacks that shook the Soviet-German front. The defeats suffered by the Red Army were not as devastating as in 1941, but too much had already been lost and another retreat could have catastrophic consequences. For some time it seemed that only a miracle could save the world from Nazi rule. There are no miracles, so the world was saved by the Soviet 62nd Army. She managed to retreat into the streets of Stalingrad in an organized manner, and instead of the 10 days planned for the assault, the Wehrmacht was stuck for two months, fighting for the ruins. The strongest of the German field armies, the 6th under the command of General Paulus, was drawn into the battle. However, the desperate defense of the 62nd in the city could have become useless if the Headquarters had not taken advantage of the weeks given to it.
While a battle that defies any description was going on in the city, in Moscow they were racking their brains over how to turn its tide in their favor. The Germans very slowly, with heavy losses, but confidently drove its defenders out of Stalingrad. The bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga became smaller and smaller. Of course, the constant introduction of reserves made it possible to slow down the retreat and prevent the Germans from throwing the army into the river, but more and more new neighborhoods passed into the hands of the Germans.
Already in September, counterattacks followed on the steppe, designed to break through a corridor to Stalingrad from the north, near the Kotluban station. These attacks remained almost unknown, and yet the Red Army suffered severe losses in them, trying to ease the fate of the city’s defenders. The blows failed one after another. The Germans bombed the trains approaching from the north, tank brigades and rifle battalions were burned out in attacks in a matter of days. The Germans were so far superior to the Soviet troops in their ability to conduct positional combat. The same thing happened over and over again. The infantry was cut off by fire, the tanks left without cover were burning, and the lying riflemen were mowed down by machine guns and mortars. There was less and less hope of saving Stalingrad with a direct blow. One could only guess how the battle in the city would turn out next. The first attacks failed due to lack of time to prepare them. It seemed that with more careful preparations a better result would be achieved. However, the Wehrmacht withstood all the blows.
Another solution
In September, a landmark meeting took place at Headquarters. Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, in the presence of Stalin, discussed the search for some “other solution” to the Stalingrad problem. Stalin, who heard this, asked what “other” solution was in mind, and offered to report on it the next day. Both generals were of the same opinion. Since it is not possible to break through the German defenses in the Kotluban area, it is necessary to increase the swing, embrace Paulus’ army attacking Stalingrad from the flanks and encircle it, advancing through the positions of Germany’s weak Romanian allies.
When looking at the map, this idea seems obvious. As Stalingrad magnetically attracted the infantry and tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, the Romanians began to cover the longer and longer front to the left and right of Paulus’s troops. They did not have the discipline, tactical training and excellent weapons that distinguished the Germans. However, in reality it was a much more difficult plan to implement than it might seem.
The fact is that the Germans perfectly understood the real combat value of the Romanians. They assigned to the allies those sections of the front that passed through the wild, almost uninhabited, and most importantly, roadless steppe. An offensive requires ammunition, fuel, medicine, food, spare parts - these are thousands and thousands of tons of cargo. If you drive numerous armies into the wasteland and begin to advance, after a while they will simply stop: they will run out of consumables, and new ones will not be brought across the steppe in sufficient quantities. And if you use small forces, then even the Romanians will be able to withstand the blow and push back the attackers. It is interesting that two opposing plans were considered as an alternative to the actually adopted plan.
Konstantin Rokossovsky proposed, since the terrain far to the west and south of Stalingrad was inconvenient, to still try to break through to Stalingrad via a short route and cut off the nearest German divisions in a small pocket. General Andrei Eremenko proposed something different: his plan included an attack on the Romanians with small forces and a giant raid on their rear with the help of cavalry and small mechanized units. Both of these plans contained sound ideas, but both had huge flaws. Rokossovsky proposed to break the Germans with a brutal onslaught where they were strong and expected a blow. It is not a fact that this could be done. Eremenko's plan would have helped stop the Germans for a few days, but it did not solve the problem. Of course, the Wehrmacht would quickly clear its rear of weak raiding groups.
Thus, the most ambitious plan was adopted. This meant that it was necessary to be able to carry out an offensive with large forces in an inconvenient terrain, and to complete all preparations before the Germans finally defeated the Stalingrad garrison. This required truly nerves of steel. Stalingrad was in a desperate situation, emotions demanded to take all the divisions in reserve and immediately throw them into Stalingrad itself or near Kotluban - to cut a corridor along the shortest route. However, Headquarters held out and did not follow the lead of emotions.
Over the next few weeks, a number of problems had to be solved. While battles raged in the streets, railway lines stretched into the steppes blown by the autumn winds. Enormous reserves of fuel and ammunition were transported to their original positions. From the north, a completely new formation was advancing to the front - a tank army. The Germans detected activity on their flanks, but did not attach much importance to it. The Romanians were slightly reinforced by separate German units. However, an offensive in these wastelands, which were recently devoid of roads, was considered unrealistic. Well, a fresh tank division, sent to help Paulus from the west, was prosaically late.
The general offensive was coordinated by Vasilevsky. The operation was codenamed "Uranus". A strike on Romanian troops from both sides was scheduled for November 19. At this moment, the Germans were already extremely weakened by the fighting in the city. The German 6th Army remained a powerful, cyclopean-sized army, but many wounded had accumulated in the rear, combat units had been seriously worn down in battle, and reserves had been drained to the bottom. It took her very little time to regain her strength before the final push to the Volga - literally two to three weeks. It was at this moment that the Headquarters threw its accumulated reserves onto the scales. It is difficult to imagine what feelings Vasilevsky experienced during more and more assaults on Stalingrad, when Headquarters drip-dropped the reserves that supported the defenders. Now all doubts were cast aside.
Punch in the gut
Heavy snowfall hampered aviation operations, but it also kept the Luftwaffe confined to the airfields. The first to go on the offensive was the northern “claw” - the front of General Nikolai Vatutin, which included a tank army. Hurricane artillery fire and an avalanche of several hundred tanks made the attack irresistible. This offensive was in no way reminiscent of the hopeless attacks on German positions at Kotlubani. Soviet troops passed through Romanian positions like a knife through butter. The Romanian front line was swept away, and in some places tanks immediately drove into division command posts and even corps headquarters.
It is interesting that on the first day Paulus did not yet believe that any significant events were taking place. He had no idea about the state of the Romanian troops and did not know that the allies were throwing down their weapons in droves and surrendering. He considered an offensive with large forces west of Stalingrad impossible and on the first day he sent his only reserve - one German and one Romanian tank divisions. There is a curious incident associated with German tank crews. The bulk of the equipment of this mobile reserve was unable to move. According to the official version, the wiring in the tanks... was chewed by mice.
The joke about the mouse saboteurs became known throughout the army, but the tankers themselves were not amused at all. It is difficult to explain this miraculous phenomenon, but the fact is that approximately two-thirds of the division’s tanks never went anywhere. However, the fact that the remaining third still started was of little use. Much to the amazement of the Wehrmacht commanders, all the circumstances that played a fatal role in the fate of the Soviet troops in 1941 now turned against them. In the chaos, the German and Romanian divisions were unable to establish communication with each other, fought discordantly, came under attack in marching columns, could not orient themselves, and were defeated in a couple of days.
The corps commander who united Paulus's armored reserves lost his position and then his freedom: Hitler ordered him to be imprisoned. In reality, the general simply experienced all the delights of commanding a counterattack in the midst of general collapse. The remnants of the two divisions made their way to the southwest in agony. They lost almost all their equipment, their soldiers - especially the Romanians - were demoralized, so the two divisions posed no threat for the next few days.
Bad weather continued to linger over the battlefield, so the formidable German aircraft could not participate in the battle. Moreover, Soviet units began to capture airfields with planes chained to the ground. Due to the defeat of the Romanian units on the front line, their remnants fled into the zone of the German 6th Army.
In the rear of the Germans themselves, a tremendous disorder reigned. The modern army is not only front-line units, but also hundreds of rear units. Now they were all rushing along the icy roads. Some went south, away from the tanks with red stars on board, others went east, into the emerging cauldron, many went straight into captivity. Paulus's only success was the rapid collapse of the flank. The German group across the Don was able to retreat into the cauldron in an organized manner and build a new line of defense. However, most of the rear units turned into an unmanageable mess.
The offensive took even those units that were not supposed to be here by surprise. For example, an Estonian police battalion came under attack while marching on the road to Donetsk. Paulus simply did not have reliable information about what was happening in his own rear. The advancing tankers and riflemen walked through complete chaos. Abandoned horses were running along the roads, somewhere there was a car with an empty gas tank, and just a few kilometers away there was an abandoned fuel warehouse. The military police could not regulate traffic, and kilometer-long traffic jams arose on the roads. Fights broke out near river crossings and road junctions, sometimes with shooting. Some even drowned trying to escape west across the Don on the ice. German field hospitals were filled with patients, but due to constant marches they could not even open dugouts there. The infirmaries were more like meat processing plants.
At this time, the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army were dying near the village of Raspopinskaya. Its main forces were commanded by the division commander, General Laskar. All higher-ups either had no contact with the troops or were already in captivity. Laskar tried to act like his German colleagues and organize a breakthrough to the west. However, on November 22, he was captured after an unexpected attack by the Russians and did not participate in the events anymore, and by the 25th, the remnants of the Romanian army - 27 thousand hungry and frozen people - laid down their arms.
Only a small group led by General Sion escaped from the encirclement, but it did not go far. The Romanians met with the German unit, but literally a few hours later the Germans transferred their guns to another area. The Romanians settled down for the night in a village. For the first time in several days, the soldiers, who had found themselves warm and had eaten, went to sleep in full force, not excluding the sentries. At night, Soviet units entered the village and killed or captured everyone they found.
On November 20, the southern “claw” went on the offensive. Here things were even worse with roads and landmarks than in the north. Therefore, there were fewer troops overall, but the share of mobile units was greater. The condition of the Romanian troops was no better than in the north. The first day was spent fighting the positional defense of the Romanians. Over the long weeks of standing, they managed to create an impressive line of field fortifications, but it quickly turned out that on its own it was not capable of holding back a powerful blow.
The German motorized division that came out to meet them was met on the march and driven inside the planned encirclement ring - to the north. A huge problem for the Soviet troops was the complete lack of landmarks. Due to the snowstorm in the first days, it was impossible to conduct aerial reconnaissance; there were no residents in rare villages. Therefore, the two mechanized corps in the vanguard rushed for some time in the void, vaguely imagining where the enemy was. Even communication with the command had to be done through couriers on motorcycles.
However, the very next day an excellent landmark was found - the railway to Stalingrad. The pliable rear of the German 6th Army was also discovered there. Within two days, only one of the vanguard mechanized corps took seven thousand prisoners at the cost of losing only 16 people.
This phenomenon should be discussed separately. The huge number of captured Soviet soldiers in the 1941 campaign is often explained by reluctance to fight, mass cowardice and similar unimportant reasons. In fact, as we see, in a similar situation, the Germans began to surrender in droves, offering almost no resistance.
This did not happen because the Germans, until recently terrible opponents, suddenly became unwilling to fight. However, during deep breakthroughs, a huge number of rear workers find themselves on the front line: builders, drivers, repairmen, signalmen, doctors, loaders in warehouses, etc. and so on. They almost never have tactical training for proper combat, and often even weapons. Moreover, the Germans constantly lost contact, and in addition to the infantry, tanks fell on them. Vasily Volsky, commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, even sent headquarters guards on motorcycles and armored cars to collect a bountiful harvest of prisoners and trophies.
On November 21, one mechanized wedge was driven into the positions of the Germans and Romanians from the north, another from the east. Between them remained the armada of the German 6th Army. The culmination of Operation Uranus was the capture of the bridge over the Don near the town of Kalach. The crossing was captured by the brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Filippov, advancing from the north. Filippov acted with considerable impudence. In the darkness of the night, a small column with headlights on moved forward. In addition to Soviet ones, it also consisted of several captured German vehicles, so the bridge guards saw familiar silhouettes and were not worried. Thirty-fours were mistaken for German trophies. When the imaginary Germans jumped from the tanks and opened fire, it was already too late. Soon Kalach himself was busy. On November 23 at four in the afternoon, Soviet groups met near Kalach. The largest army of the Wehrmacht, 284 thousand soldiers and officers, was surrounded.
The pictures of the defeat of the German and Romanian rear areas were inspiring. In the terrible summer of 1942, even the most steadfast soldiers hesitated. Now fear and humiliation have become the lot of the opposite side. The crowds of exhausted prisoners, many of whom were wounded or frostbitten, aroused pity rather than hatred. Mountains of broken and abandoned equipment rose along the roadsides like monuments to victory. True, here and there there were constant outbursts of rage.
The retreating Wehrmacht units mercilessly shot prisoners captured in the summer and autumn, whom they could not take with them. In one of the camps they found a mountain of numb corpses and only a few emaciated living people. Now that most of the prisoners were Germans and Romanians, such a spectacle could easily cost the lives of soldiers captured nearby. And yet the moral upsurge of Soviet soldiers and officers was unprecedented. The taste of victory was intoxicating. Some of the fighters later said that they did not experience such strong feelings even after the capture of Berlin.
Operation Uranus turned the tide of the entire Second World War. In just a few days, the roles were reversed. In the coming months, the Wehrmacht will have to patch up holes in the front, try to successfully or unsuccessfully break through encirclement rings and throw reserves under the tracks of tanks without any visible effect. November 1942 became the real finest hour of the Red Army.
The Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. And it began with a successful Red Army offensive, codenamed “Uranus”.
Prerequisites
The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began in November 1942, but the preparation of the plan for this operation at the High Command Headquarters began in September. In the fall, the German march to the Volga faltered. For both sides, Stalingrad was important both in a strategic and propaganda sense. This city was named after the head of the Soviet state. Stalin once led the defense of Tsaritsyn against the Whites during the Civil War. Losing this city, from the point of view of Soviet ideology, was unthinkable. In addition, if the Germans had established control over the lower Volga, they would have been able to stop the supply of food, fuel and other important resources.
For all the above reasons, the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was planned with particular care. The situation at the front was favorable to the process. The parties switched to trench warfare for some time. Finally, on November 13, 1942, the counteroffensive plan, codenamed “Uranus,” was signed by Stalin and approved at Headquarters.
Original plan
How did the Soviet leaders want to see the counteroffensive at Stalingrad? According to the plan, the Southwestern Front, under the leadership of Nikolai Vatutin, was to strike in the area of the small town of Serafimovich, occupied by the Germans in the summer. This group was ordered to break through at least 120 kilometers. Another shock formation was the Stalingrad Front. The Sarpinsky lakes were chosen as the place of his attack. Having traveled 100 kilometers, the front armies were supposed to meet the Southwestern Front near Kalach-Sovetsky. Thus, the German divisions located in Stalingrad would be surrounded.
It was planned that the counteroffensive at Stalingrad would be supported by auxiliary attacks from the Don Front in the area of Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya. Headquarters tried to determine the most vulnerable parts of the enemy formations. In the end, the strategy of the operation began to consist in the fact that the Red Army’s strikes were delivered to the rear and flank of the most combat-ready and dangerous formations. It was there that they were least protected. Thanks to good organization, Operation Uranus remained a secret for the Germans until the day it began. The surprise and coordination of the actions of the Soviet units played into their hands.
Enemy encirclement
As planned, the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad began on November 19. It was preceded by a powerful artillery barrage. Before dawn, the weather changed sharply, which made adjustments to the command’s plans. Thick fog did not allow aircraft to take off, as visibility was extremely low. Therefore, the main emphasis was placed on artillery preparation.
The first to come under attack was the 3rd Romanian Army, whose defenses were broken through by Soviet troops. The Germans were in the rear of this formation. They tried to stop the Red Army, but failed. The defeat of the enemy was completed by the 1st Tank Corps under the leadership of Vasily Butkov and the 26th Tank Corps by Alexei Rodin. These units, having completed their task, began to advance towards Kalach.
The next day, the offensive of the divisions of the Stalingrad Front began. During the first 24 hours, these units advanced 9 kilometers, breaking through enemy defenses on the southern approaches to the city. After two days of fighting, three German infantry divisions were defeated. The success of the Red Army shocked and embarrassed Hitler. The Wehrmacht decided that the blow could be smoothed out by regrouping forces. In the end, after considering several options, the Germans transferred two more tank divisions, previously operating in the North Caucasus, to Stalingrad. Paulus, until the very day when the final encirclement took place, continued to send victorious reports to his homeland. He stubbornly repeated that he would not leave the Volga and would not allow his 6th Army to be blockaded.
On November 21, the 4th and 26th Southwestern Fronts reached the village of Manoilin. Here they made an unexpected maneuver, turning sharply to the east. Now these units were moving straight to the Don and Kalach. The advance of the Red Army tried to delay the 24th Wehrmacht, but all its attempts led to nothing. At this time, the command post of Paulus's 6th Army was urgently relocated to the village of Nizhnechirskaya, for fear of being caught by an attack by Soviet soldiers.
Operation Uranus once again demonstrated the heroism of the Red Army soldiers. For example, the advance detachment of the 26th Tank Corps in tanks and vehicles crossed the bridge across the Don near Kalach. The Germans turned out to be too careless - they decided that a friendly unit equipped with captured Soviet equipment was moving towards them. Taking advantage of this connivance, the Red Army soldiers destroyed the relaxed guards and took up a perimeter defense, awaiting the arrival of the main forces. The detachment held its position despite numerous enemy counterattacks. Finally, the 19th Tank Brigade broke through to it. These two formations jointly ensured the crossing of the main Soviet forces rushing to cross the Don in the Kalach area. For this feat, commanders Georgy Filippov and Nikolai Filippenko were deservedly awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
On November 23, Soviet units took control of Kalach, where 1,500 soldiers of the enemy army were captured. This meant the actual encirclement of the Germans and their allies who remained in Stalingrad and between the Volga and Don rivers. Operation Uranus was successful in its first stage. Now 330 thousand people who served in the Wehrmacht had to break through the Soviet ring. Under the circumstances, the commander of the 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, asked Hitler for permission to break through to the southeast. The Fuhrer refused. Instead, the Wehrmacht forces, which were located near Stalingrad but were not encircled, were united into the new Army Group Don. This formation was supposed to help Paulus break through the encirclement and hold the city. The trapped Germans had no choice but to wait for outside help from their compatriots.
Unclear Prospects
Although the start of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad led to the encirclement of a significant part of the German forces, this undoubted success did not at all mean that the operation was over. The Red Army soldiers continued attacks on enemy positions. The Wehrmacht group was extremely large, so Headquarters hoped to break through the defenses and divide it into at least two parts. However, due to the fact that the front had noticeably narrowed, the concentration of enemy forces became significantly higher. The Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad slowed down.
Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht prepared a plan for Operation Wintergewitter (which translates as “Winter Storm”). Its goal was to ensure the elimination of the encirclement of the 6th Army under the leadership of the Blockade. Army Group Don was supposed to break through. The planning and execution of Operation Wintergewitter was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main striking force of the Germans this time was the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Hermann Hoth.
"Wintergewitter"
At turning points of the war, the scales tip first to one side or the other, and until the last moment it is completely unclear who will be the winner. This was the case on the banks of the Volga at the end of 1942. The beginning of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad remained with the Red Army. However, on December 12, the Germans tried to take the initiative into their own hands. On this day, Manstein and Goth began to implement the Wintergewitter plan.
Due to the fact that the Germans delivered their main attack from the area of the village of Kotelnikovo, this operation was also called Kotelnikovskaya. The blow was unexpected. The Red Army understood that the Wehrmacht would try to break the blockade from the outside, but an attack from Kotelnikovo was one of the least considered options for developing the situation. The first on the path of the Germans, trying to come to the rescue of their comrades, was the 302nd Infantry Division. She was completely distracted and disorganized. So Hoth managed to create a gap in the positions occupied by the 51st Army.
On December 13, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked positions occupied by the 234th Tank Regiment, which was supported by the 235th Separate Tank Brigade and the 20th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade. These formations were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Diasamidze. Also nearby was the 4th mechanized corps of Vasily Volsky. Soviet groups were located near the village of Verkhne-Kumskoye. The fighting of Soviet troops and Wehrmacht units for control over it lasted six days.
The confrontation, which went on with varying success on both sides, almost ended on December 19. The German group was reinforced with fresh units coming from the rear. This event forced the Soviet commanders to retreat to the Myshkova River. However, this five-day delay in the operation also played into the hands of the Red Army. While the soldiers were fighting for every street in Verkhne-Kumskoye, the 2nd Guards Army was brought into this area nearby.
Critical moment
On December 20, the army of Hoth and Paulus was separated by only 40 kilometers. However, the Germans, trying to break the blockade, had already lost half of their personnel. The advance slowed and eventually stopped. Goth's powers are gone. Now, to break through the Soviet ring, the help of the encircled Germans was needed. The plan for Operation Wintergewitter in theory included an additional plan, Donnerschlag. It consisted in the fact that the blocked 6th Army of Paulus had to go to meet the comrades who were trying to break the blockade.
However, this idea was never realized. It was all about the same order from Hitler “never leave the fortress of Stalingrad.” If Paulus had broken through the ring and united with Goth, he would, of course, have left the city behind him. The Fuhrer considered this turn of events a complete defeat and disgrace. His ban was ultimatum. Surely, if Paulus had fought his way through the Soviet ranks, he would have been tried in his homeland as a traitor. He understood this well and did not take the initiative at the most crucial moment.
Manstein's retreat
Meanwhile, on the left flank of the attack by the Germans and their allies, Soviet troops were able to resist powerfully. The Italian and Romanian divisions fighting on this section of the front retreated without permission. The flight took on an avalanche-like character. People left their positions without looking back. Now the path to Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on the banks of the Northern Donets River was open for the Red Army. However, the main task of the Soviet units was occupied Rostov. In addition, strategically important airfields in Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk, which were necessary for the Wehrmacht for the rapid transfer of food and other resources, became exposed.
In this regard, on December 23, the commander of the operation, Manstein, gave the order to retreat in order to protect the communications infrastructure located in the rear. The 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky took advantage of the enemy’s maneuver. The German flanks were stretched and vulnerable. On December 24, Soviet troops re-entered Verkhne-Kumsky. On the same day, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive towards Kotelnikovo. Hoth and Paulus were never able to connect and provide a corridor for the retreat of the encircled Germans. Operation Wintergewitter was suspended.
Completion of Operation Uranus
On January 8, 1943, when the situation of the surrounded Germans finally became hopeless, the command of the Red Army presented an ultimatum to the enemy. Paulus had to capitulate. However, he refused to do this, following the orders of Hitler, for whom failure at Stalingrad would have been a terrible blow. When Headquarters learned that Paulus insisted on his own, the Red Army offensive resumed with even greater force.
On January 10, the Don Front began the final liquidation of the enemy. According to various estimates at that time, about 250 thousand Germans were trapped. The Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad had been going on for two months, and now a final push was needed to complete it. On January 26, the encircled Wehrmacht group was divided into two parts. The southern half was in the center of Stalingrad, and the northern half was in the area of the Barrikady plant and the tractor plant. On January 31, Paulus and his subordinates surrendered. On February 2, the resistance of the last German detachment was broken. On this day, the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad ended. The date, in addition, became the final one for the entire battle on the banks of the Volga.
Results
What were the reasons for the success of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad? By the end of 1942, the Wehrmacht ran out of fresh manpower. There was simply no one left to throw into battle in the east. The remaining strength was exhausted. Stalingrad became the extreme point of the German offensive. In the former Tsaritsyn it choked.
The key to the entire battle was the beginning of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. The Red Army, through several fronts, was able to first encircle and then eliminate the enemy. 32 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. In total, the Germans and their Axis allies lost about 800 thousand people. The Soviet numbers were also colossal. The Red Army lost 485 thousand people, of which 155 thousand were killed.
During the two and a half months of encirclement, the Germans did not make a single attempt to break out of the encirclement from the inside. They expected help from the “mainland,” but the lifting of the blockade by Army Group Don outside failed. Nevertheless, in the time given, the Nazis established an air evacuation system, with the help of which about 50 thousand soldiers (mostly the wounded) escaped from the encirclement. Those who remained inside the ring either died or were captured.
The plan for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was successfully carried out. The Red Army turned the tide of the war. After this success, the gradual process of liberating the territory of the Soviet Union from Nazi occupation began. In general, the Battle of Stalingrad, for which the counter-offensive of the Soviet armed forces was the final chord, turned out to be one of the largest and bloodiest battles in human history. The fighting in the burned, bombed and ravaged ruins was further complicated by the winter weather. Many defenders of their homeland died from the cold climate and the diseases it caused. Nevertheless, the city (and after it the entire Soviet Union) was saved. The name of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad - "Uranus" - is forever inscribed in military history.
Reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht
Much later, after the end of World War II, Manstein published memoirs, in which he described in detail his attitude towards the Battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet counter-offensive under it. He blamed Hitler for the death of the encircled 6th Army. The Fuhrer did not want to surrender Stalingrad and thus cast a shadow on his reputation. Because of this, the Germans first found themselves in a cauldron, and then completely surrounded.
The armed forces of the Third Reich had other complications. Transport aviation was clearly not enough to provide the surrounded divisions with the necessary ammunition, fuel and food. The air corridor was never fully used. In addition, Manstein mentioned that Paulus refused to break through the Soviet ring towards Hoth precisely because of a lack of fuel and fear of suffering a final defeat, while also disobeying the Fuhrer’s order.
The plan of the operation, which received the conventional name "Uranus", provided for the delivery of deep enveloping strikes on the flanks of the enemy group near Stalingrad in converging directions towards the city of Kalach in order to encircle and completely defeat the 6th and 4th German tank armies.
To carry out the operation, troops from three fronts were involved: Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad. The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters - generals G.K. Zhukov and L.M. Vasilevsky.
The troops of these fronts had 1.1 million people, 1,463 tanks and self-propelled guns, 15.5 thousand guns and mortars. The enemy opposing them numbered 1,011 thousand soldiers and officers, had 675 tanks and assault guns, 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, and 1,216 combat aircraft.
To participate in the counteroffensive, four Air Armies were involved: 2, 8, 16, 17 (commanders - generals K.N. Smirnov, T.T. Khryukin, S.I. Rudenko, S.A. Krasovsky), which had 1350 combat aircraft . In addition, 5 long-range aviation divisions were involved (commander of the ADD - General A. E. Golovanov).
The forces were almost equal. But the high skill of the Soviet military leaders was manifested in the fact that, due to skillful regrouping and maneuver of troops, they were able to create double and triple superiority over the enemy in the directions of the main attacks.
In all areas of the breakthrough, due to the bold and skillful concentration of forces and means, superiority was created (in personnel - by 2–2.5 times, in artillery and tanks by 4–5 times. The artillery offensive was carried out to the entire depth of the breakthrough areas in three periods. The duration of the artillery preparation of the Southwestern and Don Fronts was 80 minutes, the Stalingrad Front - 40 - 75 minutes. The attack was supported by the method of sequential concentration of fire. A total of 15 thousand guns were involved, 1250 BM salvo fire (total salvo - 10 thousand shells). .
The density per 1 km of front was 100-117 trunks.
The air offensive, as a new form of operational use of aviation, included preparing an attack and supporting the offensive of troops in depth. Air cover was assigned to the air defense, which had 1,100 anti-aircraft guns.
Engineering support was given great importance. 17 bridges and 18 ferry crossings were built across the Don in the Southwestern Front. Ten crossings were established across the Volga south of Stalingrad. Three bridges and four ferry crossings were built in the Don Front zone. On November 19, 1942, a powerful counter-offensive of Soviet troops began near Stalingrad. At 7:30 a.m., the silence of the Don expanses was broken by volleys of 7,000 guns, which unleashed a tornado of fire and steel on the enemy. Tanks and infantry went on the offensive.
The enemy put up stubborn resistance, but under the powerful onslaught of Soviet troops abandoned one position after another.
On November 23, a significant event occurred. The advanced formations of the Southwestern Front, which captured the city of Kalach, met with units of the Stalingrad Front in the area of the village of Sovetsky. The encirclement of the enemy group at Stalingrad was completed. 22 divisions and dozens of separate units of the enemy’s 6th and 4th tank armies, up to 330 thousand soldiers and officers found themselves in an iron ring. In order to stop all attempts by the enemy to break out of the cauldron and release the encircled group, Soviet troops created internal and external encirclement fronts. Aviation forces and air defense systems on three fronts carried out an air blockade of the encircled group of Nazi troops.
A huge contribution to the defeat of the fascist German troops at Stalingrad was made by units and formations of the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps Region (commander general - artillery major E.A. Rainin). The region included 9 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 12 separate divisions, 6 anti-aircraft armored trains and other units. The 102nd Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division was operationally subordinate to the air defense area. Troops of the Stalingrad Air Defense Corps District, together with the 102nd Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division, shot down 699 aircraft during the Battle of Stalingrad from July to December. In battles with ground enemies, 173 tanks were destroyed and knocked out and about 50 artillery and mortar batteries were suppressed.
For the exemplary performance of combat missions, the air defense region was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
Hitler gave a categorical order to General Paulus to remain in his positions. At the end of November, to relieve the encircled troops, the fascist command created a strong army group "Don" of 30 divisions under the command of Field Marshal Manstein.
The Soviet Supreme High Command closely monitored developments. It temporarily suspended the operation to destroy the encircled group. The troops were given the task of repelling all enemy attempts to rescue Paulus’s army. Powerful blows were dealt to the German relief group, and its remnants were thrown back to the southwest.
The days of Paulus's army surrounded at Stalingrad were numbered. Her situation deteriorated catastrophically. Constant bombing attacks by Soviet aviation and destructive artillery fire kept the enemy under extreme tension.
The Soviet command, assessing the current situation, came to the conclusion that the time had come to implement the operation plan to eliminate the encircled enemy group. The conduct of this operation was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky. The 62nd, 64th and 57th armies of the Stalingrad Front were transferred to the front. In total, the Don Front now had seven combined arms and one air army. General N.N. was appointed as the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters at the front. Voronov. The Stalingrad Front, renamed the Southern Front, was given the task of developing an offensive on the outer front of the encirclement in the general direction of Rostov-on-Don. The start of the operation to eliminate the encircled enemy group, codenamed “Ring,” was scheduled for January 6, but then postponed to the 10th. at the beginning of the operation, the Don Front had 39 rifle divisions, 10 rifle, motorized rifle and naval brigades, 7 aviation divisions, 45 artillery and mortar regiments of the RVGK, 10 rocket artillery regiments, 5 tank brigades, 14 separate tank regiments, 17 air defense artillery regiments and a number of others parts. In total, the front troops numbered 212 thousand people, about 6.9 thousand guns and mortars, 275 tanks and 300 aircraft. The encircled group consisted of 250 thousand people, over 4.1 thousand guns and mortars, up to 300 tanks and 100 aircraft.
The liquidation of the encircled fascist troops was entrusted to the Don Front (commander General K.K. Rokossovsky). Wanting to avoid needless bloodshed, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to the enemy on January 8, 1943, demanding an end to senseless resistance. This humane proposal was rejected.
“If the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed!” The idea of Operation “Ring” was to cut the encircled divisions into isolated parts with attacks from west to east and destroy them separately. At the same time, a blow was launched from east to west, directly from the city.
On the morning of January 10, Soviet troops went on the offensive. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, by the end of January 25, the German group was squeezed into a small area of territory in the Stalingrad ruins. In two weeks, the encircled enemy lost more than 100 thousand people, lost its last airfields, but, at the request of Berlin, continued to stubbornly resist. On January 24, F. Paulus requested Hitler's permission to surrender. There was a refusal. But this was a refusal to the already doomed. On February 2, 1943, Paulus, who the day before was awarded (via radio) the rank of field marshal, and 24 other generals with the remnants of their troops (91 thousand people) surrendered. The overwhelming majority of the 91 thousand enemy soldiers captured in Stalingrad by the beginning of February had already turned into living corpses - frostbitten, sick, exhausted people. Hundreds of them died before they could reach the assembly camps.
The offensive operation in the Stalingrad direction ended in a brilliant victory for the Red Army. The gigantic battle lasted 200 days and nights. More than 3.6 million people were drawn into it. As a result, the fascist bloc lost up to 800 thousand people (including 461.1 thousand irrevocably), a huge amount of weapons and military equipment; The Red Army lost about 1,130 thousand soldiers and officers, of which 451.2 thousand were irretrievable losses).
The historic victory at Stalingrad brought enormous military-political and military-strategic results. The Red Army, having seized the strategic initiative, launched a general offensive from Leningrad to the foothills of the Caucasus, beginning the mass expulsion of the enemy from the occupied territory of the USSR.
The defeat and huge losses of the fascist German army sharply worsened the military-political and economic situation of Germany, putting it before the beginning of a deep crisis. As General G. Guderian testified, the defeat at Stalingrad and everything connected with it “led to a severe crisis, a sharp decline in morale among the troops and among the population. The military disaster was accompanied by defeat in the field of foreign and domestic policy.”
The day of February 2, 1943, considered the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, is celebrated as the day of military glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad.
The Motherland highly appreciated the outstanding feat of the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad: 44 units and formations were given honorary names - Stalingrad, 55 formations were awarded military orders, 183 units, formations and formations were transformed into guards. Tens of thousands of soldiers and officers were awarded government awards, and 112 of the most distinguished were awarded the Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union. In order to perpetuate the victory at Stalingrad. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 22, 1942, “For the defense of Stalingrad,” more than 700 thousand participants in the battle were awarded.
In November 1943, a conference of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain - was held in Tehran, at which the final decision was made to open a second front in Europe in May 1944.
US President F. Roosevelt called the victory epic. In his letter to the city of Stalingrad, he noted that victory will forever inspire the hearts of all free people.
W. Churchel called the victory at Stalingrad amazing, and the King of Great Britain sent a sword with the inscription: “To the citizens of Stalingrad, strong as steel, from King George V as a sign of deep respect for the British people.”
The victory on the Volga received wide international recognition. In France alone, more than 30 city squares and streets were named “Stalingrad.” General Pouillade, former commander of the Normandy-Niemen squadron, wrote about the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad: “...My happiness, the happiness of my life, the happiness of my comrades in arms from Normandy - Neman" is that we fought with Red Army pilots.
In memory of these battles and in memory of all who died defending Stalingrad and the freedom of mankind, we have no right to forget anything.” Recently, new generations of Soviet people have grown up who sacredly honor the memory of the heroic defenders of the Volga stronghold - Stalingrad.
In 1961, the city was renamed Volgograd. In 1965, on the anniversary of the 20th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the hero city was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
To mark the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Wehrmacht troops on the Volga line, the construction of the majestic Panorama of the Battle of Stalingrad was completed.
On October 15, 1967, the memorial at the main height of Russia was opened. The torch with the Eternal Flame was ordered to be delivered to the legendary defenders of the city, twice Hero of the Soviet Union pilot Vasily Efremov, Hero of the Soviet Union Konstantin Nedorubov and defender of the house Pavlov Ivan Afanasyev. The sacred memory of the patriots who fought in battles for their Motherland will live for centuries.
The outstanding victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad is a victory for the great Soviet people. This historic victory demonstrated the growing power of the socialist state and its Armed Forces. This victory characterizes the increased level of Soviet military art, a clear indicator of the strategic leadership of the armed struggle. And one of the main factors of victory is the high level of combat skill of commanders and fighters and the extraordinary stamina and high morale of the troops in the fight against the Nazi invaders.
